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EDITOR’S NOTE

T

he special issue begins with Starita’s description of the first US case to
give legal recognition to the first Americans as individuals. Although
many treaties had been signed (and resigned) with tribes across the
nation, the indigenous residents were not considered persons under US law.
The case of Standing Bear changed how the courts were to deal with Native
American issues, though the legal treatment of Native Americans continues to
evolve in American law to this day.
Fletcher examines state and federal court recognition of tribal court criminal convictions. He provides an overview of the constitutional landscape, and
summarizes the key cases and developments as the contours of state and tribal
cooperation in criminal enforcement matters continue to unfold. He points
out particular challenges and issues related to how both state and federal
courts handle prior tribal court convictions.
Hanan and Levit provide perspectives on
how jurisdiction is allocated between tribal
and state courts in Wisconsin. They both were
involved in litigation that has offered significant direction on how Wisconsin deals with
tribal and state jurisdictional disputes. Their
experiences might shed light for other courts
confronting inter-jurisdictional matters.
Fort provides an overview of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, one of the most frequently
litigated federal statutes in Indian law, and one
which numerous states courts have had to
grapple with. ICWA governs custody proceedings for Native American children, and provides guidance on where tribes
have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings. Fort provides an overview of how
state courts have interpreted different provisions of ICWA in handling custody cases, adaptation of ICWA as either state law or court rule, and full faith
and credit in non-ICWA situations.
Indian law is commonly perceived as a field fraught with historical anachronisms, complex doctrines, and rich variation. Carter provides a succinct
overview of research resources and methods to assist those in the field. She provides an outline of basic authorities, treaties, statutes, and executive and
administrative materials helpful to new or veteran judges and practitioners.
Rosser’s essay provides commentary on subtext which is often—though
not always—present in Indian vs. non-Indian disputes: presumptions about
harm to property value. He discusses and confronts these assumptions, and
offers thoughts for judges faced with adjudicating such cases.
Organick and Kowalski’s essay discuss the importance of tribal, state, and
federal cooperation within an historical and contemporary context. They urge
courts to treat questions of state and tribal cooperation with the recognition
that tribal sovereignty itself may be at stake.
—Tarik Abdel-Monem & Alan Tomkins
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President’s Column
Tam Schumann

The overwhelming concern shared by all courts in the
United States today is the financial impact on the courts from
these difficult economic times. In my role as president of AJA,
I have attended meetings of the Conferences of the Chief
Justices, the Conference of State Court Administrators, and the
National Association for Court Management. All of these entities have addressed the problems of running a court with less
available resources.
I would like to share the current approach California has
taken in an area that directly affects its judiciary—the voluntary waiver of a portion of our salary to prevent court-employee
layoffs. My understanding is that several other states have considered this approach. I hope by sharing the
California experience and research that it will
assist you if your state entertains a similar idea.
In California, judicial salaries are set by the
legislature. By statute, our salaries cannot be
reduced without our consent or without going
through the normal legislative procedure regarding the setting of salaries. In short, even though
we have a fiscal crisis, any immediate reduction
in our pay must be done voluntarily. The notion
of the judiciary waiving a portion of our salary
arose when the California Administrative Office
of the Courts decided that to cut costs and preserve jobs, courts in California would be closed one day out of
each month. On those closed days, our employees would be
considered as being on furlough and would be unpaid. The
feeling was that as leaders of our courts, we should also voluntarily reduce our pay so that all court employees, regardless of
whether they wear a black robe or not, would take the same
percentage cut in pay. That percentage equals 4.62% of our
salary. Needless to say (and as we are all basically lawyers),
there were a lot of questions:
1. Does the 1-day court closure require legislation?
Yes. Legislation was required to make the one-day closure a
legal holiday so that any time requirements for criminal and
civil cases would not be impacted. See Cal. Gov’t Code §
68106(b) (adopted effective July 28, 2009).
2. Does the waiver of a portion of our judicial salary have
to be legislated?
Yes. Legislation was required to ensure that even though we
will not be working several days in the fiscal year, we would
still be considered as serving full-time so that calculation of
our retirement benefits, supplemental-judicial benefits, or
any other job-related benefits would not be impacted . See
Cal. Gov’t Code § 68106(b)(3).
3. Procedurally, how do we go about making the waiver?
A form was filled out and sent to the AOC. The waiver can

4.

5.

8.

9.

be month-to-month, quarterly, annually, or any other
period, but not less than a month.
Do we still work on the closed day?
Judges who participate in the waiver program are not
required to work. Those who do not participate would have
to consult with their presiding judges to determine whether
they are to be at the courthouse on closure days.
If we work on closure days, are we covered by liability
insurance and absolute immunity?
Yes. California’s liability-insurance program for judges covers all judicial acts regardless of when performed.
6. What are the tax consequences of the
voluntary waiver?
The informal information provided by the
IRS has been that the waived salary would
not be included in the gross income for taxation purposes. Tax Court holdings have
been that where an employer and employee
agree to a reduction of salary, the reduction
amount is not included in the gross-income
amount.
7. Where will the waived monies go?
They will not go to the specific court to
which the judge making the waiver is a member. The funds instead go to the state’s fund
for allocation to all trial courts.
Is there a way a judge can make a donation to his or her
own court?
Yes, through a charitable contribution. For tax purposes, the
contribution will be considered to have been made from net
income but can be made in any amount for any period of
time.
Will there be a public record of who has exercised the
voluntary waiver or made a charitable donation?
Yes, the names will be made available upon request, including from the media. (And stating the obvious, names of
those who do not are clearly discoverable by the mere fact
of omission.)

The bottom line is that each judge has to make the decision
as to whether he or she will participate or not. This is not a clear
decision as such considerations as morale of court staff and
exposure to an election challenge must be weighed and balanced
by our own financial hardship. The California court-closure program began Wednesday, September 16, and will continue on the
third Wednesday of each month through June 2010.
I know we would welcome any information from our membership as to how their states have approached the running of
their courts in this time of fiscal difficulties.
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The Case of Standing Bear:
Establishing Personhood under the Law
Joe Starita

t ten o’clock on the morning of May 1, 1879, in Omaha,
Nebraska, U.S. District Court Judge Elmer Dundy’s
gavel smacked against a wooden bench and the trial of
Ma-chu-nah-zha v. George Crook1 was officially underway.
Delayed by heavy spring rains and widespread flooding, the
judge had just arrived from Lincoln the night before, but now
he was settled at the bench and he asked the attorneys representing Standing Bear to call their first witness.
Willie W. Hamilton, the son of the missionary on the
Omaha Reservation, approached the stand. Hamilton, 22, had
lived on the reservation for 12 years, working at the agency
store for the past six. He spoke both Omaha and Ponca fluently
and had first met the prisoners when they arrived on Omaha
Reservation land two months earlier. The younger of Standing
Bear’s two attorneys, John Lee Webster, began the questioning,
asking the witness to describe the condition of the prisoners.
When the prisoners first arrived on the morning of March
4, Hamilton testified, they were in bad shape. Those who had
them wore white man’s clothes. They lived as families, as man
and wife, with their children – two of whom were orphans.
What did they do after they arrived? Attorney Webster
asked.
All the healthy ones began to break ground and sow crops,
mostly wheat, the witness replied.
Did any of the prisoners put in a crop for themselves?
Buffalo Chip had put in four or five acres of wheat on land
the Omaha gave him.
On that Sunday, the attorney asked, were the prisoners resting on the Sabbath or working?
The judge: “Is that necessary?”
The attorney: “The theory of this government is to
Christianize these Indians, I believe.”
The witness: “It is about the same as it is with white men,
some do, and some do not.”
When his opponent finished, Genio Lambertson had some
questions for the witness on behalf of the government and his
client, General Crook. Young and brash, Lambertson was trying his first case as the newly minted district attorney.
When the prisoners were on the Omaha Reservation,
Lambertson asked, who was their chief?
Standing Bear was the head chief, the witness replied.
“Did they obey his orders?”
“Yes, sir.”
The district attorney asked if they depended on the government for their wagons, clothes and blankets.

A

Yes, for the most part, the witness said.
The young agency store clerk left the stand and Lieutenant
Carpenter, the arresting officer, was sworn in as the second
witness. Standing Bear’s attorney again focused on dress and
work habits.
When you arrested the prisoners, he asked, were they wearing citizens’ clothing?
The lieutenant said the majority of the men were – only two
wore blankets and leggings. And two of the sick Indians had
recently said they wanted to go to work.
The general’s lawyer approached, focusing again on loyalty
to the chiefs.
“How many chiefs are there?” Lambertson asked.
The judge: “Why is that material?”
The district attorney: “To show that these Indians have their
chiefs, to whom they profess allegiance.”
With that, the trial recessed for lunch, resuming again at 2
p.m. When the plaintiffs announced the name of their third
witness, the government lawyer jumped to his feet.
“Does this court think an Indian is a competent witness?”
Lambertson asked.
“They are competent for every purpose in both civil and
criminal courts,” the judge replied. “The law makes no distinction on account of race, color, or previous condition.”
Standing Bear approached the bench. He took the oath and
the store clerk, Hamilton, was sworn in as interpreter. Webster
asked the questions and, sentence by sentence, the store clerk
translated the testimony from Ponca to English.
How had things been for them on their old reservation on
the Niobrara? Webster asked.
“We lived well,” Standing Bear said. “I had my own land,
and raised enough so I could get along nicely. My children
were going to school, we had a good school, and everything
going nicely.”
Were they becoming civilized up on the Niobrara?
“He says he wants to work, and become like a white man,
and that he has tried his best.”
How were things in the Warm Country?
“I couldn’t plow, I couldn’t sow any wheat, and we all got
sick, and couldn’t do anything….Instead of our tribe becoming
prosperous, they died off every day during the time. From the
time I went down there until I left, 158 of us died.”
The witness looked up at the judge.
“I thought to myself, God wants me to live, and I think if I
come back to my old reservation he will let me live. I got as far

Authors’ Note: This article is excerpted from JOE STARITA, “I AM A
MAN:” CHIEF STANDING BEAR’S JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE (Chapter 6, “The
Color of Blood”) (2008), reprinted with permission of the publisher,
St. Martin’s Press.

Footnotes
1. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F.Cas. 695
(C.C.D.Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891).
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as the Omahas, and they brought me down here,” he said, his
voice getting louder and stronger. “What I have done? I am
brought here, but what have I done? I don’t know.”
Standing Bear got up from his chair and began to gesture,
speaking louder to the faces staring back from the sides, the
back and the benches. “It seems as though I haven’t a place in
the world, no place to go, and no home to go to, but when I
see your faces here, I think some of you are trying to help me,
so that I can get a place sometime to live in, and when it comes
my time to die, to die peacefully and happy.”
The judge told the interpreter to tell the witness not to get
too excited, to stay calm. Standing Bear sat back down. His
lawyer turned to the interpreter.
“Ask him how many of his children died in the Indian
Territory before he came away?”
“He says two died down there. He says his son could talk
English and write, and was a great help to him…and whenever
he thinks of it, it makes him feel bad.”
Does he still consider himself the chief of his people?
“He says he didn’t consider himself a chief…He says he felt
himself to be as poor as the rest of them.”
The general’s lawyer approached the witness. He told the
interpreter to ask if he was the chief of those Ponca now in the
north or any of those in the Territory?
“He says, I was not the head man; I don’t consider myself
any better than they are.”
The district attorney wanted to know if the government furnished them with wagons and farming tools.
“He says they got some wagons and some mowing
machines.”
Did they escape from the Territory in government-issued
wagons?
Two were government-issued. The third – a light spring
wagon – he bought himself.
The district attorney wanted to know why he left the Indian
Territory.
“He says he wanted to go on his own land, that had always
been his own land…that his son when he died made him
promise if ever he went back there that he would take his
bones there and bury him, and that he has got his bones in a
box, and that if ever he goes there he will bury his bones there;
that there is where he wants to live the rest of his life, and that
there is where he wants to be buried.”
Does he want to go back to the Niobrara and live as he did
before?
“He says he might go there and work until he was blind, but
that would not change his color; that he would be an Indian in
color, but he wants to go and work and become a citizen.”
When Standing Bear finished, his lawyers rested their case.
The government offered no witnesses and no testimony and
though it had been a long day, the judge instructed the lawyers
to begin their closing arguments. Webster started to summarize the important points on behalf of Standing Bear and the
Ponca, but he soon informed the judge he was too sick to continue and so the closings were postponed until ten the next
morning.
As the first day’s testimony ended, as the boisterous throng
began to file out of the courthouse, it was clear to legal
observers that the complexities of the case had winnowed

down to one essential issue:
[H]is son when he
Had the Ponca prisoners gendied made him
uinely expatriated themselves
from their tribal past and
promise... he
become firmly lodged on civiwould take his
lization’s path? If so, then they
bones there and
were entitled to the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment
bury him, and
and the government had no
that he has got
business trying to deprive
his bones in a
them of life, liberty and property. If not, then they were gov- box, and... he will
ernment wards who had illebury his bones
gally left their reservation and
there....
it was the military’s duty to
return them to the Indian
Territory.
Promptly at ten the next morning, the younger lawyer,
Webster, still a bit under the weather, began to lay out his case
in support of the Indian prisoners. First of all, he told the
judge, the Omaha legally owned their reservation and, as such,
had every right to share the land with their Ponca friends and
relatives. Standing Bear and the Ponca did not want the government’s help. They simply wanted their own land and the
chance to work it and become self-supporting. They cannot, he
stressed, be moved “at the whim and pleasure of the commissioner at Washington” who does not have “the power to move
the Indians when and where he pleases.” In fact, the government’s behavior in this case, he told the judge, openly defies
the philosophy of the nation’s third President, who, in a letter
to an Indian chief in 1803, had said, “these lands can never go
from you but when you wish to sell.” Thomas Jefferson also
was emphatic in believing Indian nations were “entirely independent and the government could in no way interfere with
their internal relations.” So how could the government now
interfere with business between the Omaha and Ponca?
Although these tribes are often called barbarous, the Omaha
and Ponca “are not savages or wanderers. They cultivate the
soil, live in houses, and support themselves.”
For three and half hours, Webster roamed far and wide
across the oratorical landscape, alternately quoting William
Cullen Bryant, Alexis de Tocqueville and Frederick Douglass
to underscore his legal arguments. After a rugged winter march
of 60 days, he told the court, the prisoners had finally arrived
at the home of the “savage” Omaha. And why had they
endured such a harsh journey? Because they had been dumped
in a place where malaria was “floating like a cloud over the
land,” where, in less than two years, their numbers had
dropped from 780 to 580 – a greater mortality rate than that of
Union soldiers during the Civil War, greater than the death
rate at the infamous Andersonville prison.
But, mostly, Webster began to bear down on the issue that
had now taken center stage. If Standing Bear and the Ponca
had broken away from the rest of the tribe, he argued, if they
had declared their independence and commitment to a new
way of life, then they had come out from under the government’s yoke. Then they had the right to return to the lands they
owned, or to share the Omaha land, and the government had
no legal right to restrain, detain or return them. After all,
Court Review - Volume 45 5

wasn’t that the point of the
Fourteenth Amendment – to
promote and protect individual rights and liberties? That
the Indian prisoners qualified
for its protection, he told the
judge, there could be no
doubt. As proof, he cited an
1870 U.S. Senate report
specifically stating that when
tribal relations are dissolved,
the Fourteenth Amendment
applies. And when the amendment applies, it made “an Indian
who was born in this country and who did not owe allegiance
to any other form of government, a citizen beyond all dispute.”
To drive home his point, Webster quoted directly from the
amendment: all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of the United States and cannot be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. And so
if these prisoners, born on American soil, were not citizens,
then what were they? “Are they wild animals, deer to be chased
by every hound?”
In the end, he said, it came down to a matter of fundamental civil rights, of basic human liberties, and the prisoners were
now asking for the court’s help. It was like the slave Douglass
had once said: “A man belongs to himself. His hands are his
own, his feet are his own, his body is his own, and they will
remain his until you storm the citadel of heaven and wrest
from the bosom of God man’s title deed to himself.”
Webster spoke until three o’clock and after he finished, the
young district attorney approached the bench on behalf of the
defendant, General Crook. He began with an appreciative tribute to his opponents, Webster and A.J. Poppleton, thanking
them for “their generosity in coming to the assistance of these
poor people, prisoners and friendless in a strange land.” And
then, for the next three hours, Lambertson laid out the case for
the government of the United States, offering a variety of reasons and legal arguments underscoring why Standing Bear and
the Ponca ended up in the barracks at Fort Omaha and why
they should be returned to their reservation in Indian Territory.
The 1871 federal law forbidding any more treaties with Indian
tribes, he told the judge, absolved the government from needing Ponca consent to move them from their Niobrara homeland to the Territory. He also suggested U.S. laws did not apply
to Indian tribes. To be included, Indians had to be either foreign subjects or citizens – and the Ponca were neither. Nor
were these tribes independent nations. They were dependent
communities, government wards relying upon the United
States for their survival. Nowhere in the law of the land, he
said, could he find any legal precedent allowing an Indian to
file suit in a federal court. And he recounted the history of
Indian atrocities against innocent white citizens, implying they
were a people too savage to be given legal rights.
But mostly, again and again, his arguments circled back to
one central theme, the foundation of his case: The Indian – as
far as the law was concerned – was neither a citizen nor a per-

son, and so he could not bring a suit of any kind against the
government of the United States. As a result, the court had
grievously erred in granting Standing Bear a hearing for a writ
of habeas corpus and then awarding him the legal opportunity
to sue an Army general. Lambertson maintained this was a
legal right available only to American citizens. And since he
was not a citizen, the court had no right to issue the writ.
Furthermore, he argued, the Ponca had never abandoned their
traditional ways. They retained tribal ties, an allegiance to their
chief and depended on the government for their survival. So,
clearly, they were not entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.
To support his main argument – that only American citizens
had access to U.S. courts – the district attorney relied a good
deal on a decision the nation’s highest court had reached 22
years earlier, a case involving a black man who had also wanted
his freedom.2
Dred Scott, born a slave in Virginia around 1800, had
bounced around as the property of several white masters, traveling from the slave states of Virginia, Alabama and Missouri to
the free state of Illinois and the free federal territory of
Wisconsin. Back in St. Louis in 1843, after his master’s widow
hired him out to an Army captain, Scott decided he wanted a
different way of life. So he offered the widow $300 for his and
his wife’s freedom. When she refused, he eventually asked the
courts, with the help of anti-slavery lawyers, to set him free –
a test case his lawyers and supporters hoped would lead to the
freedom of all slaves.
In 1857, after a decade of appeals and court reversals, his
case finally landed in the United States Supreme Court. In a 72 vote on March 6, the high court settled the matter: Anyone
of African ancestry – slaves and those set free by their masters
– could never become a U.S. citizen and therefore they could
not sue in federal court. Since Scott was black, he was not a
citizen and so he could not sue for his freedom – or anything
else – in federal court. Slaves were the private property of their
owners, the majority ruled, and the court could not deprive
owners of their property. To do so would violate the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against the government seizing property from an owner “without due process of the law.”
So, according to the court, Scott would remain a slave. The
sons of his first master had been his friends since childhood,
and they helped pay Scott’s legal bills throughout the long
court fight. Not long after the Supreme Court decision, Scott
and his wife were returned to his boyhood friends, who bought
them and then set them free. About a year later, Dred Scott
died of tuberculosis.
Although each justice had written a separate opinion in the
case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney issued the court’s majority
opinion. A loyal advocate of slavery, he said a Negro was not
entitled to the legal rights of a U.S. citizen and cited the right
to sue in federal court as an example. Furthermore, Taney concluded, Negroes had “no rights which the white man was
bound to respect.”3
In the spring of 1879, on the third floor of the federal courthouse, District Attorney Lambertson did not want the present

2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

3. Id. at 407.

To support his
main argument –
that only American
citizens had access
to U.S. courts – the
district attorney
relied [on the Dred
Scott decision].
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court to forget its past. In this case, he said in his concluding
remarks, Judge Taney’s decision remained the guiding legal
principle upon which a decision must now be based: So if a
Negro did not have access to federal court, he told the judge,
then surely an Indian didn’t either. When the district attorney
finished at six o’clock, the judge ordered a dinner recess. The
last summary would begin in an hour.
All along, he had been scheduled to have the final say, and
so on the warm, early May evening after the dinner break, the
dean of the state’s legal community made his way to the front
of the courtroom. For the next three hours, Andrew Jackson
Poppleton fused history and philosophy, religion and politics,
humanity, literature and the law – isolating each of the district
attorney’s arguments with a focused rebuttal.
No Ponca consent needed?
The district attorney, he told the court, had cited the 1871
resolution banning further treaties as the government’s justification for removing the Ponca without their permission. But
he neglected to mention that the law was not retroactive. In
other words, the language of the original treaty still applied –
the government had needed Ponca consent.
U.S. laws don’t extend to Indian tribes?
Then why, Poppleton asked, had the government entered
into numerous treaties with the Indian people – treaties ratified
by Congress obligating the government to honor Indian lands,
protect them and provide food, clothing and shelter. The government, he told the judge, can’t have it both ways. “When a
great nation of forty millions of people, wielding the purse and
the sword, and possessing all the arts of civilization, breaks
faith with the feeble remnants of humanity which all its life has
had the sunlight of civilization excluded from its view, it is
simply infamous.”
The Indian – as neither citizen nor foreign subject – has no
rights?
If the government no longer sees them as tribes or Indian
nations, he asked, then what are they? What is their status?
“Are we to say that the Ethiopian, the Malay, the Chinaman,
the Frenchman and every nationality upon the globe without
regard to race, color or creed, may come here and become a
part of this great government, while the primitive possessors of
this soil…are alone barred from the right to become citizens?”
He did not believe, he said, that this government – his government – would do such a thing. “I have been accustomed to
believe that I lived under a beneficent government. I have
believed it to be my duty to thank God I was born under the
shield and protection of this North America Republic – which
has solved so many problems and which in God’s good time we
hope will solve so many more – but is it possible that this great
government, standing here dealing with this feeble remnant of
a once powerful nation, claims the right to place them in a condition which is to them worse than slaves, without a syllable of
law; without a syllable of contract or treaty? I don’t believe, if
your honor please, that the courts will allow this; that they will
agree to the proposition that these people are wild beasts; that
they have no status in the courts. If it be true that these Indians
have no souls to save, the churches had better leave them
alone; had better not try to induce them to lead a civilized life
if they have no rights, not even the right to that salvation
which has been proclaimed as free to all.”
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hands in holy horror and call
them savages.”
And were they really dependent government wards?
The prisoners, he told the court, had established families
and communities throughout their Niobrara homeland. They
had become skilled farmers and peaceful neighbors who went
to church and sent their children to school. And just as they
were well on the way down civilization’s path, he said, the government illegally pulled them from lands they legally owned
and shipped them to strange, barren ones where they died in
droves. Now, they had severed their tribal ties and ancient allegiances and once again wanted to take up a civilized life. “I am
lacking in the power to show to this court what, to me,”
Poppleton said, “is as clear as the daylight – that is, to show
that if these Indians are honestly desirous of adopting the ways
of civilization and becoming civilized men; of pursuing the
habits and industries characteristic of the civilization of the
present age, there is no power, human or divine, that has a
right to interpose a barrier between them and the goal to which
they seek to march.”
Poppleton had spoken for close to three hours, and as he
began to wind down, after he had confronted each of the government’s arguments, he slowly began to drive a legal wedge
between the slave of yesterday and the Indian who sat before
them. Dred Scott, he said, was strictly a citizenship issue. The
only question the case resolved was that since Scott was not a
citizen of Missouri, he could not sue in federal court. It had
also confirmed, the lawyer noted, that a slave at that time in
American history had no civil rights. But in his haste to justify
slavery, Chief Justice Taney had strayed far from the legal question at hand and now – twenty-two years later – his ruling was
out of date. In the spring of 1879, there were no slaves. The
Fourteenth Amendment had seen to that. Hence this case now
before the court was not specifically about citizenship at all. It
was simply about who had a legal right to a writ of habeas corpus – a straightforward request compelling the government to
justify why it had arrested and detained the prisoners. And the
law on this particular point, he told the judge, was quite clear.
It said nothing about being a citizen. It said only that “any person or party” had the legal right to apply for a writ.
So there was really but one question, and one question only,
before the court: Was Standing Bear a person? To deny his legal
right to the writ, he said, the court would have to conclude
that he and the other Ponca prisoners were not people. They
were not human beings.
“And who will undertake that?” Poppleton asked. “Why, I
think the most touching thing I have heard in courts of justice
or elsewhere for years was the story this old man told on the
stand yesterday of the son who had gone with him to the
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Indian Territory, whose education he had care for; whom he
had nurtured through the years
of boyhood and sent to school in
the belief that that boy would be
a link between him and that civilization to which he aspired;
that he would protect him from
the wiles of agents; that there
would be one person on the
wide earth, the issue of his own
loins, who would stand between
him and the whites, whom he
knew from experience were trying to over-reach him – he said
to that boy as his eyes were closing in death in a foreign country that he would take his bones
to his old home on the Running Water, and bury him there,
where he was born.”
The lawyer paused and turned, glancing at Standing Bear.
“That man not a human being? Who of us all would have
done it? Look around this city and State and find, if you can,
the man who has gathered up the ashes of his dead, wandered
for sixty days through a strange country without guide or compass, aided by the sun and stars only, that the bones of that kindred may be buried in the land of their birth. No! It is a libel
upon religion; it is a libel upon missionaries who sacrifice so
much and risk their lives in order to take to these Indians that
gospel which Christ proclaimed to all the wide earth, to say
that these are not human beings.”
It was well after nine o’clock, almost twelve hours since the
day’s session began. The three lawyers had spoken for more
than nine hours and the large crowd of prominent citizens, of
clergy and church faithful, judges and lawyers and newsmen,
the general’s large staff decked in military uniforms and their
wives milled about after Poppleton finished his closing argument, heading for the door.
Before the crowd began to file out, the judge made an
announcement. Although the trial now had officially ended
and the legal proceedings were finished, one last speaker, he
said, had asked permission to address the court. He supposed
it was the first time in the nation’s history such a request had
been made, but he had decided to grant it and he had earlier
informed all the lawyers of his intention to do so. The crowd
settled back down and turned its attention to the front of the
courtroom.
They saw him rising slowly from his seat, and they could
see the eagle feather in the braided hair wrapped in otter fur,
the bold blue shirt trimmed in red cloth, the blue flannel leggings and deer-skin moccasins, the red and blue blanket, the
Thomas Jefferson medallion, the necklace of bear claws. When
he got to the front, he stopped and faced the audience and
extended his right hand, holding it still for a long time. After a
while, it is said, he turned to the bench and began to speak in
a low voice, his words conveyed to the judge and the large
crowd by the interpreter.
“That hand is not the color of yours, but if I pierce it, I shall
feel pain. If you pierce your hand, you also feel pain. The blood
that will flow from mine will be of the same color as yours. I
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am a man. The same God made us both.”
Then he turned and faced the audience, pausing for a
moment, staring in silence out a courtroom window, describing after a time what he saw when he looked outside.
“I seem to stand on the bank of a river. My wife and little
girl are beside me. In front the river is wide and impassable.”
He sees there are steep cliffs all around, the waters rapidly rising. In desperation, he scans the cliffs and finally spots a steep,
rocky path to safety. “I turn to my wife and child with a shout
that we are saved. We will return to the Swift Running Water
that pours down between the green islands. There are the
graves of my fathers.”
So they hurriedly climb the path, getting closer and closer
to safety, the waters rushing in behind them. “But a man bars
the passage…If he says that I cannot pass, I cannot. The long
struggle will have been in vain. My wife and child and I must
return and sink beneath the flood. We are weak and faint and
sick. I cannot fight.” He stopped and turned, facing the judge,
speaking softly.
“You are that man.”
In the crowded courtroom, no one spoke or moved for several moments. After a while, a few women could be heard crying in the back and some of the people up closer could see that
the frontier judge had temporarily lost his composure and that
the general, too, was leaning forward on the table, his hands
covering his face. Soon, some people began to clap and a number of others started cheering and then the general got up from
his chair and went over and shook Standing Bear’s hand and
before long, a number of others did the same.
The bailiffs asked for order and when it finally grew quiet
again, the judge said he would take the case under advisement
and issue his decision in a few days. Then he adjourned the
court shortly after ten o’clock on a warm spring evening on the
second of May, 1879.
***
In his office in the building that dominated the corner of
Fifteenth and Dodge streets, one floor below the large courtroom, the judge would have much to ponder in the days ahead.
He was aware that he was now in a position to bring some clarity to the long-muddled picture of exactly where the American
Indian stood upon the nation’s legal landscape. He also knew
that the location had eluded several generations of his judicial
colleagues and that neither the country’s legislative nor its
executive branch had been much help. And he knew, too, that
he would be harshly criticized – from anxious white settlers
and a powerful military on one side to newspapers, clergy and
a burgeoning East Coast Indian Reform movement on the
other – no matter which way he ruled. Still, he knew the legal
issues that had landed on his desk were long overdue, and he
intended to take his time in sorting through the important
questions they raised.
Were these Indian prisoners, as the young district attorney
maintained, still loyal to their tribe and chief? Were they
dependent government wards who had illegally fled their
assigned reservation and must now be returned – as the law
required – to the Indian Territory? Were they neither citizens
nor foreign subjects in the eyes of the law and therefore ineli-

gible to file a suit of any kind against the government? Were
these Indians then, by definition, not entitled to the same constitutional protection, civil rights and legal privileges enjoyed
by all other American citizens?
Or were they, as the dean of the state’s legal profession contended, a group of people who had broken from their past and
genuinely sought a civilized future for themselves and their
children? Indians who farmed, went to church, sent their children to school and, much like Dred Scott had once done, were
now asking the court to set them free. Indians whom the government had no legal right to arrest and detain and return to
the Territory. Indians who were people – human beings within
the meaning of the law – who had a legal right to sue the government and were entitled to the full protection and provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
So, sitting in his office in the federal courthouse, the judge
knew the case had its share of complex questions and broad
legal issues to sort through – not the least of which was a
meticulous examination of the relevancy of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Eleven years earlier, when Congress passed the
landmark legislation, debate by and large had focused on
slaves becoming free men and women, citizens who would
now join the ranks of those born or naturalized in the United
States. At one point, the Congressional debate shifted to
whether Indians who had abandoned tribal life, were taxed and
had set off on a domestic course should also be considered
citizens. By a 30 to 10 vote, however, the Senate killed an
amendment that would have included citizenship rights for
those Indians.
But what did that now mean for the twenty-six Ponca prisoners holed up in Fort Omaha during the spring of 1879? Did
the government still have the legal right to tell them when to
move? Where to live? How to live? And what if they didn’t
want to? What if they wanted to find a better way? And if the
government tried to stop them, had they been illegally
deprived of life, liberty and property? In the early part of May,
it was not unusual to see the lights burning late into the night
in the office on the second floor of the large building on the
corner of Fifteenth and Dodge.
On the morning of May 12, 1879, ten days after hearing
about the rising flood waters and the path to safety, about the
color of blood, Judge Elmer Dundy delivered his decision in a
lengthy written opinion to the Indian prisoners, the Army general and their lawyers.
“During the 15 years in which I have been engaged in
administering the laws of my country,” he began, “I have never
been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so
strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration.
On the one side we have a few of the remnants of a once
numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered and generally despised race. On the other, we have the
representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened,
and most Christianized nations of modern times. On the one
side we have the representatives of this wasted race coming
into this national tribunal of ours asking for justice and liberty
to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization and to pursue
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If sympathy were the only issue before the court, the judge
said, the prisoners would have been freed the moment closing
arguments ended. But in a nation where law determines liberty,
sympathy alone cannot guide the courts. Instead, fundamental
legal principles must decide this case. And if it cannot be determined that the prisoners are entitled to constitutional protection, they must be returned to Indian Territory, which they left
without government consent.
The judge then broke down each of the government’s legal
arguments and addressed them one by one.
First of all, the government had argued, there was the problem of jurisdiction. Put simply, the court had overstepped its
legal boundaries in allowing this case to see the light of day.
The judge, in other words, had no legal right to compel the
government to justify its arrest of the Indian prisoners because
an Indian has no legal right to sue in federal court.
Furthermore, since no Indian had ever been allowed to sue for
a federal writ of habeas corpus, there was no legal precedent to
let the case proceed.
In his written opinion, Judge Dundy labeled this argument
a “non sequitur.”4 Conceding he didn’t know of a similar case,
Dundy said it was nevertheless illogical to assume that just
because no Indian had ever sought a writ of habeas corpus
before that he could never seek one. The court also had jurisdiction in this specific case, the judge noted, because Standing
Bear and the Ponca had been restrained of their liberty in violation of an earlier treaty provision. When that occurs, it is the
federal courts – and only the federal courts – that can determine if the prisoners’ constitutional rights have been violated.
It would be “a sad commentary on the justice and impartiality
of our laws, to hold that Indians, though natives of our own
country, cannot test the validity of an alleged illegal imprisonment,” the judge wrote.
Dundy next addressed the question of who could legally
apply for the writ. Throughout the trial, the government had
steadfastly argued that only citizens could do so. And since
Indians were not citizens, they could not sue and thus the

4. Standing Bear, 25 F.Cas. at 697.
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court had grievously erred in
granting Standing Bar and the
Ponca that legal privilege.
But the law, Judge Dundy
said, clearly states “persons”
or “parties” can do this – it
says nothing about citizens or
citizenship being a requirement. And the most natural
and reasonable way to define
a “person,” the judge wrote,
is simply to consult a dictionary. “Webster describes a
person as ‘a living soul; a self
conscious being; a moral
agent; especially a living human being; a man, woman or child;
an individual of the human race.’”5 This, he said, “is comprehensive enough, it would seem, to include even an Indian.”6
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the judge then
turned to the trial’s key issue: Did Standing Bear and the Ponca
have the right to expatriate themselves from the tribe, sever
their tribal allegiance and pursue a more independent and civilized life? To answer that question, the judge began by reviewing the events and forces that had set in motion the Ponca’s
long flight north from the Warm Country.
“The love of home and native land was strong enough in the
minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril to
return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones
of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land
they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved
and protected, and formed a part of what was to them a melancholy procession homeward. Such instances of parental affection, and such love of home and native land may be heathen in
origin, but it seems to me that they are not unlike Christian in
principle.”7
This, the judge noted, demonstrated Standing Bear and the
Ponca had done all they could to terminate their tribal allegiance and underscored their desire to become independent
farmers intent on adopting the ways of civilization. So did the
Ponca prisoners detained at Fort Omaha have a legal right to
expatriate themselves? Although there had been decades of
heated discussions on the right of expatriation, those arguments had been silenced for eleven years now, the judge said.
They were silenced on July 27, 1868, when a Congressional act
declared “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent
right of all people, indisputable to the enjoyment of the rights
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”8 It was a short
step then for the judge to render his decision: An Indian “possesses the clear and God-given right to withdraw from his tribe
and forever live away from it, as though it had no further existence.”9
Finally, there was the matter of whether the government

had the legal right to remove Standing Bear and the Ponca from
the Omaha Reservation and send them back to Indian
Territory. A careful reading of the law, Dundy wrote, shows no
such power exists. The government could not arbitrarily round
up Indians who had severed their tribal ties and simply move
them whenever and wherever it wanted. He did note the government could legally remove the Ponca from the Omaha
Reservation if they were deemed “detrimental to the peace and
welfare” of the reservation.10 But in such cases, the law
required they must be turned over to civilian – not military –
authorities. And that had not happened in the Ponca case. The
judge said he had looked, and looked carefully, but had found
no congressional act or treaty provision that gave the government the power to send the Ponca “back to the Indian
Territory to remain and die in that country against their will.”11
Judge Dundy wrapped up his lengthy written opinion with
a five-point summary that concisely pulled together the essential decisions he had reached. First, he concluded, “an Indian
is a PERSON within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has therefore the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court.”12 Second, Gen. Crook had illegally
detained the Ponca prisoners. Third, the military has no legal
authority to forcibly remove the Ponca to Indian Territory.
Fourth, “Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation as
well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable
right to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.…’”13 And
fifth, since they have been illegally detained in violation of
their constitutional rights, the Ponca “must be discharged from
custody, and it is so ordered.”14
For 10 long days and nights, the judge who had been lured
in from the wilderness had sat in his office below the courtroom, poring over federal statutes and constitutional amendments, case law and congressional acts, testimony and trial
records, trying to chart a course through the legal swamp of
U.S.-Indian relations. For more than a century, those relations
had been largely overwhelmed by successive waves of broken
promises, broken treaties, land grabs, greed, graft, corruption,
cultural ignorance, incompetence, indifference and military
might. For much of the past decade, it had gotten to the point
where government programs and private agencies were often
aligned in contradictory orbits, where some federal agents and
Army officers increasingly were ordered to implement polices
they abhorred. But on the afternoon of May 12, 1879, something else began to emerge from the legal swamp, something
beyond the unfocused, uncharted landscape – the first inkling
that there might be a better way.
With a stroke of his pen, Judge Dundy had done something
unprecedented: He had not only granted the hearing, but had
declared for the first time in the nation’s history that an Indian
was a person within the meaning of U.S. law. That the country’s Native inhabitants were a people who, if they obeyed the
law, now had legal rights whites were bound to respect. People

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10. Id. at 699.
11. Id. at 700.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 701.
14. Id

First, [Judge
Dundy] concluded,
“an Indian is a
PERSON within the
meaning of the
laws of the United
States, and has
therefore the right
to sue out a writ of
habeas corpus....”

Id.
Id.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 701.

10 Court Review - Volume 45

who, having dissolved their tribal allegiance, now had the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and were as entitled to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as white citizens.
People who were something more than cattle – powerless
dependents the government could round up at will and herd to
whatever part of the country suited its interests. People who
now had the right of expatriation and who, in time of peace,
could not be arbitrarily moved about the country without their
consent. And if the government violated their constitutional
rights, they could now, for the first time as a matter of law, sue
the government in federal court.
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Sovereign Comity:
Factors Recognizing Tribal Court Criminal Convictions
in State and Federal Courts
Matthew L.M. Fletcher

S

tate and federal courts increasingly are being confronted
with prosecutors moving the court to consider prior convictions in American Indian tribal courts during the sentencing phase, and sometimes earlier. For example, in People v.
Wemigwans,1 the Michigan Court of Appeals allowed the use of
a defendant’s two prior tribal court convictions to support a
state-law felony charge for drunk driving, third offense. But in
United States v. Lente,2 a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit
noted that prior tribal court convictions (that apparently were
uncounseled) for drunk driving did not support an upward
departure under the federal sentencing guidelines. If the conviction being introduced occurred in state or federal court, the
instant court would be obligated to give full faith and credit to
that conviction.3 But if the prior conviction occurred in a tribal
court, state and federal courts are often confronted with unforeseen complexities.
This article is intended to parse through much of the political baggage associated with recognizing tribal court convictions. To be frank, the law is unsettled, leaving little guidance
for state and federal judges in these cases, while at the same
time granting enormous discretion to judges on the questions
involved. The first part of this article will provide a quick
overview of the constitutional status of Indian tribes and tribal
courts, as well providing a basic but sufficient introduction to
relevant principles of federal Indian law. The second part will
offer a summary of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country and,
in particular, what role tribes play – and how well they play it.
The third part offers a short description of the key cases in the
field, as well as relevant federal and state statutes, and state
court rules. It also offers a short normative argument on the
question of what state and federal court judges who are confronted with prior tribal court convictions should look for in
these cases, especially where the defendants convicted in tribal
court are not represented by counsel.

There are three kinds of sovereigns in the United States –
federal, state, and tribal. The Constitution delineates the
authorities, duties, and limitations of the United States in rela-

tion to the state governments, but the structure and text of the
Constitution provide for two other kinds of sovereign entity –
foreign nations and Indian tribes.4 Foreign nations, of course,
are not part of the American constitutional structure, but
Indian tribes, which are located within the boundaries of the
United States, are part of the American constitutional structure,
albeit an unusual part. As Justice O’Connor once stated, they
are the “third sovereign.”5
The constitutional text, as provided for by the practice of
Congress before the ratification of the Constitution, provides
for two means by which Indian tribes and the United States will
interact. First, the so-called Indian Commerce Clause provides
that Congress has authority to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes. One of the first acts of the First Congress was to
implement the Indian Commerce Clause in the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790.6 And the federal government’s treaty
power provides the second form by which the United States
deals with Indian tribes – by treaty. One of the earliest treaties
executed and ratified by the United States came during the
Revolutionary War in a treaty with the Delaware Nation.7 There
are over 200 valid and extant treaties between the United States
and various Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the Indian
Commerce Clause and how the Clause interacts with Indian
treaties in the so-called Marshall Trilogy of early Indian law
cases. In Johnson v. M’Intosh,8 an early Indian lands case, Chief
Justice Marshall held that the federal government had exclusive
dominion over affairs with Indian tribes – exclusive as to individual American citizens and, implicitly, as to state government.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9 Chief Justice Marshall’s plurality
asserted that while Indian tribes were not state governments as
defined in the Constitution, nor were they foreign nations, they
were something akin to “domestic … nations.” And, finally, in
Worcester v. Georgia,10 Chief Justice Marshall confirmed that the
laws of states have “no force” in Indian Country, and that the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause gave powerful effect to Indian
treaties as “the supreme law of the land.” However, largely
because Congress has authority to abrogate ratified treaties,
Congress may also abrogate Indian treaty rights, as the Supreme
Court recognized in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.11
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INDIAN TRIBES AS A THIRD SOVEREIGN IN THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
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The constitutional text, Indian treaties, acts of Congress, and
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence can be reduced to three general, fundamental principles of federal Indian law:
• First, Congress’s authority over Indian affairs is plenary and
exclusive.
• Second, state governments have no authority to regulate
Indian affairs absent express congressional delegation or
grant.
• Third, the sovereign authority of Indian tribes is inherent,
and not delegated or granted by the United States, but can be
limited or restricted by Congress.12
The key element of these three principles is the legal term of
art, “Indian Country,” which is defined by act of Congress to
include all reservation lands and other kinds of Indian lands.13
These three principles, generally, are in strongest force within
the boundaries of Indian Country.
It is useful to examine these three principles in detail to
understand how they operate in modern federal Indian law and
policy. First, Congress’s plenary and exclusive power allows
Congress to enact statutes defining the “metes and bounds” of
tribal and state sovereignty in Indian affairs.14 Congress has
delegated enormous authority to implement federal Indian
policy to the executive branch, particularly the Secretary of
Interior.15
It is the federal government’s plenary power over Indian
affairs that provide the authority for the United States to recognize Indian tribes. There are 562 federally recognized Indian
tribes.16 Many of these tribes are signatories to treaties with the
United States. Many of these tribes have been recognized by an
act of Congress or federal court order. And still others have
been recognized by the Department of Interior. There are many
others – no one knows how many, but likely relatively few –
that are not (but should be) federally recognized. The federal
government recognizes the inherent sovereignty of these 562
Indian tribes.
This federal recognition has import in many, many ways.
For example, Congress appropriates money to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service, and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, each of which then spend
that money (or deliver that money) to federally recognized
tribes, who use the money to operate tribal government ser-

12. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1941); see
also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
14. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
15. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9.
16. See Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 FED. REG. 18553 (April
4, 2008).
17. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02,
at 1346-55 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds. 2005) (Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act); id. § 22.04, at
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vices ranging from health
[S]tate governments
care to public safety to
have no authority
housing to employment
training and education,
to regulate
and many other services.17
Indian affairs
Indian tribes also use their
absent express
own, independently generated revenues to fund these
congressional
programs.18 Key govern- delegation or grant.
ment services paid for by
federal and tribal money
includes courts of record developed and operated by the tribes,
law enforcement departments, and jail facilities.
Second, there is a long tradition of excluding state governments from Indian Country, dating back to the
Constitution. According to James Madison, one of the serious
flaws of the Articles of Incorporation was the failure of the
Articles to exclude state governments from Indian affairs.19
States began competing with the federal government for the
right to acquire Indian lands and to control Indian commerce, creating tension among the states and with the United
States government. The lack of federal control over Indian
affairs weakened the nation’s position in relation to Great
Britain, France, and Spain, each of which had significant and
powerful allies among the Indian nations. The Framers
intended the so-called Indian Commerce Clause to exclude
state governments from the field of Indian commerce, while
the federal government’s treaty power would be used to deal
with Indian tribes as independent sovereign nations.20 The
First Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act as a
means to implement the Indian Commerce Clause. But states
continued to assert authority to deal in Indian affairs, including executing treaties with Indian tribes, negotiating major
Indian land purchases, and asserting their police powers on
Indian lands, but they did so in violation of federal law.21 The
situation came to a head in the Cherokee cases, in which the
Supreme Court finally declared the State of Georgia’s efforts
to legally and politically destroy the Cherokee Nation null
and void. The Court held that state laws had “no force” in
Indian Country.22
In the modern era, the notion that state laws have no force
in Indian Country is riddled with exceptions, both statutory

18. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v.
Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of
Michigan, 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
19. See The Federalist No. 42, at 284-85 (Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
20. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1149 (1995).
21. From these actions arose the so-called Eastern Land Claims that
still cost Congress and the northeastern states enormous time and
expense. See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret T. Hotopp,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian
Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17
(1979).
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1831).
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and in the common law, but
the general rule remains.23
States may not tax the onreservation income,24 the
land,25 or the property of individual Indians,26 and have no
authority over Indian tribes
whatsoever.27 States have no
authority to regulate Indian
lands, except in extremely
narrow circumstances.28 State
courts have no jurisdiction
over civil cases brought
against individual Indians for disputes arising in Indian
Country, with limited exceptions.29 And states have no authority to prosecute on-reservation crimes committed by Indians,
also with limited exceptions.30
The limited exception relevant here is a statute commonly
referred to as Public Law 280, a 1953 congressional act extending state government civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
Country in five states, and authorizing other states to assert
jurisdiction if they chose.31 Other than the six mandatory states
– California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Wisconsin,
with Alaska being added upon statehood in 1959 – several
other states chose to assert jurisdiction over some classes of
crimes. Congress removed federal jurisdiction in these areas at
the same time. However, as a general matter, Public Law 280
was a failure on the ground. Congress did not appropriate
money for the mandatory states to take over Indian Country
criminal-law enforcement, and many areas of Indian Country
literally became lawless as a result.32 Recent and ongoing studies have concluded that Public Law 280 may actually have

increased crime rates in Indian Country, and surely have
decreased tribal-state cooperation.33
The third major federal Indian law principle is the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes. It is a common misconception that
Indian treaties were a grant of land and authority to Indian
tribes, when the reverse is true. Indian treaties are reservations
of land and authority by Indian tribes. If a tribe did not relinquish a sovereign right in the treaty, it remains.34 The exception
to this rule is that Congress has authority, according to the
Supreme Court, to divest aspects of tribal sovereignty if it so
wishes.35 And finally, the Supreme Court has asserted in recent
decades the authority to divest Indian tribes of authority.36
Because Indian tribes have independent and inherent sovereignty, tribes retain the authority to make laws and be ruled by
them.37 Since before the beginning of the American Republic,
some Indian tribes have exercised their sovereignty to enact
criminal codes, establish courts, and exercise criminal jurisdiction over individuals, Indian and non-Indian. Indian nations
long have exercised non-Anglo-style law-enforcement authority, and some still do exercise this kind of governmental authority. It was the Cherokee Nation of Georgia in the 1820s that
likely was the first Indian nation to establish a written constitution and criminal code, a court system, and a formalized lawenforcement mechanism. By the 1970s, only several dozen
Indian nations exercised criminal jurisdiction over individuals.38 And now, perhaps three hundred Indian nations exercise
criminal jurisdiction, or soon will.39

23. The Supreme Court in 1973 stated, “The modern cases thus tend
to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define
the limits of state power.” McClanahan v. State Tax Commission
of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). But the Court still held,
after parsing through the relevant treaties and Acts of Congress,
that Arizona’s taxation of the income of reservation Indians was
invalid. See id. at 165.
24. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S.
114, 124 (1993).
25. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
26. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 377 (1978).
27. Indian tribes are immune from suit by state governments in any
court, absent their consent or an act of Congress. See Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991).
28. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332
(1983).
29. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208
n.17 (1978)).
31. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588. See generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, §6.04[3], at
544-81. Before this statute, Congress had extended state criminal
jurisdiction to Indian Country in Kansas and New York. See id. §

6.04[4][a], at 581-83 (New York); id. § 6.04[4][b], at 583-84
(Kansas, and some reservations in Iowa and North Dakota).
32. See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
33. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit
for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV.
697 (2006).
34. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding
that Indian treaties are “not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted.”).
35. E.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding in dicta
that Congress can divest Indian tribes and individual Indians of
the authority to alienate certain forms of Indian property).
36. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding that Indian tribes have no authority to prosecute nonIndians, even absent an Act of Congress stating so); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Indian tribes
have no civil regulatory authority over nonmembers unless nonmember activity meets one of two limited exceptions).
37. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959).
38. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7
(1978).
39. See Bureau of Justice Assistance, Pathways to Justice: Building and
Sustaining Tribal Justice Systems in Contemporary America 6
(October 2005), available at http://www.law.und.edu/tji/
web_assets/pdf/PathwaysReport.pdf.
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II. TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TRIBAL CRIMINAL

JURISDICTION

Relatively simple fundamental principles of federal Indian
law tend to fall by the wayside on the ground. Often, it is not

easy to know where “Indian Country” begins and ends in every
situation. Moreover, since many American Indians by blood are
not enrolled with a federally recognized Indian tribe, it is often
not clear who is an Indian victim or perpetrator. Congress has
experimented with granting a few state governments criminal
and civil jurisdiction over some areas of Indian Country. And
there are three kinds of sovereigns charged with authority to
investigate and prosecute crime in Indian Country. Indian
Country criminal jurisdiction is accurately described as a
“maze.”40
In states where no act of Congress such as Public Law 280
has conferred criminal jurisdiction onto the state government,
the primary sovereign with felony jurisdiction is the federal
government. Under a mishmash of statutes, such as the Major
Crimes Act,41 the Indian Country Crimes Act,42 and the
Assimilative Crimes Act,43 the United States has jurisdiction
over all Indian Country crimes perpetrated against Indians or
tribal property. Federal prosecutors have exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian Country crimes committed by non-Indians.
Unfortunately, local United States Attorneys’ Offices often are
ill-equipped to deal with Indian Country crime. Budgetary,
political, and geographic difficulties impede federal law
enforcement, especially in the government’s misdemeanor
docket. Very, very few misdemeanor crimes committed by nonIndians in Indian Country are ever seriously investigated, let
alone prosecuted. In recent years, there has been an explosion
of violence against Indian women as well as dramatic increases
in methamphetamine dealing and possession in Indian Country
that many have attributed at least partially to the lack of effective federal law enforcement.44
Indian tribes may assert jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians within Indian Country, but they have no
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians.45
Moreover, Congress has severely reduced tribal sentencing
authority to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine, effectively limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanors.46 And
Congress’s acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s determination
that Indian tribes cannot have criminal prosecution over nonIndians has allowed a veritable criminal loophole to grow over
the past 30 years. Tribal police at least have the authority to
detain suspects even if the tribe does not have criminal jurisdiction over them.47
Even in states that have criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country, Indian Country crimes rates remain high. State inves-
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federal government.
However, in the past 30
years or so, the capacity of Indian tribes to investigate and
enforce their own criminal laws is growing exponentially. Tribal
gaming money, coupled with federal grants and appropriations,
helped to fuel this growth. Moreover, congressional legislation
such as the Indian Civil Rights Act and the various Indian SelfDetermination Acts has encouraged tribal governments to
become more capable of governing. Finally, several of the
Supreme Court’s Indian law decisions, even ones that are skeptical of tribal sovereignty, have helped to encourage Indian
tribes to develop tribal court systems and law-enforcement
departments.
The growth and development of tribal law-enforcement
capacity has spurred, though often very grudgingly, cooperation
between Indian tribes, states, and local units of government.48
In many states, the State of Michigan being a prime example,
Indian tribes routinely enter into law-enforcement cooperative
agreements with municipal governments.49 These intergovernmental agreements may take many forms, with the cross-deputization agreements being one of the most common. In areas of
Indian Country where reservation boundaries are not welldefined or even are contested by the parties, intergovernmental
agreements blur or even erase the jurisdictional lines and help
to avoid the serious problem of criminal suspects getting off
because of a jurisdictional technicality.
Coupled with law-enforcement cooperative agreements,
tribal courts and state courts also are routinely entering into
agreements, usually represented by tribal and state court rules,
in which the courts will recognize the judgments of the other
courts along the lines of the comity given to the courts of foreign nations.50 However, in some states and in some areas of

40. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 13.
44. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic
Violence in Indian Country by Restoring Tribal Sovereignty,
American Constitutional Society Issue Brief 5-7 (March 2009),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Fletcher%20Issue%20
Brief.pdf.
45. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
47. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, §
9.07, at 764 n.235 (citing Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d

1176 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Haskins, 887 P.2d 1189 (Mont.
1994); Ryder v. State, 648 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1982); State v.
Pamperien, 967 P.2d 503 (Or. App. 1998); Primeaux v. Leapley,
502 N.W.2d 265 (S.D. 1993); State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332
(Wash. 1993)).
48. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian
Country, 53 FED. LAW., March/April 2006, at 38; Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007).
49. E.g., Deputization Agreement Between the Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and Leelanau County, March 19,
1997, http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/mi_grand_
traverse_deputization-3-19-1997.pdf.
50. E.g., MICH. CT. RULE 2.615.
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law, the judgments of tribal
courts must be given the same
full faith and credit as state
and federal courts give each
other. The Violence Against
Women Act and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, for example, require state and tribal
courts to give full faith and
credit to each other’s judgments and orders for purpose
of enforcing those Acts.51
Finally, there is the likelihood in the coming years that
Congress will see fit to expand current contours of tribal
criminal jurisdiction to increase tribal sentencing capacity or
even to restore tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for
certain classes of crimes. Given the spectacular increase in
Indian Country crime, it is likely that Congress will take some
action, but it is not clear what Congress will choose to do. The
leading discussion bill currently is the so-called Tribal Law and
Order Act, which would expand tribal criminal-sentencing
capacity to three years for some crimes.52

[T]here is the
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III. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TRIBAL COURT

CONVICTIONS AND COMITY

As Indian tribes develop the capacity to investigate and prosecute Indian Country crime, state and federal courts are
increasingly faced with the question of how to handle prior
tribal court convictions. As the two cases mentioned in the
introduction suggest, there are multiple ways of handling these
prior convictions. As some Michigan courts have done, the
court could recognize the tribal court conviction for purposes
of sentencing or establishing a prior criminal history. Or as
some states and federal courts have done, the court could
ignore those prior convictions. There are plusses and minuses
to each path.
The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow, but
do not require, federal courts to consider prior tribal court convictions for purposes of sentencing.53 As such, federal judges
have significant discretion on the weight to place on tribal court
convictions. Federal judges who know nothing about tribal
courts, understandably, might be less inclined to give them
much weight. The few federal judges who do know something
about tribal courts have a great deal to teach other judges.
Consider South Dakota federal district court Judge Charles
Kornmann’s commentary about criminal trials in the Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Court:
This Court respectfully disagrees with the statements
in [United States v.] Doherty that tribal court proceedings

51. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (Indian Child Welfare Act); 28 U.S.C. §
1738A (Violence Against Women Act).
52. S. 797, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1924, 111th Cong. (2009).
53. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(i).
54. United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (D. S.D.
2001) (discussing United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.
1997); other citations omitted). Judge Kornmann later wrote that
he opposed amending the United States Sentencing Guidelines to
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are informal and not adversarial and that Congress did
not wish to impose on such systems “an exclusionary
rule that presumes the existence of an adversarial
method of trying criminal cases.” … I have no information as to how a tribal court serving a total tribal membership of 300 people works in the upper peninsula of
Michigan. I do have knowledge how tribal courts dealing
with thousands of Native Americans work in South
Dakota. In particular, I have knowledge and take judicial
notice as to how the tribal court in Rosebud works. I am
also aware that federal courts are obligated to extend
respect and act with principles of comity toward tribal
courts. I decline to jump to the assumptions or conclusions advanced in Doherty that tribal courts, and by
extension the tribal court on the Rosebud, operate as
something of a family gathering and counseling session.
The description of the tribal court in Doherty sounds,
very frankly, like a description of “teen courts” now in
vogue in various high schools. That is not the way the
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court works in South Dakota and
it is clear that, at least in the present case, criminal adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated. Red Bird,
unlike Doherty, had more than “the mere existence of a
statutory right to counsel….” Nor is there any evidence
or argument to suggest that tribal court criminal prosecutions in South Dakota and particularly in Rosebud are
not adversary proceedings. They are “adversary judicial
criminal proceedings.” … They are certainly adversarial
in the eyes of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe or a public
defender’s office would not have been established and
funded. While sentences resulting from tribal court convictions are not counted in computing the criminal history of a defendant who is later to be sentenced in federal
court, they may be considered under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3
(adequacy of criminal history category). See U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2 (i). The government sometimes argues for an
upward departure based upon a defendant’s previous
convictions or even charges pending in tribal court. Such
convictions are certainly matters to be considered by the
sentencing judge.54
The Sixth Circuit in Doherty had cited to the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act where “[w]itnesses … testified that a wholesale exportation of the Sixth Amendment to
the tribes would be not be [sic] feasible; since many tribes do
not have prosecutorial systems, but instead rely on informal
and non-adversarial questioning from the tribal courts, the
introduction of outside defense counsel could ‘disrupt the
entire court system.’”55 Incidentally, Michigan’s modern tribal

treat tribal court convictions in the same manner as state or local
misdemeanor convictions. See Charles Kornmann, Commentary
on Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17
FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 222 (2005).
55. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 780 (citing Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J.
Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)).

courts are adversarial courts much like the South Dakota tribal
courts described by Judge Kornmann.56
The critical question is the right to indigent counsel. As the
Supreme Court long ago recognized in Talton v. Mayes,57 Indian
tribes are not subject to the Constitution, having not been party
to the Convention nor having ratified the text. As such, at least
until 1968, Indian tribes are not beholden to the Constitution’s
criminal-procedure duties. In 1968, Congress purported to
apply the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes in the Indian Civil
Rights Act, also known as the Indian Bill of Rights.58 But the
key question is the substantive deviations of the Indian Bill of
Rights to the Constitution; namely, the fact that the Indian Bill
of Rights does not contain a right to indigent legal defense.59
It is worth recalling the legal landscape in 1968 in Indian
Country. In 1968, many tribal courts were creatures of the federal government, so-called Courts of Indian Offenses (CIOs) or
CFR Courts created and regulated by the Department of
Interior.60 These courts enforced Law and Order Codes, also
promulgated by the Department of Interior, and usually a local
Bureau of Indian Affairs official dominated the proceedings. In
many CIOs or CFR Courts, the tribal judge was not lawtrained, the tribal prosecutor was also the tribal chief of police,
and lawyers were not allowed in the tribal courtroom. In the
hearings leading up to the Indian Civil Rights Act, many tribal
witnesses complained of abuses by tribal judges and tribal
police officers though, to be fair, these stories were anecdotal
and outnumbered by complaints about abuses by federal and
state officials.61 In the lead up to the passage of the Act, the
Department of Interior and Department of Justice complained
that a right to indigent counsel would require the United States
to foot the bill for public defenders, and so Congress did not
mandate the right to indigent counsel.62 Importantly, however,
Congress did authorize the right to counsel, effectively wiping
out tribal laws (often pushed through by federal officers) banning lawyers in tribal courts.
Modern tribal courts are nothing like the CIOs and CFR
Courts. More and more tribal judges are lawyers, and those
non-law-trained tribal judges often have lawyer clerks or consultants. More and more tribal governments provide for public
defenders, although that number is still a distinct minority.
More and more tribal courts are conducting jury trials with
juries consisting of people representative of the tribal community, including non-Indians. And modern tribal courts are
courts of record, with tribal court opinions being generated and
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credence to a prior uncounseled tribal court conviction. The cases roughly follow two parallel tracks. In the first track, the court weighs the impact of
assessing the prior conviction on the tribe’s sovereignty. In the
second track, the court applies the analysis of Nichols v. United
States, a 1994 Supreme Court opinion.63
The first track tends to focus on the tribal sovereignty
aspects of considering a prior uncounseled tribal court conviction. In State v. Spotted Eagle, for example, the Montana
Supreme Court held that prior uncounseled misdemeanor tribal
court convictions may be used in Montana courts for purpose
of sentencing:
Montana judicial policy avoids interfering with the
tribal courts and the respective tribe’s sovereignty. … This
Court treats tribal court judgments with the same deference as those of foreign sovereigns as a matter of comity.
… In most instances, comity requires this Court to give
full effect to the judgments of foreign sovereigns.…
Comity requires that a court give full effect to the valid
judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according to that sovereign’s laws, not the Sixth Amendment standard that
applies to proceedings in Montana.
To disregard a valid tribal court conviction would
imply that Montana only recognizes the Blackfeet Tribe’s
right to self-government until it conflicts with Montana
law. Moreover, it would suggest that Montana recognizes
the legitimacy of the judgments of the tribal courts to the
extent that the procedures mirror Montana procedure.
Such a position would contradict the judicial policy of
this state and indirectly undermine the sovereignty of the
Blackfeet Tribe.64

56. See Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, 67 MICH. B. J. 366, 368-69
(1988); Matthew Fletcher & Zeke Fletcher, A Restatement of the
Common Law of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians, 7 TRIBAL L. J. 1 (2008).
57. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
58. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Bill of Rights,
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 806 (2006).
59. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall … deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right … at his own expense to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense….”).
60. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-89 (1983).

61. See JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL
LEGAL STUDIES 247-48 (2004).
62. See JOHN R. WUNDER, “RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE”: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 240 (1994); see also
United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 780 (6th Cir. 1997) (“In
particular, tribal representatives testified that their governments
could not afford to provide counsel to indigent defendants, and
that a bill that required them to do so without providing for federal funding would be disastrous.”).
63. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
64. 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1008 (2003).

There was a lone dissenter in the 4-1 decision, who rhetorically stated: “In true oxymoronic fashion, our Court has said to
Mr. Spotted Eagle, ‘Out of deference to your Tribe, we accord
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you fewer protections than guaranteed to individual citizens by
the Montana Constitution.’”65
There is some scholarly dispute
about whether deference to tribal
sovereignty is sufficient to justify
the consideration of prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions in federal court for sentencing purposes,66 but there are
more sound constitutional reasons that will allow state and federal courts to set adequate standards for the consideration of
tribal court convictions. To understand the argument, it is
worth assessing how Nichols v. United States may affect the
analysis.
The Spotted Eagle Court relied upon a Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Benally, which reached the same conclusion without significant analysis, other than to note that tribes
are not required to provide paid counsel to indigent defendants.67 The Tenth Circuit also has held that guilty pleas before
tribal courts may be introduced in federal courts for purposes
of direct impeachment of defendant testimony.68 A more recent
Tenth Circuit opinion rejected a claim that to consider prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, relying heavily on Nichols.69
In Nichols, the Court held that that prior uncounseled federal court convictions could be used for sentencing purposes if
no prison term resulted from the prior conviction.70 The Eighth
Circuit refused to consider prior uncounseled tribal court convictions in United States v. Norquay,71 but that opinion was later
abrogated by the court in a non-Indian-law-related case.72 In
Norquay, the court (speaking without the benefit of the Nichols
decision), stated:
The Supreme Court has stated that misdemeanor convictions obtained in the absence of counsel for the defendant may not be used as a basis for enhancing a sentence
of imprisonment to be imposed upon a defendant.… At
least one appellate court has held, in addition, that where
a defendant was not represented by counsel at tribal court
proceedings, any consequent tribal court conviction may
not be used as a basis for upward departure. United States
v. Brady…. We believe this is to be a correct statement of
the law.73

[S]tate courts
should consider
their own
constitutional
rights and rules.

65. Id. at 1246 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
66. Compare Kevin K. Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s
Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 209 (2005),
with Jon M. Sands & Jane L. McClellan, Commentary: Policy Meets
Practice: Why Tribal Court Convictions Should Not Be Counted, 17
FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 215 (2005).
67. 756 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1985).
68. See United States v. Denetclaw, 96 F.3d 454, 458 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1141 (1997). The court did not discuss
whether the guilty pleas were made while being represented by
counsel.
69. See United States v. Lonjose, No. 01-2303, 42 Fed. Appx. 177
(10th Cir. June 19, 2002) (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738 (1994)).
70. 511 U.S. at 746-47.
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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Brady, referenced in
Norquay, held that prior uncounseled tribal court convictions
resulting in imprisonment could not be used by federal courts
for sentencing purposes.74 The court wrote:
[B]oth of Brady’s convictions were obtained in
uncounseled proceedings. The Sixth Amendment
requires that “no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel
in his defense.” ... We agree … that an “uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [may] not be used collaterally to
impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction.” ...
The government’s main argument is that the prior
tribal convictions played only a small role in the departure. Because the sentencing court did not indicate the
extent each factor played in the sentence departure, it is
impossible to determine the precise sentence enhancement attributable to the court’s reliance on the uncounseled convictions. Nonetheless, we hold that any term of
imprisonment imposed on the basis of an uncounseled
conviction where the defendant did not waive counsel
violates the Sixth Amendment….75
The Brady opinion predates the Nichols decision and therefore may be suspect, but the reasoning should survive. In Brady,
the court noted that the prior tribal court convictions resulted
in jail terms, albeit shorter than 30 days.76 But under Nichols,
the key is whether the prior uncounseled convictions resulted
in jail terms, and so the outcome in Brady would have been
same even after Nichols.77
As such, while there is no definitive Supreme Court statement on
the subject, it is likely that federal courts may use prior uncounseled tribal court convictions, so long as those convictions did not
result in jail time.
How does this affect state courts? Well, it doesn’t, because
state courts should consider their own constitutional rights and
rules. For example, in a case decided before Nichols, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Watchman refused to consider prior uncounseled tribal court convictions.78 However, a
later NM appellate court overruled Watchman after Nichols (a
non-Indian law case); thus, Watchman may no longer be good
law.79

71. 987 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1993).
72. See United States v. Thomas, 20 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
73. Norquay, 987 F.2d at 482 (citing Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 853-54 (9th
Cir. 1991); other citations omitted).
74. 928 F.2d at 854.
75. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
76. See id. at 853.
77. Another Ninth Circuit case following Brady is United States v.
Grey Hawk, No. 91-30385, 977 F.2d 592 (Table), 1992 WL
245979 (Sept. 30, 1992).
78. 809 P.2d 641 (N.M. App. 1991), cert. denied, 807 P.2d 221 (N.M.
1991).
79. See State v. Hosteen, 923 P.2d 595 (N.M. App. 1996).

That brings us to the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v.
Wemigwans.80 The court there, in an unpublished per curiam
opinion, described the workings of a modern typical modern
American tribal court:
There are many significant similarities between the
criminal procedure followed in the tribal court and the
procedure followed in Michigan courts. The record establishes that defendant was informed of the following
rights and opportunities: to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusations against him; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have a speedy and
public trial in which he could present witnesses in his
favor; to have a trial by jury, in which the government has
the burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; to be protected against self-incrimination and to
be free from the threat of double jeopardy; to have counsel at his own expense; and to be protected against cruel
or unusual punishment, excessive bails, or fines. Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302. These rights are substantially similar to rights afforded defendants in
Michigan courts.
The tribal court informed defendant of his rights prior
to accepting each of his guilty pleas. In both prior cases
before the tribal court, the tribal judge tested defendant’s
competency before accepting his pleas. The record establishes that defendant acted freely, made a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the many rights that were enumerated to him prior to his pleas, and made an intelligent,
informed and conscious decision to plead guilty in each
case. In so doing, defendant received the benefit of sentencing agreements that eliminated the threat of longterm incarceration. In addition to the protections of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, defendant had, among other
things, the right to access the tribal appellate courts.
Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Code §§ 1.513, 1.514.
Defendant elected not to assert his right to seek appeal of
the tribal convictions.81
Of import, while the tribal court in Wemigwans had sentenced the defendant to 60 days in jail, the sentence was suspended, bringing the case into the Nichols framework.82 The
Michigan appellate court reviewed the convictions under principles of comity, as would be used for any foreign court judgment, and concluded that despite the uncounseled character of
the convictions, Michigan courts could use them:
The only significant difference between the procedural
process afforded in the two judicial systems, as pointed
out by the trial court, relates to the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. Under Michigan law, if defendant established indigency and the risk of incarceration,
then he would have been entitled to the benefit of coun-

80. 2003 WL 734257 (Mich.App.) (per curiam).
81. Id. at *2-3.
82. See id. at *3 n.3.
83. Id. at *3. Of note, adult members of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian
Tribe receive significant gaming-revenue per capita distributions,

sel. Under tribal law, a defendant receives no such guarantee. Instead, a defendant only receives the benefit of
counsel at his own expense. Preliminarily we note that
Michigan law does not require that all process be identical. Rather, we review in its entirety the process afforded
defendant in the foreign jurisdiction for an intolerably
high risk of unfairness. In the present case, the substantive laws in question are identical, the procedural protections afforded in the foreign jurisdiction are generally
consistent with the procedural protections afforded
under Michigan law and defendant was found to have
made a knowing, free and voluntary waiver of the many
rights that were expressly explained to him in order to
tender a plea of guilty. Thus, it would not be without reason to conclude, regardless of defendant’s indigency status, that defendant was afforded sufficient due process in
the foreign jurisdiction to allow the use of the foreign
convictions for purposes of enhancing the charge against
defendant.83
A second issue involves the question of whether the tribe in
a prior conviction has provided access to “lay advocates,” or
law-trained individuals who are not licensed attorneys. Judge
Kornmann’s flat rejection of the quality of lay advocates – they
do not “cut it”84 – seems reasonable for tribal court convictions
resulting in jail time.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the coming years, state and federal judges will increasingly be confronted with prosecutors introducing prior tribal
court convictions for sentencing and enhancement purposes.
This article hopefully provides a sufficient overview of the reasons why tribal court convictions are becoming more prevalent,
why tribal court convictions usually should be entitled to
comity, and what kinds of tribal court convictions should be
examined carefully (namely, uncounseled convictions).
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and it is unlikely that any of them would qualify as indigent.
Lincoln v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, 967 F. Supp. 966 (E.D.
Mich. 1997).
84. Konmann, supra note 54, at 222.
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Wisconsin’s Experience in
Allocating Jurisdiction between
State and Tribal Courts
Beth Ermatinger Hanan and William H. Levit, Jr.

E

leven federally recognized Indian tribes are located in
Wisconsin. When civil disputes arise between tribal and
non-tribal members, one of the first questions is which
court has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ quarrel. It may be
that both the state and tribal courts have jurisdiction, such that
the next question is, which court should proceed? Over the
past several years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, using both
its decision-making and rule-making powers, along with sustained, cooperative efforts of tribal and state court judges, has
devised various rules and guidelines by which many interjurisdictional issues can be decided.
Decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Teague v. Bad
River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians1 resulted in jurisdictional allocation protocols for the two judicial districts
where the bulk of the state’s Indian tribes are located. More
recently, the state Supreme Court approved statutory guidelines for a less formal discretionary transfer of state court cases
to tribal courts within Wisconsin.
Other states may wish to use one or both mechanisms for
assigning or transferring jurisdiction between tribal and state
courts. To better explain the Wisconsin experience and to help
readers identify areas of possible jurisdictional overlap, this
article first will describe some of the procedural background of
Teague and of the first case to apply the Teague protocol. Then
we discuss the more recent development of the discretionary
transfer rule.
BACKGROUND OF THE TEAGUE CASES

Jerry Teague, a non-tribal member, was employed under
contract as general manager of the Bad River Band’s casino.
After he was terminated, Teague filed suit in Ashland County
Circuit Court, seeking to compel arbitration.2 Early on, the
Circuit Court determined that the Band had waived sovereign
immunity. The Band asserted that Teague’s employment contracts were invalid because they lacked the required tribal
council and federal approval.3

Authors’ Note: A portion of this article appeared in 2006 in the
Wisconsin Lawyer magazine. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and not of Mr. Jerry Teague, whom Ms. Hanan represented on appeal in Teague v. Bad River Band, nor of the Forest County
Potawatomi Community, which Mr. Levit represented in the Mohr
litigation described herein.
Footnotes
1. 2000 WI 79, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709 (“Teague II”).
2. Teague II, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 2.
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Over a year into Teague’s suit, the Band filed its own action
in Bad River Tribal Court, seeking to invalidate the employment contracts and reasserting its claim that the requisite
approval was lacking.4 The Band asked the Circuit Court for a
stay until the Tribal Court ruled on the tribal law challenges to
the contracts and until all tribal remedies were exhausted.5
The Circuit Court denied a stay because the Tribal Court
action would not entirely dispose of Teague’s claim. The
Circuit Court acknowledged that the Tribal Court could
address the limited issue of actual authority before the Circuit
Court resolved the rest of the case.6 The Band then amended
its Tribal Court complaint, adding that the Tribal Court should
invalidate the contracts based on apparent authority.
For reasons not clear from the record, Teague’s trial counsel
accepted service of the amended Tribal Court complaint but
did not plead responsively in Tribal Court. The Tribal Court
granted the Band’s motion for default judgment on the ground
that the contracts were invalid.7
The Band sought full faith and credit in the Circuit Court
for the Tribal Court default judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §
806.245. But the Court declined to grant full faith and credit
based on a “prior action pending” rule.8 As the Circuit Court
understood things, the Tribal Court, a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, did not properly have jurisdiction over the matter
because the case was filed first in state court. After an Ashland
County jury found Teague’s employment contracts valid, an
arbitrator awarded him over $390,000 in damages. The Band
appealed.9
The Court of Appeals (in “Teague I”) reversed.10 On review,
the Supreme Court agreed that the “prior action pending” rule
did not apply to a court of an independent sovereign.
Principles of comity, however, required that the state and tribal
courts confer and allocate jurisdiction between them, so as to
avoid a race to judgment and the inconsistent results that had
occurred. The Supreme Court remanded for a novel interjurisdictional conference.11

3. Id. at ¶ 6.
4. Id. at ¶ 7.
5. Id. at ¶ 8.
6. Id. at ¶ 9.
7. Id. at ¶ 11.
8. 6 Wis. 2d 154, 94 N.W.2d 161 (1959).
9. Id. at ¶ 15.
10. Id. at ¶ 2. The Court of Appeals decision, 229 Wis.2d 581, 59394, 599 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1999), is referred to as Teague I.
11. Id. at ¶ 2.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
tribal courts within this state. So the Teague II Court exercised
its authority over the Circuit Court by ordering it to invite the
Tribal Court judge to a unique meeting. As envisioned, the two
judges virtually would step back in time to the point when
they had first learned of the parties’ parallel actions. The
judges then would discuss applicable comity concerns and
decide which court should have proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction and which court should have refrained. This joint
meeting, dubbed a “jurisdictional allocation conference” and
now known colloquially as a “Teague Conference,” can be used
to divide jurisdiction between state and tribal courts when the
parties are identical and there is issue overlap.
WISCONSIN’S FIRST JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATION
CONFERENCE – COMITY IN ACTION

Comity is a doctrine of respect for the proceedings of
another system of government, reflecting a spirit of cooperation. Comity recognizes the sovereignty and sovereign interests of each governmental system and its unique features,
including cultural and religious values. Overall, grants of
comity are discretionary, highly fact specific, and reviewable on
appeal for an erroneous exercise of discretion.12
At the March 2001 jurisdictional allocation conference, the
Band asked the Circuit Court to reopen its judgment approving the arbitration award. The parties also considered a draft
proposed protocol then under discussion by a forum of state,
federal and tribal judges. The draft protocol proposed particular comity factors that should be weighed at a jurisdictional
allocation conference.13
The conference was held on the record at the Ashland
County Courthouse with both judges and lawyers for each
party. In extensive discussion, each judge explained his view of
the proceedings that had transpired in his court.14 The Circuit
Court judge discussed the comity principles identified by the
Teague II Court, as well as the principles set forth in the
forum’s draft protocol and in an alternative proposal submitted
by the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association (WTJA).15 After
almost two hours of colloquy, stalemate remained. Both courts
declined to reopen their respective judgments.16

portions of the forum’s draft
proposed protocol, and added
other considerations identified in the WTJA draft.18
The protocol signed by the
Tenth Judicial District and
four Chippewa tribes (Bad
River, Lac Courte Oreilles, St.
Croix and Red Cliff) in
December, 2001, was the first
of its kind.19 The Protocol sets
forth the following factors to
be considered in allocating
jurisdiction:

The protocol
signed by the
Tenth Judicial
District and four
Chippewa tribes
(Bad River, Lac
Courte Oreilles,
St.Croix and Red
Cliff) in December,
2001, was the first
of its kind.

(1) Whether there are issues
which directly touch on or require interpretation of a
Tribe’s Constitution, By-Laws, Ordinances or Resolutions;
(2) Whether the nature of the case involves traditional or cultural matters of the Tribe;
(3) Whether the action is one in which the Tribe is a party, or
where tribal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or territory is an
issue in the case;
(4) The tribal membership status of the parties;
(5) Where the case arises;
(6) If the parties have by contract chosen a forum or the law
to be applied in the event of a dispute;
(7) The timing of the motion to dismiss or stay, taking into
account the parties’ and courts’ expenditures of time and
resources, and compliance with any applicable provisions
of either court’s scheduling orders;
(8) The court in which the action can be decided most expeditiously;
(9) Such other factors as may be appropriate in the particular
case.20

The Band appealed again, and the Court of Appeals certified
the case to the Supreme Court. While Supreme Court review
was pending, Chief Judge Edward Brunner of the Tenth
Judicial District17 convened an ad hoc committee to develop a
tribal/state protocol governing the exercise of jurisdiction
between Wisconsin state courts and tribal courts within his
district. The committee’s final version was a meld – it retained

To prevent a deadlock such as the one which occurred
between the two courts in Teague, the Tenth District Protocol
provides in Section 5(c) for a mechanism to select a third judge
drawn from a standing pool of four circuit court and four tribal
court judges. That judge then is directed to sit with the two
judges from the courts where the two actions are pending to
conduct a hearing de novo, at the close of which the three
judges are to deliberate and allocate jurisdiction on the basis of
the factors listed above.
Back in Madison, and mindful of the Tenth District’s
Protocol, a majority of the Supreme Court (“Teague III”)
reversed the Circuit Court’s refusal to reopen the lower court
judgment. The Court refrained from focusing its decision on a
race to the courthouse, or on formal constitutional provisions.

12. Teague III, at ¶ 69.
13. See Teague III, at ¶¶ 5, 92.
14. See Teague III, at ¶ 91 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
15. See Teague III, at ¶¶ 5, 92.
16. 2003 WI 118.
17. Judge Brunner is now on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District
III, but remains involved with a group of Wisconsin tribal and

state court judges that meets to promote understanding and cooperation between those courts.
18. See Teague III, at ¶ 5.
19. Historic State Court-Tribal Court Agreement to be Signed at Bad
River Reservation, http://www.wicourts.gov/news/archives/
2001tribal120401.htm.
20. See id.

THE FIRST TRIBAL/STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL
ALLOCATION PROTOCOL IS APPROVED
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Instead, Teague III clarified
that when state and tribal
courts exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter, and each
court knows of the other’s
proceedings, the full faith and
credit statute is not yet
applicable.21 Instead, each
court should stop its proceedings, consult with the other,
and as a matter of comity
decide which court should
proceed.22
The Teague III Court further instructed that when
comity principles are applied
in this circumstance, the
application is weighted toward the Tribal Court:23 “In the context of state-tribal relations, principles of comity must be
applied with an understanding that the federal government is,
and the state courts should be, fostering tribal self-government
and tribal self-determination.”24 This instruction applies even
when the tribal entity has waived a claim of sovereignty in the
state court. It is an instruction that forces litigants and state
courts to recognize that judicial qualifications are determined
by the appointing sovereign, and not by other governments.
The Teague III majority then listed a host of factors from
various sources, including the Tenth District’s Protocol, noting
that the weight given each would vary from case to case:

[T]he twelve
counties of the
Ninth Judicial
District and five
Indian bands with
reservations or
property within
the district signed
their own tribal/
state protocol on
the judicial
allocation of
jurisdiction.

1. Where the action was first filed and the extent to which the
case has proceeded in the first court;
2. The parties’ and courts’ expenditures of time and resources
in each court and the extent to which the parties have complied with any applicable provisions of either court’s scheduling orders;
3. The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access
to and admissibility of evidence and matters of process,
practice, and procedure, including whether the action will
be decided most expeditiously in tribal or state court;
4. Whether the nature of the action implicates tribal sovereignty, including but not limited to, the following:
a. The subject matter of the litigation.
b. The identities and potential immunities of the parties.
5. Whether the issues in the case require application and
interpretation of a tribe’s law or state law;

21. Teague III, at ¶ 58.
22. Id.
23. Id., at ¶ 79:
The principles of comity applicable to state court-tribal court
relations are built upon the goal of fostering tribal self-government through recognition of tribal justice mechanisms.
Consequently, the significance of the plaintiff’s choice of a forum
and the application and interpretation of state law are outweighed by the fact that the litigation involves tribal sovereignty
and the interpretation of tribal law, and that the material events
occurred on tribal land. Even where a circuit court had con-
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6. Whether the case involves traditional or cultural maters of
the tribe;
7. Whether the location of material events giving rise to the
litigation is on tribal or state land;
8. The relative institutional or administrative interests of each
court;
9. The tribal membership status of the parties;
10. The parties’ contractual forum selection;
11. The parties’ contractual choice of the law to be applied;
12. Whether each court has jurisdiction over the dispute and
the parties and has determined its own jurisdiction;
13. Whether either jurisdiction has entered a final judgment that
conflicts with another judgment entitled to recognition.25
With the decision in Teague III, that case came to an end,
but its legacy continues.
A SECOND TRIBAL/STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL
ALLOCATION PROTOCOL IS DEVELOPED

On July 28, 2005, the twelve counties of the Ninth Judicial
District and five Indian bands with reservations or property
within the district signed their own tribal/state protocol on the
judicial allocation of jurisdiction. The signatory tribes are the
Bad River Band, Forest County Potawatomi Community, Lac
du Flambeau Band, Sokaogon Chippewa Community (Mole
Lake) and Stockbridge-Munsee Band. The Ninth District
Protocol applies where there is concurrent jurisdiction in both
state and tribal court and provides for dismissal by either court
if it determines it lacks jurisdiction.26
Section 7 of the Ninth District Protocol enumerates the
same 13 factors identified in Teague III and provides that these
factors “shall be considered in determining which court shall
exercise jurisdiction.” The tie-breaking procedure is the same
as in the Tenth District Protocol.27
Notably, the Ninth District Protocol does not apply to one
tribe with a presence in that district, based on a federal distinction. Public Law 280 (28 U.S.C. section 1360) gives
Wisconsin courts civil jurisdiction over matters involving
Indians which arise in Indian country. The Menominee are a
non-P.L. 280 tribe – Wisconsin’s only such tribe – and as a
result, an assertion of jurisdiction by a Wisconsin court over a
claim arising in Indian country and brought by a non-Indian
against a Menominee tribal member would infringe that tribe’s
sovereignty. Because of its status as a non-P.L. 280 tribe, the
Menominee Tribe did not sign the Ninth District Protocol.

ducted significant proceedings before the tribal court even began
to hear the case is outweighed by the tribal court’s institutional
interest in determining the validity of contracts made with the
tribe.
Id.
24. Id., at ¶ 70.
25. Id., at ¶ 71 and n.38.
26. Copies of the Ninth District Protocol may be obtained from the
District Court Administrator, Susan Byrns, (715) 842-3872, 2100
Stewart Avenue, Suite 310, Wausau, WI 54401.
27. Id.

THE SECOND JURISDICTIONAL ALLOCATION
CONFERENCE IS HELD IN THE MOHR LITIGATION

In January, 2005, a Teague Conference was held in a case
arising out of a 2003 consultant contract the Forest County
Potawatomi Community’s (“FCPC”) Executive Council, but
not its General Council, entered into with James B. Mohr. “All
actions of the Executive Council are subject to review and
rescission by the General Council.”28 The four-year contract
was to pay Mohr, a recently retired state court judge, a substantial sum for assisting the tribe with the development of its tribal
court system, a juvenile justice action plan and other related
programs. The contract contained a sovereign immunity waiver
and provided for arbitration in the event of a dispute. The
immunity waiver, however, was not implemented in accordance
with FCPC tribal law, which requires that the General Council
approve any waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.
In January 2004, the tribe’s General Council rejected the
Mohr consultant contract. Efforts to reach a settlement were
unavailing and on April 21, 2004, Mohr’s counsel gave notice
of his intent to proceed with arbitration.
On May 6, 2004, the tribe commenced an action in FCPC
Tribal Court against Mr. Mohr,29 seeking to enjoin him from
commencing or pursuing arbitration and ultimately to declare
the contract void. Days later, Mohr began his own action in
Oneida County Circuit Court against the tribe,30 in an effort to
compel arbitration and challenge the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction
to adjudicate the dispute. At the same time Mohr filed a
motion for a conditional stay pending an “inter-jurisdictional
consultation.” Counsel for the tribe and Mohr agreed to take
no further action in their respective lawsuits to permit the consultation to take place.
On July 25, 2004, a reserve judge sitting in Oneida County
Circuit Court sent a letter to the Chief Judge of the FCPC
Tribal Court, adopting the parties’ suggestion that a Teague
Conference be held after two rounds of briefing. Counsel
agreed that both actions should be stayed in the interim. They
also advised the judges that, unlike the protocol adopted by
the Tenth Judicial District, in the event there was a deadlock at
their Teague Conference, the parties would then confer as to
how it should be resolved.
The Teague Conference for the FCPC-Mohr cases was held
January 25, 2005, in a Wisconsin circuit court courthouse.
After oral argument, the proceedings were adjourned to permit
the two judges to deliberate. After deliberations the proceedings resumed on the record. First the Tribal judge and then the
Circuit Court judge delivered his ruling. Both agreed that jurisdiction should be allocated to the FCPC Tribal Court, although
they reached their conclusions in a somewhat different way.
Judge Butterfield, as a judge of a tribal court of a sovereign
Indian nation who was not bound by decisions of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, used the nine factors set forth in
the August 3, 2004, draft protocol for the Ninth District,

28. CONST. OF FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY, WISCONSIN,
ART. V, §II.
29. Case No. 04-CV-27.
30. Case No. 04-CV-152.
31. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).

which had been approved
[T]he state and tribal
by the state court judges
but had not yet been acted courts with the most
upon by the tribal courts in
overlapping
that district. The nine fac- activity... developed
tors listed in the draft proa very good
tocol are the same as those
in the Tenth District’s
relationship, and
Protocol. Judge Williams of
...the judges often
the Circuit Court, on the
give each other a
other hand, applied Teague
III’s 13 factors. He then phone call to resolve
entered a stay of any fur- where the litigation
ther proceedings in his
best belongs.
court.
The interesting dynamic
underlying the FCPC-Mohr Teague Conference was that it was
convened in recognition of and reinforced by principles of
comity. The FCPC-Mohr conference also was guided by the
policy articulated by both the United States Supreme Court
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court that promoting tribal justice systems is essential to foster tribal self-government and
self-determination. Had the Circuit Court action been permitted to proceed, it would have divested the Tribal Court of the
right to interpret tribal laws and the right to adjudicate challenges to its jurisdiction, both critical elements of the right of
tribal self-government. Under the federal exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine established by the United States Supreme
Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians,31 the Tribal Court must be allowed to address questions of its own jurisdiction and fully and finally adjudicate a
dispute before a party can challenge the existence of tribal
jurisdiction as a federal question in district court. As the
Teague III court held, “general principles of comity, including
principles of abstention, must be used to resolve” conflicts
between state and tribal courts.32
WISCONSIN’S NEW RULE ON DISCRETIONARY
TRANSFERS FROM STATE COURT TO TRIBAL COURT

The FCPC-Mohr case is the first known use of a Teague
Conference. Court staff believe that the protocols developed in
the Ninth and Tenth Districts have been used successfully by
courts and parties, but infrequently. Instead, it seemed that as
time went on, tribal and state courts have been using informal
approaches to resolve jurisdictional differences. As Judge
Brunner reports, the state and tribal courts with the most overlapping activity have, over time, developed a very good relationship, and in situations where both sides feel jurisdiction
may be questionable, the judges often give each other a phone
call to resolve where the litigation best belongs.33 Several state
court judges have held court in tribal courtrooms.34
Aware of this evolution, on July 24, 2007, the Wisconsin

32. Teague III, at ¶ 66.
33. Telephone Interview with Judge Edward Brunner, Wisconsin
Court of Appeals (June 2, 2009).
34. Id.
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Director of State Courts submitted a Petition on behalf of
the
State-Tribal
Justice
Forum35 seeking promulgation of a rule governing discretionary transfer of state
court cases to tribal court.
The Petition noted that the
State-Tribal Justice Forum
had learned of a number of
situations in which courts
were transferring cases in an
exercise of discretion as the
interests of justice require. Given the large number of pro se
tribal court litigants, particularly in family law matters, the
Forum advocated a user-friendly, discretionary transfer mechanism that could be used when there is concurrent jurisdiction.
In his Petition, the Director of State Courts made reference
to research conducted by the State-Tribal Justice Forum on
how other states handle the concurrent civil jurisdiction. In
particular, the Forum, as well as the Petition, cited § 10.02 of
Rule 10 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice for District
Courts. Title I, Section 10.02 outlines the factors to be considered when recognition of Tribal Court orders and judgments is
discretionary. The comment to Rule 10 provides that when
there is no applicable statute, recognition of Tribal Court
orders and judgments is governed by principles of comity.36
The Petition also cited State of Washington Court Rule 82.5(b)
on concurrent Tribal and Superior Court jurisdiction. That
rule authorizes a superior court to transfer an action to a Tribal
Court in the interests of justice, taking into account “the
nature of the action, the interests and identities of the parties,
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, whether state or
tribal law will apply to the matter in controversy, and the remedy available in such Indian tribal court.”
The rule proposed by the Petition was adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court on July 31, 2008, and became
effective January 1, 2009.37 Unlike the Teague Protocol, which
requires dual filings in both state and tribal courts, the new
WIS. STAT. § 801.5438 gives a circuit court, after notice and a
hearing on the record, the discretion to transfer an action to
tribal court when there is concurrent jurisdiction and when
transfer is warranted after consideration of all relevant factors,
including the following:
(a) Whether issues involve interpretation of tribal laws.
(b) Whether the action involves traditional or cultural matters
of the tribe.
(c) Whether a tribe is a party, or tribal sovereignty, jurisdiction
or territory is involved.

(d) The tribal membership status of the parties.
(e) Where the claim arose.
(f) Whether the parties have by contract chosen the forum or
law to be applied.
(g) The timing of any motion to transfer, taking into account
the expenditure of time and resources by the parties and
the court and compliance with any scheduling orders.
(h) The court in which the dispute can be decided most expeditiously.
(i) The institutional and administrative interest of both
courts.
(j) The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access
to and admissibility of evidence and where the action can
be heard and resolved most promptly.
(k) Any other factors having a substantial bearing on the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.

35. The Forum is a joint committee of representatives of state and
tribal courts established by the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to promote communication and cooperation
among Wisconsin’s state and tribal court systems.
36. See Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts tit.
1, § 10.02, Tribal Courts and Judgments, http://www.courts.state.
mn.us/Documents/0/Public/Rules/GRP_Tit_I_3-12-09.pdf.
37. Sup. Ct. Order No. 07-11-2008 WI 114, issued July 31, 2008, eff.

January 1, 2009.
38. WIS. STAT. § 801.54(2)(a)-(k) (West Supp. 2008).
39. WIS. STAT. § 801.54 cmt. (2008).
40. See WIS. STAT. § 801.54(2m) (2008); Sup. Ct. Order 7-11A, 2009
WI 63 (issued July 31, 2009, eff. July 31, 2009).
41. See, e.g., Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 47.10) (eff. Oct. 15, 2004);
California (Cal. Rules of Court 5.483) (eff. Jan. 1, 2008);
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-126) (eff. May 30, 2002); Iowa

The purpose of this
rule is to enable
circuit courts to
transfer civil
actions to tribal
courts in Wisconsin
as efficiently as
possible where
appropriate.
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As can be seen, these 11 factors are strikingly similar to the
13 points enumerated by the Teague III majority. Upon a discretionary transfer to tribal court, further proceedings in state
court are stayed for up to five years, subject to modification on
motion and notice to the parties as the interests of justice may
require. A discretionary transfer to tribal court may be
appealed as a matter of right.
The following comment to WIS. STAT. § 801.54, although
not adopted, may be consulted for guidance in interpreting it:
The purpose of this rule is to enable circuit courts to
transfer civil actions to tribal courts in Wisconsin as efficiently as possible where appropriate. In considering the
factors under sub. (2), the circuit court shall give particular weight to the constitutional rights of the litigants and
their rights to assert all available claims and defenses.39
DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER RULE IS AMENDED

After consideration at several open administrative conferences, the Wisconsin Supreme Court on July 31, 2009,
adopted an amendment to § 801.54, effective as of that date,
that permits a circuit court on its own motion or that of any
party, to transfer a post-judgment child support, custody or
placement provision of an action in which the state is the real
party in interest to a tribal court located in Wisconsin which is
receiving Federal funding to operate child support programs.
Once the circuit court has made an explicit finding of concurrent jurisdiction, transfer will occur unless a party timely
objects or establishes good cause to prevent transfer. If there is
a timely objection, the court must hold a hearing on the record
to consider § 801.54(2) factors.40 Permitting such transfers in
child support cases is consistent with the practice in a number
of other states.41

CONCLUSIONS

Although we are not aware of any post-Mohr formal Teague
Conferences, we understand that the principles of comity identified in Teague III have been significant in facilitating discussions and cooperation between state and tribal court judges
faced with duplicative litigation. In the short time since Wis.
Stat. § 801.54 took effect, there is no data on the frequency of
its usage. We anticipate that § 801.54 transfers will be made
when it makes sense to do so. Such transfers can be done without the formality of a Teague Conference, which, in any event,
cannot bind a tribal court. Section § 801.54(2m), the 2009
amendment, was adopted at the behest of the Oneida Indian
Nation, which had added a child support enforcement agency
to its judicial system.42 This amendment will facilitate transfer
of post-judgment child support, custody and placement matters of which it has been estimated there may be more than
4,000 statewide.43
In the future, parties and courts in the Ninth and Tenth
Judicial Districts have at their disposal formal and informal
mechanisms to avoid the race-to-judgment problems presented in Teague. If non-child support parallel actions should
arise involving the non-signatory Menominee Tribe, or with
tribes located in other judicial districts such as the Ho-Chunk
Nation or Oneida Indian Nation, the parties and judges or
judicial officers may convene a Teague Conference on an ad
hoc, voluntary basis, not unlike what occurred in Mohr, but
they also are free to use the discretionary transfer rule of Wis.
Stat. § 801.54. Absent a controlling protocol with a tie-breaking mechanism, there remains some risk of a deadlock between

(IOWA CODE § 232B.5) (adopted 2003); Michigan (Mich. Court
Rule 3.980) (eff. May 1, 2003); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 260.771)
(eff. July 1, 2007); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1504) (adopted
1985); New York (N.Y. Ch. 55 CONS. LAWS Art. 2 § 39) (eff. Dec.
21, 2005); Oklahoma (10 OKLA. STATS. Ch. 1B § 40.4) (eff. Sept.
1, 1994); Oregon (34 OR. REV. STAT. 419C.058) (adopted 2003);
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-15.1) (adopted 2005);
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.034, 13.34.070,
13.32A.152 and 26.33.040) (all eff. June 10, 2004).

the two judges, as occurred in Teague. But the federal tribal
exhaustion doctrine, as formulated by the United States
Supreme Court and recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in its Teague decisions, makes deference to proceeding in
tribal court more likely. Likewise, the development of the discretionary transfer rule itself reflects that the fruit of sustained
communication and cooperation between state and tribal court
judges can yield not only formal protocols, but a more collegial, cooperative relationship that facilitates informal means of
deciding to transfer a case from one court’s sovereign jurisdiction to another. In short, the informal, cooperative process has
become more useful than the protocol. This is progress.
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42. Recently available federal funds have encouraged a number of
tribal courts to develop their own child support enforcement
agencies, which tend to pursue enforcement more effectively than
over-burdened state courts are able. See Telephone Interview
(June 2, 2009), supra note 33.
43. Telephone interview with A. John Voelker, Wisconsin Director of
State Courts (May 26, 2009); D. Ziemer, Cases Can Transfer to
Tribal Court, WIS. L.J, May 11, 2009.
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Beyond Minimum Standards:
Federal Requirements and State Interpretations
of the Indian Child Welfare Act
Kathryn E. Fort

A

woman comes to state court with a tribal custody
order, seeking to modify its provisions. The state
removes a child from her home and her mother is a
tribal citizen. A couple seeks a divorce in state court but both
are tribal citizens. When these cases appear in state courts,
practitioners need to know how and where family law and
Indian law intersect, and how that intersection shifts the cases
out of the majority of family law cases in state courts. Because
family law is such a large portion of the civil docket, it is easy
for certain procedures to become routine. However, some
cases involving tribal citizens require the application of different laws and different standards which are hardly routine. The
intersection of family law and Indian law may account for a
small number of cases, but particularly in states with high
Native populations it is necessary for all state court practitioners to have a basic understanding of the issues involved.
The appearance of a tribal citizen or tribal court order in
state court may cause confusion for state court judges and
practitioners. Judges and lawyers may try to handle the case
under the state family laws with which they are already familiar. However, there are specific federal and state laws which
govern many of these situations. On the federal level, the most
important is the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).1 ICWA
requires certain minimum federal standards be met when an
Indian child is in state court. However, courts are also grappling with the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),2 and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (AFSA). 3 In addition, state
laws can provide more than the federal minimum standards
provided by ICWA and also affect cases when ICWA does not
apply. Specifically, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)4 as adopted by the state, and various full faith and credit rules and interpretations, address
tribal courts and tribal court orders when in state court.
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

Of the federal laws which come into play in state courts, by

Authors’ Note: Portions of this article were previously published as
When the Rules Shift: A Review of the Indian Child Welfare Act, M.C.R.
2.615 and Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Michigan Family Law Cases in 10
MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW JOURNAL 11 (Spring 2007).
Footnotes
1. 25 U.S.C. §§1901-1963.
2. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. PL 105-89; 111 Stat 2115.
4. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uccjea/
final1997act.htm (versions of the UCCJEA have been passed by 40
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far the most important is the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA). ICWA is the law governing cases involving the
removal of Indian children from their homes and tribes. Passed
in 1978, ICWA governs the removal of an “Indian child” from
the home, the termination of parental rights, and pre-adoption
and adoption placement procedures.5 The goal of ICWA is to
preserve Indian families and keep children connected to their
tribe against an onslaught of state agency attempts to break up
these families and place the children with non-Indian families.
For example, from 1971 to 1972, Indian children were adopted
at eight times the rate of non-Indian children, and virtually all
of these children were placed in non-Indian homes.6 Because
the very existence of a tribe is in its children, this taking of
children strikes at the heart of tribes and their existence.7
Understanding ICWA’s dual goals – to protect both the child
and the tribe – is the first step in understanding the various
provisions of the law.
ICWA changes the rules of traditional family law practice by
requiring different, and higher, standards based on a child’s
tribal status. Though ICWA singles out a specific group for different treatment, such as higher standards of proof for terminating parental rights, or requiring more effort by the state in
maintaining family ties, this federal law is not unconstitutional.
The group ICWA seeks to protect are tribal citizens and their
nations. ICWA is based on the government-to-government relationship between the federal government and Indian nations,
and the political status of tribal citizens as citizens of their
nations.8 The federal government has long recognized a “trust
relationship” with tribes, based on treaties, statutes and court
cases. Some also trace the relationship to the Commerce Clause
and Treaty Clause of the Constitution. As stated in the
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, “[t]he commerce clause has
become the linchpin in the more general power over Indian
affairs recognized by Congress and the courts.”9 The Commerce
Clause, therefore, “anticipat[es] and affirm[s] federal law
singl[ing] out Indian nations and their members for separate

states, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/docs/UCCJEAadoptions.pdf).
5. See B.J. JONES, MARK TILDEN & KELLY GAINES-STONER, THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK (2nd ed. 2008).
6. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32
(1989).
7. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Origins of the Indian Child Welfare
Act: A Survey of the Legislative History (Michigan State University
Indigenous Law & Policy Center Occasional Paper Series, 200904 (April 10, 2009)). available at http://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/2009-04.pdf.
8. 25 U.S.C. §1901.
9. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §5.01[4] (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds. 2005).

treatment.”10 The Supreme Court also provides a basis for the
trust relationship in various decisions as early as 1831.11
The trust relationship now covers a broad range of federal
legislation designed to provide services and benefits to tribes
and tribal citizens, and is often cited by Congress when passing legislation designed for tribes or tribal citizens. In ICWA,
Congress started the findings section by “recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to
Indian people....”12 Because of this special relationship, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to “legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”13 This
singling out is also based on tribal citizens’ own political relationship as citizens of their tribes.14 As citizens, or potential
citizens, of a tribe, a child is due both the benefits and responsibilities as a tribal citizen and the benefits of the federal trust
relationship. In removing a child from a tribe, not only does a
tribe lose one of its citizens, the child loses her tribe.
For these reasons, ICWA is a particularly important statute.
However, while ICWA itself is not long or complex, state interpretations of it are wide ranging. Most importantly, ICWA
slows down the usual practices regarding the removal and
placement of Indian children outside of their homes and their
tribes. This is because of the abuse, or complete lack, of due
process procedures when children were systematically
removed from parents by the state.15 Indeed, even with the
implementation of ICWA, certain due process procedures
required by the statute are still systematically not followed.16
While the only Supreme Court case interpreting the statute,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield17 strongly
encouraged uniform state application of the law, stating “a
statute under which different rules apply from time to time to
the same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from
one State to another, cannot be what Congress had in mind,”18
interpretations of the provisions of ICWA do vary widely from
state to state. In addition, ICWA provides for the “minimum
federal standards” for protection of Indian children in state
court. Some states have passed laws with higher standards for
Indian children in their state courts. Regardless, the federal
provisions of ICWA require state courts to follow certain procedures in ICWA cases.
ICWA applies to specific “child custody proceedings.”
These proceedings are usually non-voluntary, such as foster
care or guardianship placement where the child “cannot be
returned upon demand” of the parent, or permanent, such as
termination of parental rights, pre-adoption and adoption
placement procedures.19 For example, while deciding to allow

a child to be adopted may
...ICWA is a
be a voluntary act by the
particularly
parent, it is a permanent
severance of the child from
important statute.
the parent, and likely the
However, while
tribe, and therefore falls
ICWA itself is not
under the ICWA. ICWA
does not apply in custody
long or complex,
disputes stemming from state interpretations
divorce cases. However, as
of it are wide
discussed below, laws other
ranging.
than ICWA or state divorce
laws may govern in those
cases.
For ICWA to apply in these situations, the child must be
considered an “Indian child.” The state agency bringing the
action falling under ICWA has the affirmative duty to determine whether the child might be a tribal member or eligible for
tribal citizenship and a biological child of a tribal citizen. Since
only the tribe has the ability to determine whether the child
would be considered an Indian child under the act, the tribe
must be contacted by the state in these proceedings. While the
court does not have the ability to determine the child’s status
as an Indian child, it does have a role in determining whether
the tribe qualifies under ICWA, specifically, whether the tribe
is federally recognized.
While the court must determine if the child is potentially an
“Indian child,” it is not, nor is it ever, the state court’s role to
determine if the child is eligible for tribal membership. That is
a decision of the tribe, and implicates a key area of tribal sovereignty. The Supreme Court, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
stated “a tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal
purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as
an independent political community.”20 Most states around the
country have upheld this fundamental provision of tribal sovereignty.21
In conjunction with determining if ICWA applies to the case,
the state also must comply with the notice provision. The state
is required to notify the tribe, the parent, the “Indian custodian” and the regional BIA office of the proceedings as soon as
the state has any knowledge the case might fall under ICWA.
The agency making the petition has the duty to make the notification and make it properly. Lack of notice at the start of a case
can be an incurable flaw later in the case. For example, the
Michigan Appeals Court has held that “failure to comply with
the requirements of the ICWA may render invalid a proceeding
terminating a parent’s rights.”22 California routinely remands

10. Id., §14.03[2][b][i].
11. Id., §5.04[4][a].
12. 25 U.S.C. §1901.
13. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
14. Id. at 554.
15. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 4.
16. See, Kathryn Fort, The Cherokee Conundrum: California Courts and
the Indian Child Welfare Act (MSU Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 07-07 (April 20, 2009)), available at SSRN
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392293.

17. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
18. Id. at 46.
19. 25 U.S.C. §1903(1).
20. 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978).
21. See In re N.E.G.P., 626 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Mich. App. 2001);
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT 5 (2007), available at http://narf.org/
icwa/print/application.pdf.
22. In re N.E.G.P, 626 N.W.2d at 923.
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ICWA cases for noncompliance
with the notice provisions of
the statute.23 Without notice,
the tribe is unable to exercise
its right of intervention and
petition for transfer. Improper
notice means ICWA cannot be
applied to the rest of the proceeding, since the tribe may
have no way of knowing the
case even exists. This notice is
of particular importance given
the jurisdictional aspects of
ICWA. Finally, notifying and communicating with the tribe is
one way a state court may determine whether the child is considered an Indian child by the tribe.
Initially ICWA shifts jurisdiction slightly from the usual
civil tribal jurisdiction interpretation. In an ICWA case, if the
Indian child resides off of the reservation, the state and tribe
have concurrent jurisdiction. If the child resides on the reservation the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction. These cases are not
evaluated under principles of civil tribal jurisdiction; ICWA
clearly provides for the jurisdictional boundaries in these
cases. If the state is exercising its concurrent jurisdiction, the
tribe, or Indian custodian, has the right to intervene in the
case. The tribe also has the right to petition for transfer of the
case to tribal court. Absent “good cause to the contrary” the
state court “shall” transfer the case to the tribal court.24
ICWA is a highly litigated statute, and both the intervention
and transfer provisions have been the subject of cases in state
court. “Good cause” is a difficult standard to quantify, and each
state has determined for itself what “good cause” may be. One
area of guidance is the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for
State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings.25 The Guidelines
are not binding on state courts, though many states find them
persuasive. While the Guidelines provide different factors
involved to determine “good cause,” including the timeliness of
the petition for transfer, the best interests of the child standard
is not to be considered by the court. Because the best interest
standard is used by most family law courts, there have been
some cases where courts have incorrectly applied the best interests standard to this jurisdictional standard. In South Dakota,
the supreme court overturned a decision by the trial court to
deny a transfer to tribal court based on an evaluation of the best
interests of the child. The court held “that a substitute parent
might provide a child with good care or even better care than
its natural parent is not an appropriate standard for determining the best interests of the child in the context of a ICWA
transfer decision.”26 As an appellate court in Illinois pointed
out, the best interests test was “relevant not to determine juris-

diction but to ascertain placement.”27
If the tribe does not seek to transfer the case to tribal court,
or if the state fails to transfer the case because of good cause,
the state is still bound by ICWA and required to follow its provisions. Among others, these include the placement provisions
and active efforts provision. When a child is removed from her
family and placed in foster care or with an adoptive family, the
court must place the child in accordance with the ICWA’s placement preferences. Importantly, the court first must determine if
the tribe has passed a law regarding placement preferences, as
these are to be the primary guidance for a state court to follow.
Otherwise, children in foster care must be placed in the “least
restrictive setting” in “reasonable proximity to his or her home”
and placed with either a member of the child’s extended family,
a foster home approved or licensed by the tribe, an Indian foster home licensed by the state, or an institution run by an
Indian organization or approved by the tribe. Children being
adopted must be placed with a member of the child’s family,
members of the child’s tribe, or another Indian family. 28
There is, however, a “good cause,” exception to the ICWA
placement preferences as well, and some state courts have
inserted the best interests test into this determination as well.
For a court to deviate from the placement preferences, it must
provide “good cause to the contrary.”29 Again, the BIA
Guidelines provide some guidance as to what “good cause”
might consist of, but specifically does not list a best interests
standard as good cause. ICWA assumes the best interests of the
Indian child are served by following the placement preferences. Using the best interests standard of the state court to
undermine the placement preferences ignores Congressional
intent and fails to acknowledge the reasons ICWA had to be
passed in the first place. The best interests test is amorphous,
and allows the court to insert the very standards and values
ICWA tries to counter.
Another vital provision in the act is the active efforts section. The phrase “active efforts” refers to the portion of the law
which requires that in the event of foster care placement or termination of parental rights, the party seeking to remove the
child must demonstrate that “active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
efforts have proved unsuccessful.”30 Unfortunately, the statute
does not define what these active efforts need to be, and are
often the subject of litigation. The BIA Guidelines do provide
some instruction, stating that the efforts should “take into
account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way
of life of the Indian child’s tribe. They shall also involve and
use the available resources of the extended family, the tribe,
Indian social service agencies and individual Indian care
givers.”31 At the very least, active efforts require more than pas-

23. Fort, supra note 16, at 18.
24. 25 U.S.C §1911.
25. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child
Custody Proceedings, 44 FEDERAL REGISTER 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979)
(“BIA Guidelines”).
26. In re J.C.D., 686 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D. 2004).
27. Interest of Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. 1990) (cited in

Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction under the Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ.
L. REV. 353, 390 (1992)).
28. 25 U.S.C. §1915.
29. Id.
30. Id. at §1912(d).
31. BIA Guidelines, D.2, 44 Fed Reg 67584, 67592.
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sive efforts, and also must include tribal services and culturally
appropriate services.32
Because of the relatively amorphous definition, there are
not many cases listing what satisfies the active efforts requirement. Rather, the courts tend to focus on the facts of each individual case to determine whether active efforts occurred. A
majority of state courts have found active efforts require more
than the normal services offered to non-Indian parents.33 In
South Dakota, the Supreme Court followed the Holyfield
directive for the statute to be applied uniformly across the
country and determined that active efforts did require more
than the regular services offered by the state.34
More recently, courts have been struggling with the interplay between ICWA and AFSA. However, AFSA and ICWA
have contradictory goals, and ought not to be read together.
Generally the biggest conflict comes under ICWA’s requirement of active efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the Indian
family separated by the court. Under AFSA, in certain circumstances, reasonable efforts are not required by the court before
terminating parental rights. Indeed, the goals of AFSA, to
hurry up adoption proceedings and streamline the process, are
the opposite of ICWA, which is to slow down the parental termination process and make sure proper procedures are followed before the permanent removal of Indian children from
their families. Where ICWA applies, AFSA should not.35
Even after the application of active efforts, there are different standards of proof in non-ICWA and ICWA cases. Under
ICWA, removal of an Indian child from the home requires clear
and convincing evidence, and testimony by qualified experts,
that leaving the child in the home will lead to “serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” Under ICWA, termination of parental rights requires evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, and testimony by qualified experts, that the child will
suffer “serious emotional or physical damage.”36 Different
states have applied these standards in various ways. For example, in Michigan, both the federal and state levels of evidence
must be met. Therefore, to terminate the parental rights of a
parent to an Indian child, the court must prove the ICWA standard, and also “find clear and convincing evidence that one or
more enumerated statutory grounds for termination exist.”37
ICWA also provides rules for the enforcement of any tribal
court orders a state court might encounter in an ICWA case.
Under ICWA, tribal court judgments are to be enforced by the
state court without any question into the nature of the tribal
court or previous tribal court proceedings. In other words, in
ICWA cases, tribal court orders, tribal laws and judicial proceedings are granted full faith and credit by the state courts.38

Finally, some courts have
Some states have
used the judicially created
adopted ICWA as
existing Indian family
exception to avoid applying
either a state law
ICWA at all. Courts created
or court rule.
the existing Indian family
exception for children and
families the court determines should have no contact with the
tribe. In other words, the court puts itself in the position of
determining the “Indian-ness” of a child, and ignores the federal requirements of ICWA’s Indian child definition. Many
states have rejected this exception, and – notably – it was also
recently rejected in Kansas, the state to first introduce the
exception.39 States which have also rejected the existing Indian
family exceptioninclude Michigan, New York, Illinois and
Alaska, among many others.40

32. See In re Children of SW, 727 NW2d 144, 149 (Minn. App. 2007).
33. See, e.g., In re JS, 177 P3d 590, 593-4 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008);
Fletcher, supra note 7, at 9.
34. In re JS, 177 P3d at 593.
35. Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family
Services State Plan Reviews, 65 Fed Reg 4020-01, 4029-30 (January
25, 2000) (While AFSA is silent on ICWA, the Federal
Regulations interpreting AFSA conclude that “nothing in this regulation supersedes ICWA requirements.”).
36. 25 U.S.C. §1912(e),(f).

37. In re Dougherty, 599 N.W.2d 722, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
38. 25 U.S.C. §1911
39. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
40. NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, supra note 21 at 2-3.
41. 25 USC §1921.
42. IOWA CODE §232B.3 (2003).
43. In re A.W.,741 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2007).
44. CAL. WELF. & INST. § 360.6 (1999).
45. In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., 2001).

STATE LAWS, COURT RULES, AND ICWA

Some states have adopted ICWA as either a state law or court
rule. These laws or rules may be different than the federal
statute. As Congress wrote, ICWA is considered the “federal
minimum standards” governing cases involving Indian children. Some states have chosen to go beyond those minimum
standards, while some adopt the law with no changes. Under
ICWA, when a state or federal law provides a “higher standard
of protection” for the parents or Indian custodian of an Indian
child, the state or federal law applies.41 However, state courts
react to these laws and rules in different ways. One issue with
state law adaption of ICWA is the state court’s ability to review,
and determine the state constitutionality of, these laws.
In Iowa, the state legislature adopted ICWA as state law,
with some changes to various parts of the federal statute. The
Iowa ICWA statute extended the definition of Indian child to
include children recognized as members of the tribal community.42 Recently the Iowa Supreme Court found that portion of
the ICWA statute unconstitutional. Citing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Morton v. Mancari, the Iowa Court determined that the state definition impermissibly included
“racially” Indian children, not just children who are tribal
citizens or eligible for tribal citizenship.43
After a series of cases in the California appellate courts, the
California legislature passed a law banning the courts from
using the existing Indian family doctrine to prevent the application of ICWA.44 At least one appellate court found that
statute to be unconstitutional and applied the existing Indian
family doctrine.45 However, the legislature passed the law
again, now as Welfare and Institutions Code §224, and a 2007
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appellate court case upheld the
law as constitutional.46 There
is still a split, however, in the
California appellate courts
regarding the application of
the existing Indian family
exception.
In
Michigan,
the
Department
of
Human
Services of course must follow
the notice requirements of
ICWA.47 The Michigan Appeals Court agreed with a Vermont
Supreme Court case that “it is preferable to err on the side of
giving notice and examining thoroughly whether the juvenile
is an Indian child.”48 However, Michigan also provides for
more extensive notice proceedings than the ICWA notice provisions. Michigan’s court rule on ICWA requires a court to
inquire about the child or parent’s status as a tribal citizen. The
appellate court cited to ICWA and stated that “Michigan
imposes a more stringent standard than that found in §1912(a)
of the ICWA to ensure that inquiry and notification are performed.”49
In another case, though, the Michigan appeals court maintained ICWA’s narrow definition of an Indian child, holding
that ICWA does not apply when the “minor child is claimed to
be an Indian child from an Indian tribe that is not recognized
as eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary of
the Interior,”50 contrary to the state’s own Children’s Foster Care
Manual, which encouraged the courts to extend ICWA to staterecognized or Canadian tribes. The tribe in question in the
case was neither a non-federally recognized tribe located in
Michigan nor a Canadian First Nation. Whether the Michigan
court would consider those under Michigan ICWA standards is
questionable.
Finally, Wisconsin has also found that when trying to “harmonize” its children’s code and ICWA, the state law may be
invoked when it provides higher standards of protection.
Specifically, the court stated when the state law “provides a
higher standard of protection than is mandated by the ICWA,
we find it appropriate that where the children’s code provides
additional safeguards beyond what is mandated by ICWA,
those additional safeguards should be followed.”51
At this time at least two states, Michigan and North
Carolina, are contemplating incorporating ICWA into state
statutes to both clarify and potentially extend ICWA’s federal
minimum protections.52

Generally, the
treatment of tribal
court orders in
family law cases
is governed by
both state and
federal law

46. In re Vincent M., 150 Cal. App. 4th 1247 (Cal. App. 6 Dist.,
2007).
47. In re IEM, 592 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Mich. App. 1999).
48. Id. at 757 (quoting In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627 (Vt. 1989)).
49. In re Elliot, 554 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Mich. App. 1996).
50. In re Fried, 702 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. App. 2005).
51. In re D.S.P., 480 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wis. 1992).
52. Interview with Allie Maldonado, General Counsel for the Little
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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN NON-ICWA FAMILY LAW
CASES

There are family law cases where ICWA does not apply, but
other state and federal laws may. Generally, the treatment of
tribal court orders in family law cases is governed by both state
and federal law. Part of the issue comes down to distinguishing
between full faith and credit, comity and various state court
rules regarding comity or full faith and credit.
Full faith and credit is guaranteed in Art. IV of the United
States Constitution, to ensure the sister states give full force to
the judicial proceedings in other states. When faced with an
order from another state, the implementation and enforcement
of it ought to be automatic. There are no discussions of due
process standards or reading behind the order itself. A federal
statute, 28 USC §1738, expanded the full faith and credit
clause to territories and possessions of the United States. The
statute does not explicitly include tribes. However, two states
– Idaho and New Mexico – interpret the statute to include
tribes.53 These states conclude the tribes are equivalent territories, and therefore grant full faith and credit to tribal court
judgments. The vast majority of states do not interpret that
statute or the Constitution to ensure full faith and credit for
Indian tribes. However, other federal statutes such as the
Violence Against Women Act and the Child Support Order Act
include full faith and credit for tribal court order provisions.
When these statutes apply, the state court does not invoke a
state statute, rule or comity when enforcing the judgment.
Enforcement of the judgment is automatic under these federal
statutes.
When faced with a foreign court order, a state or federal
court will invoke principles of “comity.” Comity is a far more
amorphous concept, based on the respect of another sovereign.
The Supreme Court, in Hilton v. Guyot,54 stated that comity was
“neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,” which
it has cited approvingly in later cases.55 Enforcing a foreign
court order is not guaranteed or required. Comity requires a
discussion of a number of factors, including due process concerns and public policy issues. Indeed, it has been noted that
the use of comity may even bring up concerns of separation of
powers and political question issues, as only Congress and the
Executive Branch have the power to deal with foreign nations.
The granting, or not granting, of comity to a foreign court may
have the potential to cause larger foreign policy problems.56
A majority of states, when enforcing tribal court judgments
not governed by federally mandated full faith and credit laws
still use principles of comity to determine the enforcement of

Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, in Lansing, MI (May 11,
2009).
53. Jim v. City Financial Services Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975);
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982).
54. 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
55. Banco National de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408 (1964).
56. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
Intern., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).

the judgment. Some states, however, have passed a statute or
court rule to provide guidance for state courts when enforcing
a tribal court judgment. In Michigan, a unique court rule governs the enforcement of tribal court judgments when there is
no other state or federal law dictating otherwise. M.C.R. 2.615
is not quite full faith and credit, but is a higher standard than
comity, and is a reciprocal rule. In order for a tribe to have its
orders enforced in a Michigan state court, it must pass a law or
rule ensuring its tribal courts enforce state court judgments.
The tribe must notify the State Court Administrative Office
(SCAO) of their rule. The SCAO maintains a list of which
tribes qualify under M.C.R. 2.615. In addition, M.C.R. 2.615
does not limit reciprocity to tribes located in Michigan. Any
federally recognized tribe can file with the SCAO, provided the
tribe has passed the rule regarding the enforcement of
Michigan state court judgments in their court.
Under M.C.R. 2.615, a tribal court judgment is presumed
valid. The party challenging the order must prove otherwise.
This is a distinct difference from comity, where the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to enforce the foreign order.
Therefore, a tribal court judgment is presumed valid by the
court unless challenged, and when challenged, that party must
demonstrate one of five factors applies to the order. Four of the
factors are types of evaluations the state courts do in other
comity cases, including whether the order was obtained
through fraud or duress, without notice or hearing, “repugnant” to public policy, or not final. The fifth factor, however, is
a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, a determination which requires an understanding of civil tribal jurisdiction.
Regardless of state court rules, in all cases, a court must
determine whether the tribe had jurisdiction over the case
under which the order arises. Civil tribal jurisdiction requires
a complex analysis and complete understanding of the parties’
tribal citizenship and residence.57 As a sovereign entity, a tribe
has inherent jurisdiction over its own citizens residing on the
reservation. If the tribal citizens are not domiciled on the reservation, the state and tribe may have concurrent jurisdiction,
depending on the tribe’s code. In some instances, the tribe has
jurisdiction over non-Indians as well. If a dispute occurs
between a tribal citizen and a non-Indian on the reservation,
the tribe may have jurisdiction, but if the same dispute arises
off the reservation, the state has jurisdiction. Of course, a nonIndian can consent to tribal jurisdiction, and in some cases the
tribal code extends jurisdiction to non-Indians living on the
reservation.
One additional issue regarding full faith and credit implicates the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).58 Many states have adopted this
model statute as state law. In the draft published by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, tribes were included in section 102 and 104. Specifically,
the draft law stated that if ICWA applies to a case, the UCCJEA
does not. However, the draft law also requires states to treat
tribes as if they are sister states for the purposes of applying the

law, and also states that tribal determination of child custody
must be “recognized and enforced.”59 If the tribal court had
proper jurisdiction over the custody proceeding, then the state
cannot later exercise jurisdiction other than to enforce the custody order. While some states may not have chosen to add the
additional language when they codified the UCCJEA as state
law, some have. Since the UCCJEA is used every day by family
court practitioners, treating tribes as states does not require a
difficult analysis. The same rules apply to a tribal court order
as to a state court order.
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57. For a more detailed discussion of tribal civil jurisdiction, see
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 7.
58. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, available
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59. Id. at §104.

CONCLUSION

The interplay of these laws can be confusing, particularly if
the practitioner is not familiar with their language or application. Family law cases are already emotionally difficult, with
multiple parties trying to achieve what they believe will be the
best conclusion for a child. When the family court routine
shifts with the introduction of different laws, confusion and
miscommunication is not uncommon. An understanding of
these laws and why they apply makes it easier for all involved
parties. However, ignoring ICWA or misapplying ICWA early
on only leads to extended litigation. The court’s adherence to
the federal law can ensure the relatively quick resolution of difficult cases.
Many tribes now have fully functioning tribal courts at both
the trial and appellate level. Both highly educated tribal citizens and traditional tribal elders sit as judges and justices on
these courts. Acknowledging and respecting the work these
tribal courts do on a daily basis is a first step for any state court
judge when faced with a tribal court order or a motion to transfer a case to tribal court. Cooperation and communication
between tribal and state courts make difficult cases easier and
lead to better resolutions for those involved.
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American Indian Law
Research for State Courts
Nancy Carol Carter

A

merican Indian law commonly describes the body of
law by which the United States government regulates
its relationship to Indian tribes and Native American
citizens. First explorations of Indian law tend to surprise and
intrigue the researcher. Unique legal rules characterize the
field and extensive historical research may be required. Basic
legal principles that govern a factual situation involving nonIndians may not apply to an Indian-law case of similar facts.
Appellate decisions may lack broad applicability because they
are so closely tied to treaty language or the history of a single
tribe. Questions involving Indian law are beginning to arise in
new contexts and have become more complex. Specialty legislation applies to Alaska Natives and questions about the legal
status of Native Hawaiians and their land rights remain unresolved. Increasingly, there are efforts to invoke international
human-rights standards and to use comparative law in the
analysis of domestic indigenous issues. Assumptions must be
avoided in favor of careful research on every point.
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW RESEARCH IS DIFFERENT

Once viewed as an esoteric legal cul-de-sac, Indian law was
short on research sources. The subject had no law-school casebook until 1973. In the absence of an academic treatise, it long
relied on the Handbook of Federal Indian Law1 written as a federal government guide by Felix Cohen in 1942. The ubiquitous nutshell series did not deal with the topic of American
Indian law until 1981.
Awareness of American Indian law has dramatically
increased, helped in part by the Indian-rights movement and
increased and effective legal advocacy. Media coverage has
brought popular attention to specialized legislation like the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990,2 national news when Indian tribes claimed the ancient
bones of Kennewick Man in a protracted legal dispute.
Extensive coverage of an ongoing class action alleging federal
fiduciary failures in the management of Indian trust funds is
alerting many for the first time that the federal government
serves as a trustee for some Native Americans. Conflicts over
religious practices and disputes over areas claimed as sacred
sites have been widely reported. Likewise, the emergence of
Indian gaming and new tribal economic power has drawn a
great deal of attention to the once obscure field of Indian law.
Academia has seen a growth in Native American studies programs and more law schools than ever teach courses in
American Indian law and offer graduate law degrees in the
field.
For researchers, this higher profile is a welcome development because many more scholars and legal commentators are

Footnotes
1. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942).
2. 25 U.S.C, §§ 3001-3013 (2006).
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working in the field. Over the past 30 years, an increase in the
production of books, articles, microform, websites, and digitized original documents has largely overcome the former
scarcity and inaccessibility of American Indian law materials.
Researchers are thus confronted with the classic challenge of
selecting the most authoritative sources from an array of possibilities, a particular challenge in a field fraught with political
questions, rich with advocacy literature, and tied to a history
of national policy fluctuations and reversals.
Further complications arise because American Indian tribes
govern and adjudicate. As governments with sovereign powers, they join the federal government and state governments to
form a triangle of competing jurisdictional powers. While the
federal government claimed preemption over Indian affairs
from the earliest history of the United States and recognized
the powers of tribes to be self-governing, Congress has subsequently legislated federal intrusions into tribal affairs and
extended the jurisdictional powers of states into tribal lands
and over tribal citizens. Cases that appear to be relevant legal
precedent may have arisen during a period when jurisdictional
lines were different than in the present instance. Likewise, legislation may still be on the books, although very basic elements
of the legal relationship have altered. Notably, this is an area of
domestic law in which treaties matter, so historical context is
always important. The field of Indian law is also plagued by
ambiguity and troublesome legal black holes, sometimes created by inattentive legislative drafting. Too often Congress
does not specify whether tribal governments are intended to be
subject to legislative or regulatory provisions, or that an action
intentionally and mindfully conflicts with prior legislation or
treaty terms.
FOUR BASIC INDIAN-LAW REFERENCES

The Internet provides quick access to many of the once
arcane sources of American Indian law, but four works in traditional printed format are recommended for basic reference.
The only treatise in the field is the one-volume Cohen’s
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2005 Edition.3 This work
updates and expands upon the 1982 edition, which had used
Felix Cohen’s 1942 Handbook as the starting point for producing an Indian-law treatise. Researchers may also come across a
1958 edition of Cohen’s classic work. This Department of the
Interior rewrite was produced during the period when federal
policy was to terminate the federal-tribal relationship and to
downplay tribal self-government and Native American land
rights. This official government work is criticized for bias and
poor legal scholarship. When federal policy changed completely, the 1958 work was set aside as obsolete.

3.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton,
ed., 2005).

As with every good treatise, Cohen’s 2005 edition is an
excellent starting point to gain an overview of the law and to
find citations to the leading cases and statutes. The book provides a concise history of federal Indian policy and explains
interpretive principles applied in Indian law. A chapter is
devoted to the tribal-state relationship, and others to topics
such as civil and criminal jurisdiction, taxation, environmental regulation, and rights regarding water, hunting, fishing, and
gathering. A chapter on the Indian Child Welfare Act4 may be
particularly useful to state court researchers.
Federal judge and former law professor William C. Canby,
Jr., contributes a very useful work with his American Indian
Law in a Nutshell.5 A new edition was recently published.
While the nutshell format is necessarily truncated, Canby’s
work is regarded as a scholarly standout in this series. He presents a valuable history of Indian policy and serves up an
excellent introduction to the main themes and principles of
Indian law. This work is useful for background, identification
of issues, and discussions of prominent cases and legislation.
Works with an obvious viewpoint usefully highlight issues,
and two are recommended for a basic collection. Stephen L.
Pevar’s The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Authoritative ACLU
Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights6 is a quick starting point for
basic questions about the civil rights of tribal members and
tribal rights under federal law. Subject coverage is fairly complete but succinct; the question-and-answer style is practical
and to the point. Extensive footnotes lead to primary sources
for further research.
State attorneys general interact closely with tribes. These
lawyers practice on the knife edge of the federal-tribal-state
jurisdictional conflict and deal directly with issues arising from
the existence of Indian reservations and the operations of tribal
governments and tribal courts within state boundaries. That
experience has produced the American Indian Law Deskbook7
by the Conference of Western Attorneys General. The work
aims at a broad audience by keeping legal jargon to a minimum
and focusing on a clear and straightforward presentation of
topics such as Indian lands, criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country, water rights, and tribal sovereignty in the context of
Indian gaming, environmental matters, and child welfare. A
treatment of the statutory and judicial foundations of Indian
law is included, along with extensive analysis of federal and
state court decisions. The first edition of this deskbook was
criticized by one Indian-law scholar as a legal brief in favor of
extending state powers into Indian country. Subsequent editions are credited with achieving more balance, but awareness
of the viewpoint is relevant when consulting this widely relied
upon and useful reference book.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

25 U.S.C. §§1901-1963 (2006).
WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed.
2009).
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE
AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS (3d ed.
2002).
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK (3d ed., 2004).
C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS & TREATIES (1904) (online

PRIMARY SOURCES:
UNITED STATES STATUTES,
CODES, AND
LEGISLATION

Most laws
pertaining to
Indians and
currently in force
are codified at Title
25 of the United
States Code.
However, other
important
legislation is
scattered
throughout the
federal codes.

Tribal governments and
the lives of their citizens are
heavily touched by federal
law and always have been.
This means that contemporary researchers in the field of
Indian law often look back to
the earliest days of the republic for relevant case and
statutory law. The works of
Charles J. Kappler and Felix
S. Cohen aid historical statutory research in Indian law.
Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws
and Treaties8 (now digitized and online) devotes four of its five
volumes to statutes. A Department of Interior update of
Kappler’s work includes laws in force as of 1967. The original
1942 edition of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law has an
“Annotated Table of Statutes and Treaties.”
As final authority, the United States Statutes at Large9 must
be relied upon in most instances. However, exacting historical
statutory research also will lead to the earliest federal codification, the Revised Statutes of the United States.10 All laws
included in this edition were reenacted as positive law, meaning that the text of laws published in the Revised Statutes
replaces the Statutes at Large as the authoritative source.
Most laws pertaining to Indians and currently in force are
codified at Title 25 of the United States Code. However, other
important legislation is scattered throughout the federal codes.
Title 18, for example, contains definitions of Indian country
and jurisdictional legislation for crimes and criminal procedure involving certain Indians. Statutory research in contemporary Indian law may be conducted online or in the General
Index volumes of United States Code Annotated or United States
Code Service. Use of an annotated code is especially helpful in
this field where policy changes can set entirely new directions
for legislation.
New and pending legislation on Indian affairs is easily
tracked through various online sources, including Thomas, the
Library of Congress congressional information source
(http://thomas.loc.gov/), and the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs home page (http://indian.senate.gov/public/). The
House of Representatives does not have a separate committee
on Indian affairs, and parcels out legislative work on Indianlaw matters to various committees.

from Oklahoma State University, available at http://
digital.library.okstate.edu/Kappler/.)
9. The official source of laws and resolutions passed by Congress,
Statutes at Large contains every public and private law arranged
in chronological order by the date of passage. Other documents
are included, such as treaties with Indian tribes.
10. Containing all laws in force on Dec. 1, 1873, the Revised Statutes
were published in 1875.

Court Review - Volume 45 33

Legislative history is often
illuminating for Indian-law
matters, but only a few compiled legislative histories have
been published within the field.
The best sources for finding
citations to relevant legislative
history documents are case law
and the often exacting and
detailed tracking of legislative
history found in student lawreview notes or comments. Many historical documents of the
United States Congress are now digitized and searchable in full
text, making the once tedious task of compiling a legislative
history much easier. The United States Congressional Serial
Set11 available in paper, on microform, and in a digital collection is a treasure trove of legislative history material.

The continuing
force of Indian
treaties partially
accounts for the
inability to
generalize about
Indian law.

PRIMARY SOURCES: TREATIES

Today, ratified treaties remain important primary sources of
Indian law. Following the tradition of the colonial powers in
America, the United States entered into treaties with Indian
tribes from its earliest years. The form and ratification procedures for Indian treaties were the same as for any international
treaty. Likewise, an Indian treaty can be unilaterally abrogated
by the United States, as can treaties with other countries.
The formal end of treaty making came in 1871 as the House
of Representatives asserted its determination to wield more
control over Indian affairs. By this date, great tracks of land
already had been shifted away from Indians and tribes were a
waning military power. Incentives for treating with tribes were
on the decline. At the same time that Congress ended treaty
making, it reaffirmed the national obligations created by
treaties in existence. After 1871, agreements were made
between tribes and the federal government or its agents. These
executive agreements have been enforced similarly to treaties.
The continuing force of Indian treaties partially accounts
for the inability to generalize about Indian law. Federal obligations to individual tribes can vary greatly, depending on treaty
terms. Treaty rights can survive the termination of the special
federal-tribal relationship denoted by federal recognition.
Treaties also may act as a proscription on tribal rights and powers. Contemporary litigation over hunting, fishing, and water
rights, including the power of a state to regulate activities on
Indian land, often involves treaty interpretation.
Approximately 80% of the 375 treaties ratified by the United
States Senate have been the subject of litigation.
The resolution of Indian-law questions may require study of
an original treaty text. It also may be necessary to confirm the
treaty’s continuing validity, to study the circumstances sur-

11. Commonly called the “Serial Set,” this publication collects
House and Senate documents and reports and some executivebranch materials from 1817 to the present. Earlier federal documents are published in the American State Papers.
12. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1944-. This Department of State
publication provides citations to bilateral and multilateral
treaties in force as of January of the current year and is now
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rounding treaty negotiations, trace the tribal and federal
courses of conduct under a treaty, and find all administrative,
executive, or judicial interpretations of treaty terms.
While there are many sources of treaty texts, including
many Internet postings, legal research demands a text with
unquestionable authoritativeness. However, classic compilations of treaty texts, such as the Department of State publication, Treaties in Force,12 exclude Indian treaties. Researchers
must look to the United States Statutes at Large as the official
and authoritative source of Indian-treaty texts. Volume 7 is a
compilation of Indian treaties entered into from 1778 through
1845. The treaties are in chronological order and are indexed
by tribal name. After Volumes 7 and 8 (the first compilations
of Indian and non-Indian treaties), texts of treaties were regularly published in a separate section at the end of each Statutes
volume. Indian treaties are intermingled with all others. They
are indexed within each volume by tribal name and also listed
under the index headings. Volume 16 of the Statutes carries the
last substantial number of Indian treaties, although stray treaty
texts do show up in later volumes, as they were found and
published. In addition to furnishing official treaty texts,
Statutes at Large can be used to trace subsequent congressional
action in furtherance of treaty obligations. For example, appropriations for meeting treaty obligations to furnish supplies,
schools, and farm implements to tribes are easily researched
through the index of the Statutes.
For quick reference to treaties, the original or online version
of Charles J. Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties13 may be
consulted. Volume 2 is a reliable compilation of Indian treaties
presented in chronological order. The index to Volume 2 doubles as a guide to the name and number of treaties signed by
various tribes, although the most careful researcher must note
that Kappler did not break out individual tribal names from
confederated groups.
Constitutionally, all treaties are the supreme law of the land.
But treaties are subject to interpretation, modification, and
abrogation. That Congress can unilaterally abrogate an Indian
treaty by enacting legislation that conflicts with treaty terms is
not in doubt.14 The degree to which Congress is required to
explicitly express its intent to abrogate has been the subject of
litigation and court interpretation. Gauging the present force
and effect of an Indian treaty is not an easy matter, but Charles
D. Bernholz has provided a highly useful aid citing all references to Indian treaties in cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court between 1799 and 2001.15
PRIMARY SOURCES: CASE LAW

Judicial interpretation established basic tenets of Indian law
in the first decades of American legal history and continues to
shape the field to this day. Federal case law is of prime impor-

online at: http://www.state.gov/s/l/c8455.htm.
13. Kappler, supra note 8.
14. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
15. CHARLES D. BERNHOLZ, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A GUIDE TO TREATY CITATIONS FROM THE OPINIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004).

tance, although state courts hear an increasing number of
Indian-law cases.
Leading Indian-law cases are identified in Cohen’s Handbook
of Federal Indian Law and the other basic research source books
described above. The National Indian Law Library of a Boulder,
Colorado, public-interest law firm – the Native American
Rights Fund – has for several years published a collection of
leading cases. Previously titled Top Fifty: A Collection of
Significant American Indian Law Cases from the United States
Supreme Court, the latest edition of the work is called Landmark
Indian Law Cases.16 It reprints in chronological order 53 cases
that resolve important questions or set forth broad principles of
federal Indian law and are useful to lawyers, scholars, judges,
and other practitioners of Indian law. A basic subject index is
provided, along with an alphabetical index by case name. No
interpretive information is included.
Law-school casebooks are useful compilations of illustrative
cases and other readings. In American Indian Law: Native
Nations and the Federal System, Fifth Edition,17 the authors’
stated approach is to merge jurisprudence, history, comparative
law, ethnology, and sociology to bring meaning to the tribalfederal relationship. There is also an effort to accurately portray
Indian tribal perspectives and voices on questions of federal
Indian law.
The fifth edition of Cases and Materials on Federal Indian
Law18 provides a history of federal Indian law and policy in
Part I and federal Indian law in its contemporary perspective in
Part II, covering topics like the federal-tribal relationship; tribal
sovereignty, federal supremacy, and states’ rights; the jurisdictional framework; criminal- and civil-court jurisdiction; taxation and regulation of reservation economic development;
Indian religion and culture; water rights; fishing and hunting
rights; rights of Alaska natives and native Hawaiians; and comparative and international legal perspectives.
A new 2008 casebook, American Indian Law, Cases and
Commentary,19 aims to provide an introduction to the legal relationships between American Indian tribes and the federal government and the individual states. It incorporates the foundational cases with statutory text.
A historic collection was brought together in 1900 when the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs was funded to compile a digest
of court decisions (federal, state, territorial), opinions of the
attorney general, and Interior Department decisions. This
Bureau of Indian Affairs Digest of Decisions Relating to Indian
Affairs is a key source of nineteenth-century judicial thought
on Indian law.20

The president of the United States has been an involved and
powerful maker of Indian law and policy. Between 1855 and

1919 (when Congress voted
The president of
itself exclusive power to set
the United States
aside public lands for Indian
reservations), large tracks of
has been an
public land became reservainvolved and
tion land by executive order.
powerful maker
The executive also acted to
extend federal trust periods
of Indian law
over allotted reservation
and policy....
land, redefine reservation
boundaries, and otherwise
prescribe Indian land holdings. After 1871 when treaty making
ended, the diplomacy of Indian affairs continued with negotiated documents looking very much like treaties, but called
executive agreements. In other words, agreements were concluded and effectuated by presidential decrees establishing
reservations and making land transfers that might once have
been accomplished by treaty.
Research in presidential documents may be required to clarify issues involving reservation land, or the reserved rights of a
tribe, or even the potential jurisdictional powers of a state over
aspects of Indian life on a reservation. This kind of research
was once complicated by the lack of a consistent numbering
scheme for proclamations and orders and their haphazard publication. Now, the pre-1936 historical documents are organized
and indexed and, with the creation of the Federal Register in
1936, newly issued proclamations are sequentially numbered
and consistently published.
Legally, there is no difference between presidential proclamations and executive orders, but modern custom assigns
weighty business to executive orders, while proclamations are
more often used for ceremonial pronouncements. Indian-law
researchers will encounter historical anomalies in this pattern
and must regard both proclamations and executive orders as
substantial sources of law.
The CIS Index to Presidential Executive Orders and
Proclamations (1987) indexes more than 74,000 executive
orders and proclamations issued from 1789 through 1983,
with texts appearing in a companion set of microfiche. The
subject index may be approached by tribal name or terms like
Indian reservations. Research by geographical area may also
yield results. Under Minnesota territory, for example, there are
several references to Indian matters. Proclamations from 1846
forward (but not executive orders) are published in a separate
section of each volume of Statutes at Large, most of which are
available through online databases or at free Internet sites.
The United States Government Printing Office produced
two volumes of Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations,
1855-1922.21 This publication usefully arranges executive
orders geographically by the state in which the Indian reservation is located. An index by reservation name is provided for

16. NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY, COMP. (AALL PUBL. SER. 65, 2002).
17. ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, AND REBECCA TSOSIE,
EDS. (2007).
18. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AND ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, EDS., 2004.
19. ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, AND

SARAH A. KRAKOFF, EDS., 2008.
20. H.R. Doc. No. 538 (2d Sess. 1901), reprinted Kraus, 1973.
21. Issued in various editions by the United States Government
Printing Office, with the 1912 edition combining two volumes in
one as the most commonly relied upon. Reprinted commercially
by Scholarly Resources, 1975.

PRIMARY SOURCES: PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS
AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
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the first volume, but not the
second. The complete table
of contents does, however,
make it easy to find orders
relating to a particular reservation.
Finally, this is yet another
area in which Charles J.
Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws
and Treaties22 can be helpful.
Kappler is one of the best
sources for early proclamations and executive orders
relating to Indian law and
policy. The table of contents
of the “Laws” volumes lists
“Executive Orders Relative to Indian Reservations” in a stateby-state arrangement. Proclamations also are listed with a brief
explanation of their content, e.g., “Ponca lands, Indian title
extinguished.”

The lives of Native Americans are influenced by administrative agency programs, rules, regulations, and decisions to a
greater degree than most citizens. As a threshold matter,
administrative rules establish the procedure by which a tribal
group is federally recognized as being in a government-to-government relationship with the United States. Administrative
contact also flows from the federal responsibility to provide
services to Indians in fulfillment of treaty obligations or in furtherance of the federal trust responsibility. Trust responsibility
can be of a general nature, growing from the history of federal
dealings with a group of Indians, or it can be tied to property
held in trust by the federal government for individuals or
tribes.
Federal administrative rules and regulations relating to
Indians, particularly Bureau of Indian Affairs organization and
operation, are gathered in Title 25 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), but several other titles contain relevant
entries. Research on administrative aspects of Indian law conceivably can lead to any federal agency or department, including the Bureau of Land Management, Office of Economic
Opportunity, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Education, Health and Human Services, etc. The Office of
Tribal Justice serves as the primary channel of communication
for Native Americans with the Department of Justice, and
helps coordinate a broad range of Native American issues with
all other federal entities. Some of the issues that come to the
Office of Tribal Justice include: religious freedom, protection of
sacred sites, environmental enforcement in Indian country,
gaming issues, taxation of Indian tribes, tribal justice systems,
law enforcement, Public Law 280 policy, and international
indigenous rights. The Office of Tribal Justice maintains a website at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/.
The Code of Federal Regulations is updated annually while

Federal Register keeps up-to-date with proposed and newly
adopted administrative rules and regulations. The formerly
daunting work of administrative-law research has been mercifully transformed by the United States Government Printing
Office’s GOP Access website (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
index.html) providing instant keyword access to rules and regulations in the CFR and Federal Register.
The federal administration of Indian affairs has been delegated to the Department of the Interior since 1849. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) is a major division within the
Department. Twelve BIA area offices across the country administer its local and tribal units. The statutory authority for the
BIA is established in the first sections of Title 25 of the United
States Code; organizational information is found in Title 25 of
the Code of Federal Regulations and at the BIA website
(http://www.doi.gov/bia/).
A major responsibility of the BIA is to determine whether a
tribe will be legally recognized under federal law. “Recognition”
is a term of art describing federal acknowledgment of a government-to-government relationship between an Indian tribal
entity and the United States. Federal recognition is a watershed
legal determination affecting all manner of tribal rights, privileges, and obligations. Services delivered by the BIA and other
agencies, as well as immunity from certain state laws, are conditioned upon federal recognition.
The BIA historically made ad hoc and unexplained decisions
about the recognition of tribes. As an increased number of
Indian groups sought federal recognition and experienced long
waits, the shrouded BIA procedures drew criticism. Complaints
eventually led to the 1978 establishment of a formal administrative process for reviewing petitions from tribal groups. The
process was substantially revised in 1994 and today is handled
by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA). This office
operates with notice and public comment according to procedures published in the Code of Federal Regulations for establishing that an American Indian group exists as a tribe.23
The BIA has completely opened the process, and its website
has comprehensive information on the disposition of petitions
for acknowledgment. Researchers wanting to know if tribal
groups in their state have applied for acknowledgment will find
a list of pending petitions organized by state on the BIA website. The BIA is mandated to regularly publish a list of recognized tribes in the Federal Register. Because the list is officially
titled Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, its
retrieval by keyword on the GPO Access website is not instinctual. More convenient access is through a link on the BIA website.
Administrative handling of recognition by the BIA has long
created friction among states, Congress, Indian groups, and the
agency – a conflict made more combustible by the possibility
that newly recognized tribes will initiate gaming operations.
While largely a delegated administrative process, recognition
remains a congressional prerogative and recognition is occasionally achieved or restored through the passage of a bill spe-

22. Kappler, supra note 8.

23. 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2009).
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PRIMARY SOURCES: ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
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cific to a single Indian governmental entity. The testimony and
documents used in a determination of tribal status create a
valuable research record, delineating tribal history and the
course of dealings between a tribe and the federal government,
and collect in one place otherwise difficult-to-assemble information.
Historic research in administrative law relating to Indians
leads back to the Official Opinions of the United States Attorney
General.24 The frequent exercise of executive authority over
Indian affairs, particularly after 1871, heightens the value of
attorney general opinions advising the president and executive
agents in Indian-law matters. Attorney general opinions are
strongly persuasive, although they are not binding on executive officers or the courts. Taxation, leasing, reservation
boundaries, trust matters, and general land questions have all
been frequent subjects for attorney general opinions on Indian
affairs. Attorney general opinions for the nineteenth century
are more easily accessed than contemporary ones.
The solicitor is the chief legal officer of the Department of
the Interior. Within the Solicitor’s Office there is a Division of
Indian Affairs. When requested by the secretary or another
officer of the Department, the solicitor renders opinions on
Indian matters. These opinions are not binding on courts, but
are often accorded great weight. More frequently, these opinions are the last word on a subject because few are appealed or
litigated. In the field of Indian law, Solicitor opinions have
interpreted statutes, determined the status of Indian lands,
defined tribal powers, and analyzed many other important
issues. Most early Solicitor opinions were inaccessible to the
researcher until the 1979 publication of Opinions of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian
Affairs, 1917-1974.25
New appeals boards were created in 1970 to consolidate the
quasi-judicial functions of the Department of the Interior. Two
boards were to deal exclusively with Indian matters. A third,
the Interior Board of Land Appeals, eventually took over some
Indian cases. The functions and published decisions of the
boards are important to researchers in the administrative law
area. All fall under the Office of Hearings and Appeals.
Appeals on decisions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and of
other Department of the Interior officials in matters of Indian
probate, lease agreements, grants and funding, and Indian entitlement under federal legislation are reported in the United
States Department of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals’
Decisions, beginning in 1970.
Appeals from decisions on land selection under the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act are published in volumes one
through seven of the United States Department of the Interior
Alaska Native Claims Appeals Board Decisions. After the
Alaska Native Claims Appeals Board was abolished in 1982,
cases arising under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
were transferred to the Interior Board of Land Appeals which

24. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE., OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: ADVISING THE PRESIDENT AND
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, IN RELATION TO THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES
(1873- ).
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A HIDDEN RESOURCE: INDIAN-CLAIMS REPORTS

Despite federal immunity, Indian tribes were occasionally
provided a mechanism for lodging a claim against the federal
government. Executive commissions, Congress, and federal
and special courts have all acted to hear disputes and determine remedies for tribal claims. However, in the decade after
the Court of Claims was created in 1855 to hear claims against
the federal government, Indian claims were specifically barred.
Consequently, claims by Indian tribes against the government
could not be brought in any forum. From time-to-time
Congress responded to petitions by passing jurisdictional acts
that allowed a specific tribal grievance to go before the Court
of Claims. Under this system, only 142 Indian-claims cases
were adjudicated in 90 years.
In 1946 Congress created the Indian Claims Commission
(ICC) as a temporary tribunal to hear every pre-1946 Indian
claim against the United States. Claims arising after August 13,
1946, were to be heard in the Court of Claims. The causes of
action could be based on legal, equitable, or even “moral”
grounds, including failure of the government to deal fairly and
honorably with Indians. Within the five-year period for filing
ICC claims, over 600 dockets were set (some cases were split
into multiple dockets). No personal claims of individual
Indians were accepted. Generally, claims related to compensation for land ceded to the federal government by treaty.
The ICC first made a determination on the claimant tribes’
title and the specific amount of land ceded. Next, the value of
the land at the time of transfer was determined. If past compensation to the tribe was found inadequate, a cash settlement
(without interest) was awarded. Finally, the commission considered General Accounting Office evidence of any federal gratuities granted a tribe or payments made to the tribe under

25. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR., OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, OPINIONS OF
THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO
INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974 (2 vols., 1979).
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treaty terms. All federal compensation to the tribe was offset against the award.
The
Indian
Claims
Commission was expected to
complete its work in ten years,
but its life was extended several times by Congress. The
ICC was finally dissolved on
September 30, 1978, at which
time it transferred about 100
pending cases to the Court of
Claims (now called the United
States Court of Federal Claims).
The decisions of the ICC are published in various formats,
but the most convenient access is the digitized 43 volumes and
index (incomplete) available online through Oklahoma State
University (http://digital.library.okstate.edu/ icc/index.html).
The hidden resource of the ICC is an exceptionally rich evidentiary record. There are transcripts of testimony and written
reports from anthropologists, archaeologists, economists,
forestry experts, geographers, geologists, historians, and linguists whose expertise helped commissioners determine the
extent of tribal land holdings and their value. This is a source
of tribal history, a record of the course of dealings between
tribes and the federal government, and a documented background of tribal land holdings within state borders.
Unfortunately, the records of the U.S. Indian Claims
Commission containing this evidence are hard to access, but
have been reproduced in microform26 and collected by major
libraries. Indexing is incomplete, but some help is found in
Index to the Expert Testimony Before the ICC: The Written
Reports.27
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RESEARCHING TRIBAL LAW

American Indian tribes are self-governing, autonomous
entities that may legislate, regulate, police, and adjudicate.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor described tribes as a “third sovereign,”28 standing with states and the federal government.
With more Indian tribes being recognized and with the reinvigoration of tribal governments and tribal courts, and with
the renewed economic power of some tribes, an increasing
number of citizens and lawyers are encountering the third
American sovereign. These interactions can be confusing
because there is little understanding that tribes are politically
acknowledged governmental units – with sovereign immunity
– not simply racial defined groups, and that tribal law is
unique to each Indian nation.
The primary sources of a tribe’s law can include the tribal
constitution, tribal code, miscellaneous laws, statutes, ordinances, and administrative regulations. Only a few tribes formally publish their tribal codes. If the tribal courts issue writ-

26. Expert Testimony Before the Indian Claims Commission [microform] (1973- ).
27. NORMAN A. ROSS, COMP. AND ED., INDEX TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE ICC: THE WRITTEN REPORTS (2001).
28. Sandra Day O’Oonnor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign, 33 TULSA
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ten opinions, they also constitute primary law for the tribe, but
some tribes adhere to orally transmitted, non-written, customary law. Primary sources affecting tribal law may also include
treaties with the United States government, agreements and
executive orders specific to the tribe, and federal laws applicable to the tribe.
In 1993, an estimated 170 tribes had a court system; today
more than 280 tribal courts are operational. The United States
Tribal Courts Directory29 provides tribal court contact information, listing administrators, judges, and whether or not opinions are published.
There are three types of tribal courts functioning in the
United States: (1) traditional courts, which are most prevalent
in the Southwest where pueblo cultures were somewhat insulated from the massive breakdown of tribal social and political
traditions in the second half of the nineteenth century; (2)
tribal courts or IRA courts, which are the predominate model
and are authorized by tribal constitutions and apply tribal law
(often established under the provisions of the Indian
Reorganization Act and as a replacement for Courts of Indian
Offenses); and (3) Courts of Indian Offenses (also called “CFR
courts” because their authority and operational rules are
specified by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Code of Federal
Regulations).
Researching tribal law requires persistence, but the online
Tribal Law Gateway at the National Indian Law Library
(http://www.narf.org/nill/) offers access to a large collection of
tribal codes and constitutions. This electronic gateway also
links to tribal law documents found elsewhere. Tribal court
opinions are selectively published in the Indian Law Reporter,30
but the best way to find tribal court decisions is online. Two
websites offering tribal court decisions are the National Tribal
Justice Resource Center (http://www.ntjrc.org/) and the Tribal
Law and Policy Institute (http://www.tribalinstitute.org/).
These websites have a great deal of other information and are
excellent starting points for research on tribal law and government, tribal courts, and tribal judges.
RESEARCHING TRIBAL-STATE INTERSECTIONS

Jurisdictional issues and controversies have long been a
center point of tribal-state-federal contact. This is an area
requiring the careful research suggested in the introduction: it
is innately complicated, and over the years, the rules have
drastically changed. There is also inconsistency from state-tostate. Reference to Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law and
Indian Law in a Nutshell will provide an informed backdrop for
further research specific to the state and tribal jurisdictional
question at issue. For a policy discussion of this issue, see
Building on Common Ground: A National Agenda to Reduce
Jurisdictional Disputes Between Tribal, State, and Federal Courts,
a report with recommendations sponsored by the State Justice
Institute, Conference of Chief Justices, the Native American

L.J. 1 (1997).
29. APRIL SCHWARTZ, UNITED STATES TRIBAL COURTS DIRECTORY (3d ed.
2008).
30. Published by the American Indian Lawyer Training Program
since 1974.

Tribal Courts Committee of the National Conference of Special
Court Judges of the American Bar Association, the National
American Indian Court Judges Association, and the National
Center for State Courts. This report is posted on the Tribal
Court Clearinghouse website (http://www.tribal-institute.org)
under the “State Law” tab.
The appropriate treatment of tribal court outputs poses
questions for states. While the full-faith-and-credit clause of
the United States Constitution requires every state to respect
and enforce the judgments of other states, there is no single
mandate to guide state courts in handling tribal court judgments and orders. With mixed results, federal legislation has
occasionally included a full-faith-and-credit provision, such as
the Violence Against Women Act31 requirement that tribes and
states respect each others’ protection orders. But as a general
matter, each state must adopt court rules on this point. Some
are looking to comity, the doctrine allowing enforcement of
foreign judgments in domestic courts, as a legal theory for the
enforcement of tribal judgments. Other states are less caught
up in the theoretical considerations, but find that controversy
impedes timely solutions. Minnesota worked on the issue for
years with a joint task force of tribal judges and state judges.
Wisconsin and South Dakota set a fairly high bar, but North
Dakota and Oklahoma were early adopters of a reciprocal
approach. The 1994 Oklahoma court rule is posted on the
Oklahoma State Courts Network at http://www.oscn.net.32
Minnesota legislators have access to Indians, Indian Tribes,
and State Government,33 a guidebook discussing major issues
between tribes and state government, including criminal and
civil jurisdiction, gaming, liquor regulation, taxation, human
services, and education. Loaded with maps and statistics, this
remarkable document was written by legislative analysts in the
Research Department of the Minnesota House of
Representatives and can serve as a model for any state seeking
to make informed policy decisions.

Some innovative work on a broad spectrum of other tribalstate issues results from the teamwork of the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the National
Congress of American Indians. Their State-Tribal Relations
Project is addressing several specific, substantive issues
between states and tribes. Both organizations claim a commitment to education and practical problem solving. The project
maintains a list of all the state committees and commissions on
Indian affairs (http://www.tribal-institute.org).
An excellent website for tapping into state-tribal reports and
shared information is that of the previously cited Tribal Court
Clearinghouse. Under the “State Law” tab there are pages of
“Tribal-State Relations” information with excellent links.
Researchers can access state gaming compacts, tax agreements,
and the increasingly important law-enforcement agreements
(more than 200 tribes now have a police force). This page also
links to policy papers and a host of other resources and organizations. Unlike just a decade ago, Internet research on best
practices for almost any aspect of the state-tribal law is likely
to be profitable and informative.

31. 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2000).
32. Rules of District Courts, Title 12, Chapter 2, Appendix B, Rules
for District Courts in Oklahoma, Rule 30—Standard for
Recognition of Judicial Proceedings in Tribal Faith and Credit.

33. HOUSE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND STATE
GOVERNMENT
(4th
ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/ hrd/pubs/indiangb.pdf (last
visited July 15, 2009).
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Assumptions Regarding Indians
and Judicial Humility:
Thoughts from a Property-Law Lens
Ezra Rosser

T

nothing of the case’s denial of Indian sovereign territorial
rights, has been rightly criticized by scholars. Just as the
Oliphant assumption that non-Indians would be harmed by
Indian courts is problematic, so too are assumptions regarding
how Indian land holdings impact neighboring non-Indians
and off-reservation communities.

wo Indians refuse to move until their complaints are
heard. Stoically they stand. Waiting. Eventually a staffer
promises them a meeting. This image of stoic and mostly
silent Indians formed a mini-drama on the TV-show The West
Wing. The treatment of Indian issues on HBO’s The Sopranos
was similarly curt: sitting out on the curb, mobsters complain
that Indians are getting stuff – from gambling – without having to work for it like Italian-Americans have had to. This
anger culminates in an attack on Indians protesting Columbus
Day. Largely missing from both stories are Indian voices;
instead, Indians are understood only as they relate to nonIndians. The same holds true for how the U.S. Supreme Court
understands Indians, or doesn’t understand them.
Awareness and understanding – real or assumed – of Indian
legal issues varies considerably by location. Non-Indians in
Arizona or New Mexico living near an Indian reservation have
a distinct set of experiences from, say, Connecticut residents
reading about the rise of Foxwoods Casino. And judges or justices living in large metropolises such as Washington, D.C.
may have to go far out of their way to learn a little bit about
the continent’s original inhabitants.1 Unfortunately, an assumption that Indians harm non-Indians can be found throughout
the relatively recent Indian-law jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The recent decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York2 attests to the power of this assumption of harm.
Briefly, Sherrill involved a tribe that, after buying up land within
its original reservation boundary, claimed the right not to pay
taxes on this property because through such purchases the tribe
had unified fee and aboriginal title. The Supreme Court disagreed and under an (un-briefed) laches theory ruled that too
much time had passed since the land had passed out of Oneida
hands for the tribe to assert such sovereignty. A secondary basis
for the decision was the idea that were the Oneida to be successful in reasserting sovereignty it would be disruptive and
harm the expectations of non-Indians in the area.
Indian-law academics have focused their ire on Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 which rejected tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Oliphant assumption that nonIndians would not be treated justly by tribal courts, to say

It comes as quite a shock for my first-year law students to
learn that they have to read an Indian-law case for their first
day of property law. Yet Johnson v. M’Intosh4 is the first case in
the two leading property-law textbooks – Krier et al. and
Singer.5 The second case, the first case for those for whom lawschool memories are more removed, is the tale of a dispute
between two fox hunters: Pierson v. Post.6 There are some professors who skip Johnson v. M’Intosh, either because it is too
complicated or they do not want to bother with the Doctrine
of Discovery or the fact of conquest. But in general only the
most conservative members of the faculty do not teach both
cases; since my primary field is Indian law, I follow the textbook order and the cases work well together.
My first year teaching, I walked up to the podium and
within 20 seconds asked one student, “What are the facts in
Johnson v. M’Intosh?” His startled reaction before getting to the
case: “Wow, that was fast.” This was the first type of push-back
I got from students reading about Indian rights to land, but by
no means the last. During a break the second time I taught
Johnson v. M’Intosh, a student came down to the podium quite
perturbed and declared that I “shouldn’t use the word Indian.”
I assured her that it was alright. Students at my school are
either too comfortable with the case – they enjoy finding the
racist language in the opinion and denounce students who
approach the case in a detached way – or they feel that they
have little they can contribute and seem to long for the impersonal esoteric rules of civil procedure from their first semester.
Johnson v. M’Intosh is a largely invented case. According to
the opinion it is a dispute between one party who acquired title
to land from an Indian tribe and another party whose title
traced back to a non-Indian sovereign. Chief Justice John
Marshall writes that because of the Doctrine of Discovery, a

Footnotes
1. Justices Breyer and O’Connor toured the Navajo Nation in 2001 and
while there praised the restorative aspects of the Navajo judicial
system. See Jim Maniaci, Judges Laud Navajo System: Peacemaker
Court Called Impressive, GALLUP INDEPENDENT, July 20, 2001.
2. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).

3. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
4. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5. JAMES E. KRIER ET AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (4th ed.
2006).
6. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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racist doctrine under which European nations were said to
acquire sovereign authority over land they “discovered” without regard to the Indian tribes already living on the land, and
the fact of conquest, the party with Indian title must lose out
in such a dispute. But as Eric Kades proved, in fact there was
no real dispute – the land claims of the two parties never in fact
overlapped! The Court did not trouble itself with the minor
problem of a looking at whether there in fact was a real dispute, instead the case was decided and helped pave the way for
an efficient transfer of land from Indians to non-Indians.7
What students usually fail to pick up on is that Indian title
survived the ethnocentrism of Johnson v. M’Intosh.8 The party
who bought land directly from an Indian tribe rather than
acquiring it from the U.S. Government does have recourse,
albeit not recourse before a U.S. court, according to Chief Justice
Marshall: “The person who purchases lands from the Indians,
within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their
protection, and subject to their laws.”9 The Court acknowledged
Indians as “the rightful occupants of the soil” while at the same
time arguing that Indian “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished.”10
The second case involves a fox, two hunters, and hounds.
Lodowick Post and his hounds are chasing a fox (“poor reynard” as the fox is called in the dissent) when “Jesse Pierson
jumps out of nowhere and grabs the fox.”11 The question
before the court was whether through his pursuit alone Post
acquired a right to the fox sufficient to “sustain an action
against Pierson for killing and taking” the fox.12 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Tompkins, was that Post had no
right to the fox. For support, Tompkins looked to the writings
of, in his own language, various “ancient writers.”13 Post’s
claim was doomed because he had not “deprived the fox of his
natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control,”14
as Tompkins held was required by the sources he surveyed.
Tompkins concludes with a policy argument: that the rule
adopted will help preserve “peace and order in society” by limiting “quarrels and litigation.”15
But Justice Livingston’s dissent is a powerful one. He argues
that rather than relying upon the majority’s ancient writers, the
dispute “should have been submitted to the arbitration of
sportsmen.”16 Livingston calls into question the utility of hunting codes written “many hundred years ago,” and argues for
the right to “establish” a new rule given the time that has
passed.17 From an ancient writer, Livingston finds a distinction

between “large dogs and
Indian contact with
hounds” and mere “beagles,” a
non-Indians, or
distinction that beagle owners
may object to and which vice versa, invites
obscures the more powerful assumptions from
parts of the argument. Reading
both sides.
the dissent provides its share of
entertainment – the fox is
referred to as “poor reynard” whose memory “has not been
spared” – but Livingston’s main point is that a new rule might
be more efficient and better encourage the hunting of foxes.
Most students come to property law without much interest
in either the rights of Indians to land or fox hunting, and by
such metrics perhaps material on gated communities would be
a better place to start. But students soon begin to raise questions: Should the racism in Johnson v. M’Intosh be forgiven as a
product of its time? Did Marshall really believe in the assumptions underlying the Doctrine of Discovery or was he sufficiently apologetic about using the Doctrine? Perhaps because
the challenges of the decision are readily apparent to even those
encountering the case for the first time, it makes for a great way
to start Property law. But I have found that many students only
truly start questioning Johnson v. M’Intosh after they have read
Pierson v. Post. Livingston’s primary contribution to propertylaw courses is not that he distinguishes between hounds and
beagles, it is that he forces students to question judicial assumptions. Chief Justice Marshall’s voice in Johnson v. M’Intosh is just
too authoritative, but the back-and-forth of Pierson v. Post
brings out the need to think critically about the often unstated
assumptions and the descriptions of the world found in judicial
opinions.

7. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and
the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065
(2000).
8. Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. has been the leading scholar on
the nature and historical development of the eurocentricism of
federal Indian law. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSE OF CONQUEST
(1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219.
9. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593 (1823).
10. Id. at 574.

11. Bethany Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of
Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1091 (2006).
12. Pierson v. Post, 3 CAI. R. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 178.
15. Id. at 179.
16. Id. at 180 (J. Livingston dissenting).
17. Id. at 181 (J. Livingston dissenting).
18. NEW MEXICO ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FARMINGTON REPORT: A CONFLICT OF CULTURES 1
(July 1975), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/35/64/c0.pdf.

CROSSING BOUNDARIES

Indian contact with non-Indians, or vice versa, invites
assumptions from both sides. Indians may assume that nonIndians are after their land or resources (perhaps a fair assumption) and non-Indians may assume that all Indians are casino
Indians or are alcoholic (frequent but unfair assumptions). The
places where contact is most frequent and perhaps most troublesome are often border towns, cities located just off-reservation whose consumer base includes a sizable number of reservation Indians.
In 1974, the bodies of three “beaten, tortured, and burned”
Navajo men were found in the canyon country near
Farmington, New Mexico.18 Three Anglo teenagers were
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charged with the murders.19
Sparked by the murders, the
New Mexico Advisory
Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights
held hearings in Farmington
and ultimately released its
report in July 1975. “It was
perhaps inevitable,” the Farmington Report notes, “that someday the presence of conflicting races, cultures, and value systems would lead to violence and confrontation.”20
By the 30th anniversary of the first report, when the advisory committee returned to check on how things had changed
in three decades, “it found significant progress in race relations
between Navajos and whites in Farmington.”21 And yet a year
after the second Farmington Report was released, three Anglo
teenagers picked up a 47-year-old Navajo hitchhiker and on
the outskirts of “the Selma, Ala., of the Southwest,” kicked,
punched, and beat him with a stick while using “racial slurs as
they pummeled him.”22 Things may have progressed since
1974, but there is still a ways to go in Farmington and in many
other border towns, from Gallup, New Mexico, to the City of
Sherrill, New York.
Recently, much has been asked of non-Indians living within
the original reservation boundary of the Oneida Indian Nation.
The success of Turning Stone Resort and Casino allowed the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York to buy up land within their
original reservation, and non-Indians were asked to respect the
right of the tribe to claim treaty-protected territory. When the
land claims of the Oneida threatened non-Indians, nonIndians balked. Without going into the details – the tribe faced
a bomb threat and repeated use of racially charged language –
it is safe to say that non-Indians suddenly realized and reacted
against the idea that an Indian nation could have an impact on
their lives or their property values.23
What should courts do when faced with a conflict involving
Indian and non-Indian contact? The last time that the U.S.
Supreme Court squarely took this on was in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes,24 a case involving the power of a tribe to
exercise zoning authority over its original reservation.
According to a plurality, the tribe could zone the “closed” portions of the reservation – areas with few non-Indians – but the
“open areas” of the reservation were a different story. Because
the tribe “no longer possesses the power to determine the basic
character” of an area that had become predominantly nonIndian in both ownership and population, the tribe could not
exercise its zoning regulatory power over the open area.25 The
decision only seems like a split decision until you realize that

by treaty the United States supposedly had guaranteed the tribe
“exclusive use and benefit” of the reservation.26 There is nothing new about the problem of line drawing, but one might have
hoped that the Court would have been more protective of
promises memorialized in treaties that purport to respect reservation boundaries.
Ex Ante it is hard to list all the possible disputes between
Indian and non-Indian neighbors or community members that
may end up before a court. Disputes have erupted over
whether non-Indian corporations should develop natural areas
that have religious or spiritual significance to area Indian
tribes. Similarly, whether stores on Indian land should be able
to sell gasoline or cigarettes without charging customers the
same taxes found off-reservation has been a hotly contested
issue. But the disputes can be more mundane: What powers
should state police officers have in checkerboard areas – areas
with alternating reservation and fee lands – within reservation
boundaries? What limits are there on the rights of a nonIndian bank to discriminate against Indian borrowers and what
courts get to hear such cases?
To illustrate the challenges even in a garden-variety dispute
involving two neighbors, one Indian, one non-Indian, I am
going to use a nuisance hypothetical. Suppose that the NonIndian, Bob Johnson, is your fairly typical white suburbanite.
He drives an oversized SUV, has a house surrounded by a sixfoot-tall privacy fence, and owns a full-bred yellow lab. The
city he lives in prohibits junk cars from being kept on the
lawns of residents and also has a noise ordinance for residential areas. Fortunately, Bob’s yellow lab cannot jump the privacy fence and therefore does not need to be kept chained up,
which keeps him happy and ensures he does not bark very
much. Moreover, Bob’s house has a three-car garage that
houses his SUV, an old junker, and his motorcycle, so he has
never been in violation of the city’s prohibition on visible junk
cars. Just beyond Bob Johnson’s fence is a section of tribal trust
land, on which Margarita Yellowhair has a single-wide trailer,
three dogs, a horse, and seven chickens. Margarita also owns
three dilapidated Ford F-150s. At any one time she can only
seem to keep one truck running and she tends to use the others – parked or on blocks in her front yard – as a source of
needed parts. Initially she let her dogs roam free, but after a
neighbor’s dog got pregnant from one of her dogs, she decided
to keep them on chains. Having once been free, her dogs bark
constantly in protest of the new arrangement.
Readers familiar with reservation life may rightly question
the above depiction of Bob and Margarita. The wealthy nonIndian, Bob, and less wealthy Indian, Margarita, are problematically stereotypical. Of course, if the hypothetical was based

19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 15.
21. NEW MEXICO ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FARMINGTON REPORT: CIVIL RIGHTS FOR NATIVE
AMERICANS 30 YEARS LATER 52 (Nov 2005), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/122705_FarmingtonReport.pdf.
22. Evelyn Nieves, “In Navajo Country, Racism Rides Again,”
SALON.COM, Sep. 2, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2006/09/02/navajo/.

23. For a more complete account of non-Indian reactions, see Ezra
Rosser, Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? The Property
Consequences of Indians, 87 ORE. L. REV. 175, 198-209 (2008).
24. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
25. Id. at 446.
26. Treaty of the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians, Mar.
8, 1959, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
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on a casino tribe with high per capita payments in a poor community, the identities could be flipped. But it remains the case
that overall Indians on reservations are of a notably lower
socioeconomic class compared to the United States average.
Therefore, given the truth behind the stereotypes, perhaps
most apparent in border towns, I hope I will be forgiven for
relying upon stereotypes in the hypothetical.
But who is harming who? Property scholars developed the
infamous “box of four” out of one of the most influential lawreview articles of all time – Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed’s Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral27 – in part to answer this question.
Figure 1 is the box of four as it is often presented for nuisance
cases (Calabresi and Melamed rely heavily upon nuisance
examples):

According to this framework, Rule 1 means that the
Resident gets the initial entitlement (say to be free from pollution) and sets the price that he or she is willing to sell the entitlement to the Polluter. Rule 2 means the Resident gets the initial entitlement but the state, or a court, sets the price at which
the Resident must sell the entitlement (often called a damage
award). For Rule 3 and Rule 4, the Polluter gets the initial entitlement (say to pollute), and in Rule 3 the Polluter sets the
price and in Rule 4 the state sets the price.
Many non-lawyers, or those new to the law (such as students), instinctively equate “Resident” with “Good Actor” and
“Polluter” with “Bad Actor.” Some of the cases reinforce this
mental shortcut: A sympathetic homeowner is subjected to
smoke from a factory or to excessive noise from an apartment
building’s industrial strength air-conditioning unit. From the
perspective of the Resident, they are being harmed by the way
that the Polluter is using his or her land; however, from the
perspective of the Polluter, they are being harmed by the way
Resident is using his or her land. The Resident cannot use his
or her property as desired, say to peacefully look up upon the
night sky because of the Polluter’s use and similarly the
Polluter cannot freely pollute because of the competing desires
of the Resident. One way property law deals with this simultaneous benefit and harm is by limiting Resident claims when
the Polluter employs a large number of people in the community or when the Resident “comes to the nuisance.”

The first challenge when
Property scholars
thinking about the conflictdeveloped the
ing land-use decisions of
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question.
When the city’s zoning rules
are included it seems almost
self-evident that Margarita is the “Bad Actor.” Such a judgment
arguably reflects middle-class values, and perhaps non-Indian
ones as well, more than a meaningful distinction between Bob
and Margarita’s actions. If Bob and Margarita live in an open
area where most people do not wall off their homes, then Bob’s
privacy fence could well be viewed as an eyesore breaking up
the view Margarita can enjoy. And in poorer communities or in
areas where most lots are spaced far apart, broken down cars
may be viewed as normal rather than something that a neighbor could be upset about. Even expectations about the noise
from barking dogs can reflect class-based biases. Bob and
Margarita are, therefore, both the Resident and the Polluter.
One way to solve the question of who is being harmed
would be to apply the “coming to the nuisance” idea. In a dispute involving Indian and non-Indian land-use decisions, nonIndians, including Bob, arguably “came to the nuisance,” in
that Indians were the initial occupiers of the continent. This
solution has the advantage that it is simple – Indians are always
right – but it is not reflective of values all but the most strident
Indian advocate would have. Even if the dispossession of
Indians was accomplished through manifest destiny – arguably
genocidal – policies, often with the imprimatur of legality, the
“newcomers” surely have obtained rights with time.28 So we
must be careful not to take the “coming to the nuisance” argument too far.
One way to appropriately limit its power would be to take
seriously reservation boundaries. The expectations of nonIndians who live inside original reservation boundaries – the
boundaries that are memorialized through treaty or executive
orders, not the boundaries post-allotment – should not be the
same as they might be if they lived off-reservation. To put it
back in terms of Bob and Margarita’s land-use conflicts: If Bob’s
land is located within the boundaries of a reservation, then he
should not expect Margarita to hide her cars and Margarita
should have a greater right regarding her unobstructed view.
The challenge is what to do when the boundary between Bob
and Margarita is also the reservation boundary. I submit that in
such a case both parties should have little recourse regarding
their neighbor’s choices.
The law tolerates all sorts of boundaries, even arbitrary or
inefficient ones. The town of Crater Lake, Iowa, is a great case

27. 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
28. See also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 611 (2006)

(noting that in Sherrill “the Supreme Court appears to have given
whole-hearted support for what I have called the “reliance interest in property””).

FIGURE 1: CALABRESI & MELAMED BOX OF FOUR
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in point. As the New York
Times reported, Crater Lake
is a little “nub” of land that
into
Omaha,
juts
Nebraska.29 The Missouri
River made an oxbow curve
around Crater Lake, making
the land connect with Iowa;
that is until 1877 when the
river changed course, cutting off the oxbow and leaving Crater
Lake, Iowa, stranded in Nebraska!30 In a more familiar example, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Village of
Euclid, Ohio’s authority to limit industrial expansion using its
zoning authority even though Euclid was fast becoming a suburb of Cleveland.31 Though the Court left open the future possibility that “general public interest” might at some point “far
outweigh the interest of the municipality” in determining
municipal development through zoning, the Court upheld
Euclid’s “authority to govern itself as it sees fit.”32
Indian nations should also have the ability to govern reservations as they see fit, but there will be challenges. The U.S.
Supreme Court has limited tribal authority over non-Indians in
several important respects: first by curtailing criminal jurisdiction and more recently by limiting tribal authority in the civil
context. But it is important that assumptions regarding the
nature of tribal governance or the nature of Indian land not
form the basis for further limitations on tribal sovereignty.
Non-Indians may believe any number of things about how
Indian sovereignty or the reservation status of nearby land
harms them, but it is important to distinguish between nonIndian assumptions and demonstrated harm.
In the tribal court context, many non-Indians assume that
non-Indians cannot get a fair hearing before a tribal court. This
assumption, shared by many non-Indian judges, can form the
basis for denying tribes’ jurisdiction over non-Indians that
tribes would have if jurisdiction was determined, as it is in the
state context, by geographic boundaries. As with most assumptions, it has an intuitive basis: non-Indians might be nervous
for example that an Indian jury might not be a jury of their
peers or they might fear that Indians might have justifiable
prejudice against non-Indians. Yet, as Professor Bethany
Berger’s research shows, the treatment of non-Indians who
appear before Navajo Nation courts is “remarkably balanced,”
both in terms of their win-loss ratios and in qualitative terms.33
While the assumption may seem reasonable at first blush, there
is no proof that it is accurate.
Another assumption non-Indians may make is that it is
“bad” to live next to an Indian reservation or have Indian

neighbors. The research I am currently working on explores
one aspect of this assumption, using tax data from upstate
New York to test if non-Indian property values are negatively
affected by proximity to Indian land. The research was
inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court’s unexplored assumption
of harm to non-Indians in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York.34 The challenges exploring this harm
reveal the assumptive nature of the Court’s claimed harm to
non-Indians. Lawyers are generally not comfortable with
Geographical Information Systems programming or with statistical data analysis, so to do the exploration, I had to find coauthors with such expertise. Even having assembled people
with the expertise needed, the answer to whether non-Indians
are harmed has not jumped out of the analysis; therefore, our
work continues. These challenges suggest two important
things: (1) the assumption of harm may well not be accurate,
at least as it relates to non-Indian property values, and (2) the
Court did not adequately investigate its assumption of harm
before the assumption was used as a reason to limit tribal
sovereignty.
There is much that can be said in defense of the Court’s
assumption of harm, but it is important to notice that it is in
fact an assumption. The same can be said of Justice Tompkins’s
majority opinion in Pierson v. Post – there may in fact be good
reasons that pursuit alone should not give a hunter a right to
the fox, but assumptions relied upon should be acknowledged.
Doing so may inspire a little judicial humility.

29. William Robbins, “Standing by a Capricious Neighbor,” N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at 18.
30. Id.
31. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. Id. at 389-90. Fifty years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court
famously overrode a municipality’s exclusionary zoning outside of
Camden and Philadelphia in support of the general public interest in affordable housing. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P.
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975).

33. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1047
(2006).
34. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
35. Perez v. Sharp, 32 CAL. 2D 711 (1948); Loving v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For commentary on these cases and
antimiscegenation laws, see RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL
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HUMILITY AND COURTS

Humility is required when courts are asked to weigh in on
disputes between Indians and non-Indians. Why humility?
Because decisions should not be based upon stereotypes of
Indians or assumptions, based on limited experiences or anecdotal evidence, regarding how Indians affect non-Indians. The
good news is that state courts and lower federal courts could
play a leading role in this. The U.S. Supreme Court has been
fairly unconcerned with learning what life on a reservation is
like, or even with mastering the precedent applicable to
Indian-law cases. State court, and to some degree lower federal
court, judges, especially judges in states with larger Indian
populations, have the ability to help set a new course for
Indian/non-Indian relations, one that rejects the American
legacy of colonialism rather than embraces it.
State courts have in the past recognized the right thing to do
well before the U.S. Supreme Court. The California Supreme
Court invalidated a state antimiscegenation law in 1948, nineteen years before the United States Supreme Court caught up
in Loving v. Virginia.35 And as noted in its recent unanimous

decision on gay marriage, the Iowa Supreme Court struck
blows against slavery and segregation “long before” the United
States Supreme Court.36 Beating the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize a right might seem anything but an example of humility, but in cases involving Indian tribes, the right thing to do is
the recognition of existing rights rather than the creation of
new rights. Any time that a non-Indian court considers an
Indian/non-Indian dispute, the resulting opinion has the
potential to limit the authority of sovereigns whose societies
pre-date the War of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.
The decisions of the Rehnquist Court, and now the Roberts
Court, with few exceptions have taken away the sovereignty of
tribes when such sovereignty impacts non-Indians. State
courts need not dogmatically follow this trend. Humility – here
I mean recognition that sovereign nations, even nations
located entirely within the United States, should not have their
powers stripped lightly – regarding the role the judiciary
should play when courts hear disputes involving the powers of
tribal nations, would seem to require affording greater respect
to tribal sovereignty and greater deference to tribal decisions
on how to govern reservations.
If you surveyed Indian-law professors about where the U.S.
Supreme Court has made the biggest mistake or caused the
most problems in the field, I suspect that the leading contender would be Oliphant, though more radical scholars might
highlight Johnson v. M’Intosh. But I am particularly troubled
and disheartened by the mistaken assumptions and arrogance
of Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley.37 In a unanimous decision
the Court invalidated the Navajo Nation’s 8% hotel-occupancy
tax after the tax was challenged by Atkinson Trading
Company, the owners of Cameron Trading Post. The Court
held that the tax did not fit within either of the Montana
exceptions. In Montana v. United States,38 the Court limited
civil authority of tribes over nonmembers as a general matter,
but provided two exceptions. The first is that tribes can regulate “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members.”39 The second exception is that tribes “may exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare
of the tribe.”40 The Atkinson Court quickly rejected application of either exception, holding that Cameron Trading Post
had not met the consent test – for if there was in this case “the
exception would swallow the rule” – nor did it have a large
enough direct effect.41
Looking out from the chambers of the Supreme Court this
might make sense – how important can a hotel or trading post
really be after all? But from the Navajo Nation, and perhaps
from anywhere in rural parts of the southwest, it is out of

touch with the reality of life
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such
areas.
In
in
Indians and nonWashington, D.C., there may
be countless hotels and other
Indians will not
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that such
and social life of tribal memdisagreements
bers. Moreover, as the Court
not become cause
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web of relationships and
interdependencies; to allow the trading-post owners to pretend
that they should not have to contribute to area governance that
they benefit from makes the two exceptions virtually meaningless.42 The Atkinson decision is based on the assumption that a
hotel or trading post means the same in northern Arizona, on
the Navajo Nation, as it does in wealthier, more densely populated, non-Indian parts of the country. The Court could have
been more humble before it stripped the Navajo Nation of one
of the central government powers, taxation; it could have
required more of Atkinson Trading Company than simply
showing that Cameron Trading Post was located on fee land.
The U.S. executive branch attorneys, while not using the language of humility, joined the tribe in urging the Court to appreciate the unique role that traders play on reservations and leave
in place the Navajo Nation’s power to impose this tax.43 The
Court balked.
Like all neighbors, Indians and non-Indians will not always
get along; yet it is important that such disagreements not
become cause for destroying tribal sovereignty. The parties
involved mean that many cases will end up in the federal court
system, but not all will reach the Supreme Court, and some will
be heard by state court judges. At a recent and rare public
appearance, Justice Thomas stated:
I’m very very reluctant to, to have a strong opinion on
something without having briefs or opinions to read and
think through. It slows you down because, you know
this job is easy for people who’ve never done it. [laughter, clapping] And what I have found in this job is that
they know more about it than I do, especially if they have
the title “law professor.”44

36. Varnum v. Brien, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31, at 24, available at
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38. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
39. Id. at 565.
40. Id. at 566.
41. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655-57 (2001).

42. The reverse of the justices’ fears is true: the rule has swallowed the
exceptions!
43. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656 (2001).
44. Justice Clarence Thomas, “Keynote Address,” Bill of Rights
Institute’s Being an American Awards Gala, Mar. 31, 2009, transcript available at http://www.beinganamerican.org/files/
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Justice Thomas’s stated reluctance to have a strong opinion
about a controversy without having first read and thought
about it is a step in the right direction. Hopefully, judges closer
to reservation life will be able to add a local understanding and
a skepticism regarding what is “known” about Indian tribes and
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reservations to this reluctant stance. Professor Jeffrey Rosen
writes, “Humility, ultimately, is a character trait as well as a
judicial disposition. It describes the spirit, as Judge Hand put
it, ‘which is not too sure that it is right.’”45 As a term “judicial
humility” seems loaded, a rhetorical tool of (conservative)
court commentators to decry activist judges. I do not mean to
employ “judicial humility” in that way. Rather, judicial humility as it relates to disputes involving Indian tribes counsels for
caution regarding what is “known” about Indian nations.
Cursory treatment of Indian issues in shows like The West
Wing and The Sopranos should not be mirrored by equally shallow judicial assumptions regarding how Indians affect neighboring non-Indians.
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From Conflict to Cooperation:
State and Tribal Court Relations in the Era of Self-Determination
Aliza G. Organick and Tonya Kowalski

he Indigenous nations1 of the United States have long been
subject to federal policy. Since the Civil Rights Era, that
federal policy purportedly has been to encourage selfdetermination and tribal sovereignty. One of the hallmarks of
self-determination is the development of Tribal legal systems,
which have been actively encouraged and funded by the federal
government. As a result, Tribes have been exercising their jurisdiction in ways that were not contemplated decades ago. As
Tribes have expressed their sovereignty through their court systems, it is not surprising that states sometimes feel that their
own jurisdiction is threatened. This conflict creates a need for
increased understanding, communication, and cooperation
between Tribal and state governments. The extent to which
Tribal-state cooperation succeeds or fails depends in large part
upon their ability to understand each other’s philosophical,
legal, and historical realities. Cultural barriers to communication can, if left unattended, prevent meaningful cooperation
from taking place. Historical myths and prejudices about the
First Peoples of the United States threaten to keep Indigenous
communities impoverished and marginalized. These myths
stem from first contact, and form the root of modern, antiTribal policies, legislation, and court decisions.2 If we agree that
Tribal-state relationships should evolve, we must first accept
that the historical animosity and distrust are the products of a
powerful legacy of colonization, genocide, and oppression.
Furthermore, Tribal-state tensions result from a clash of
political philosophies and differing worldviews. From the EuroAmerican standpoint, the concept of national statehood
evolved from the philosophy of natural law, as well as from the
pragmatic desire to centralize power and encourage long-distance trade.3 Modern states are also typically characterized by
large, somewhat diverse populations.4 In contrast, from the
Indigenous standpoint, sovereignty is “interwoven with the
social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic aspects of the communities they serve.”5 Historically speaking, Indigenous

T

nations tended to form around kinship ties or other community-based relationships. They also tended to have “decentralized political structures often linked in confederations, and
have enjoyed shared or overlapping spheres of territorial control.”6 These differences can make it difficult for Westerners to
comprehend Indigenous sovereignty.7 Nevertheless, even by the
colonizers’ definition, Indigenous peoples of the emerging
United States were sovereign entities, and governments
engaged with them on an international basis.8 There is ample
evidence that early, pre-colonial settlers, the British Crown, and
the fledgling American government dealt with Indigenous
nations as coequal sovereigns, recognizing that North American
lands were already occupied by Indigenous nations.9
As with any topic involving Indigenous peoples, Tribal-state
cooperative arrangements must be viewed within their historical context. History shows that the hundreds of early treaty
relationships between Indigenous nations and colonial governments recognized the potential for cooperative arrangements in
establishing trade, building alliances, and defining territory.10
These relationships remained the status quo while the balance
of power between Indigenous peoples and colonists remained
relatively balanced. However, as the United States grew in
wealth, military might, and population, that balance of power
changed.11 The colonies—and eventually the states—coveted
Indigenous territory for settlement and expansion. Before long,
it became evident that the Crown could not control its subjects
in their hunger for Indigenous lands and for gold.12 The United
States Supreme Court made a decisive move that set the tone for
Tribal-state relations for centuries to come. In the landmark
case Worcester v. Georgia,13 the State of Georgia attempted to
extend its laws and jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation. The
Supreme Court “unequivocally rejected any role for states . . .
in favor of an exclusive federal-tribal relationship.”14 The Court
premised its holding on inherent Tribal sovereignty vis à vis the
hostile, encroaching state, but, as a matter of policy, clearly also
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wished to reserve to the government profitable trade relationships. This political sovereignty was qualified by the Court’s
decision one year earlier, declaring the Tribes to be “domestic
dependent nations,” a unique brand of internal sovereign that
was neither a state nor a foreign country.15
In the era immediately following these early decisions from
the Marshall Court, the federal government became the exclusive entity to enter into formal relations with Indigenous nations
in the United States. However, this exclusivity created points of
conflict that continue to this day. Additionally, federal policy—
both judicial and legislative—has consistently eroded Tribal sovereignty, creating a paradox in Tribal-federal-state relations:
Tribes have inherent sovereignty, however limited, and yet are
continually undermined by federal initiatives to erode, assimilate, and ultimately terminate them.16 Federal erosion of
Indigenous sovereignty leaves the Tribes vulnerable to state
encroachment, furthering the process of sovereign destruction.
This cultural and historical context also frames the issue of
cooperation between Tribal and state court systems. One of the
most profound expressions of a sovereign’s power to manage
the affairs of its people is the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Historically, Tribes have always had dispute-resolution
mechanisms that expressed the cultural values of each Tribe.17
In 1934, the federal government encouraged Tribes to create
their own court systems under the Indian Reorganization Act,
but pressured them to adopt largely Anglo-American models of
jurisprudence.18 In the past few decades, Tribal courts have
experienced explosive growth, hearing complex cases and
responding to federal pressure to maintain many aspects of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, while also “crafting a unique
jurisprudence of vision and cultural integrity.”19 There are currently over 560 federally recognized Tribes and over 250 Tribal
courts in the United States.20 As Tribal courts have grown in
number, ever more practitioners find themselves practicing in
Tribal jurisdictions on a wide variety of civil, criminal, and family matters.21 Typically, as a result of the IRA, Tribal courts have
largely Western-style legal systems, often including written
Tribal constitutions and codes, appellate courts, rules of civil
and criminal procedure, and even rules for appearance pro hac
vice. In addition to the vertical, Western form of justice familiar
to state and federal practitioners, Tribes also have rich sources
of internal common law, as well as holistic dispute resolution

bodies—both traditional and contemporary—such as
Peacemaker circles22 and Healing-to-Wellness courts.23
Just like other aspects of sovereignty, Tribal courts and their
jurisdiction have suffered from erosion by Congress and by
state and federal judicial decisions. Underlying these decisions
is the myth that Tribal courts somehow lack transparency or
even competence, especially when dealing with non-Indian
entities. This myth is reflected in the erosion of criminal jurisdiction for “major crimes” and for crimes involving non-Indian
defendants. One of the most famous examples comes from the
aftermath of Ex parte Crow Dog,24 in which the Supreme Court
reversed the North Dakota territorial courts’ negation of a Tribal
decision to resolve a homicide through a traditional form of
restitution25 rather than by capital punishment, thereby recognizing the Tribes’ right to express their sovereignty through
criminal jurisdiction. The cultural norms reflected by this more
holistic, community-centered solution were simply beyond the
ken of the non-Indigenous, territorial courts that reviewed the
decision. In fact, the Supreme Court’s holding in Crow Dog
prompted Congress to divest the Tribes of much of their felony
jurisdiction. The Major Crimes Act26 extended federal jurisdiction over an extensive list of felonies occurring in Indian country. Even today, this lack of cultural awareness and understanding continues, ironically articulated as a lack of transparency or
competence on the part of the Tribal courts.27
In this era of political, judicial, and economic growth for our
First Peoples, there is the potential for either increased conflict
or increased cooperation. Fortunately, in at least a handful of
states, Tribes and states are increasingly looking for opportunities to cooperate, and the last two decades have seen the development of a number of programs. In the legislative arena, the
National Conference of State Legislatures and the National
Congress of American Indians have joined forces to study and
promote cooperative agreements based on mutuality and
trust.28 In the judicial arena, one promising result of recent
cooperative movements has been the Civil Jurisdiction in
Indian Country Project.29 A number of Tribal-state court
forums have also begun around the country, developed largely
under an initiative by the National Center for State Courts and
Conference of Chief Justices.30 State courts and Tribal courts are
most likely to resolve jurisdictional differences and protect the
integrity of their Native communities when they establish

15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
16. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 24 (1997).
17. Christine Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 18 (1997).
18. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts: Providers of Justice and
Protectors of Sovereignty, 79 JUDICATURE 110, 112 (1995).
19. Id.
20. Pat Sekaquaptewa, Tribal Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
18 BUS. L. TODAY 23, 23-24 (2008).
21. Cf. Gabriel S. Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law, 64 OR. ST. B.
BULL. 62, 62 (Nov. 2003).
22. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 17, at 19.
23. See generally Tribal Law & Policy Institute, Tribal Healing to
Wellness Courts, http://www.tribal-institute.org/LISTS/drug_
court.htm (last accessed June 5, 2009).
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26. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 24, 30-31 (2008).
28. E.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES & NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT:
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29. Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal
Jurisdictional Dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154, 155 (1995).
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72 MICH. B. J. 420, 421 (1993).
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agreements recognizing comity and full faith and credit for
Tribal court judgments; possibly share resources like jails, court
personnel, and probation officers; jointly develop legislation
that contemplates cooperation on Indian child-welfare, taxation, and criminal-law enforcement; and promote awareness of
Tribal affairs by the state bench and bar.31 One fruitful path for
opening these intergovernmental and intercultural discussions
is the listening conference. In one example, the New York
Federal-State-Tribal Courts Forum, in conjunction with several
other organizations, “convened state and federal judges and
court officials in sessions with tribal judges, chiefs, clan mothers, peacemakers, and other representatives from the justice
systems of New York’s Indian Nations and Tribes, to exchange
information and learn about [their] respective concepts of justice.”32
Another way in which state courts can support Tribal courts
is by developing jurisdictional agreements to adopt a form of
Indian abstention doctrine. Although the federal Indian-abstention doctrine may be eroded by the holding in Nevada v. Hicks,33
the Supreme Court has encouraged federal courts to abstain
from exercising concurrent jurisdiction in Indian country over
suits involving “reservation affairs.”34 The Indian-abstention
doctrine is similar to various abstention principles between
state and federal courts.35 Arguably, state courts that have concurrent jurisdiction with Tribal courts, such as Public Law 280
jurisdiction, should exercise their discretion to abstain from
matters pertaining to Tribal lands or affairs and should mindfully employ choice of law principles to defer to Tribal court
jurisdiction where Tribal law applies.36 For example, in 2005,
the Wisconsin courts and Wisconsin-based Tribes held a conference on jurisdiction, in which they developed a thirteen-factor protocol for determining the proper forum in cases with
concurrent jurisdiction.37
This discussion has focused primarily on the state courts’
role in cooperating with Tribal communities. But Tribal-state
cooperation can also reduce conflict in legislative and executive
matters, such as taxation, gaming, natural resources, social services, policing, and so on.38 While it is generally accepted that
better relationships will emerge from increasing intergovernmental collaboration, there are also major, legitimate concerns.
The devolution of many federal-Tribal programs to state, Tribal,
and local governments creates pressure for Tribes to enter into
state compacts and contracts, and sometimes even mandates
joint programs.39 By abdicating its role, the federal government
is forcing Tribes to negotiate matters that should be reserved to
the Tribal-federal trust relationship.40
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B. J. 10, 11 (2006).
33. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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In this era of “forced federalism,” it is critical for the courts,
as well as state and local governments, to understand that the
issue at stake for Tribes is nothing less than their sovereignty.41
Cultivating healthy Tribal-state relationships requires conscious, mindful efforts to engage in cross-cultural communication based on “mutual understanding and respect.” 42
Jurisdictional agreements and other cooperative arrangements
that support Tribal sovereignty flow back to the states in the
form of increased economic activity and social well-being.
Therefore, when the opportunity arises for courts to engage in
problem-solving across Tribal-state lines, it benefits both sovereigns, and most importantly, their people.
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Resource Page: Focus on Indian Law
Editor’s Note: Professor Nancy Carol
Carter has provided an excellent review of
sources for research on Indian Law (see p.
32). This Resource Page separately identifies some resources that we have surveyed
that appear useful. Judges wanting a comprehensive overview of potential sources
about Indian law should review the Carter
article in addition to this Resource Page.

A
BOOKS

ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF,
A M E R I C A N I N D I A N L AW : C A S E S A N D
C OMMENTARY. Thomson/West, 2008
($141). 901 pp.
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW IN A NUTSHELL. Thomson Reuters,
2009 ($33). 529 pp.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW (NELL JESSUP NEWTON, ED.). Lexis
Nexis, 2005 (with 2009 Supp.) ($189).
1,413 pp. plus 153-pp. Supp.
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS
TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU
GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS. New
York Univ. Press, 2004 ($20). 380 pp.
AND

These four books are among the best
for providing coverage of American
Indian law. We will briefly describe each
one before comparing their potential usefulness to judges.
The first one listed—we’ll call it the
Anderson casebook for convenience since
he’s the first-listed author—is the most
recent law-school casebook in the field,
published in 2008. All four of the authors
are law professors who also serve either as
editors or authors for Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law. (We note too that one
of the authors, Philip Frickey, is a member
of the Court Review Editorial Board.) The
book is thorough and well written; it
includes both source materials (excerpts
of key statutes, cases, and even legislative
history) as well as treatise-like coverage of
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the caselaw in many areas of focus, like the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
The Anderson casebook begins with
three chapters explaining the scope of
Indian law and reviewing the various
approaches to Indian policy that have
been used in United States history. Later,
at least one chapter is devoted to each of
these topics: criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country; tribal sovereignty; jurisdictional struggles between states and
tribes; tribal jurisdiction over non-members; tribal jurisdiction over natural
resources, hunting, and fishing; water
rights; and the religion and culture of
American Indians. Other chapters look
at the rights of natives in Alaska and
Hawaii, as well as the rights of indigenous people in other countries, including
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
For those who may be interested in
the disputes that drive scholarly work in
the area of American Indian law, there is
a useful, six-page overview of those
debates at the end of the book. The
authors describe foundationalist scholars
who attempt to reconnect Indian law to
its precedential and constitutional roots,
critical scholars who point to racism as a
factor in the decisions made, pragmatists
who note imperfections but also point to
guiding principles even in cases that
today may seem flawed by racism, and
skeptics who question whether there are
truly distinctive Indian law principles
that should guide cases rather than more
general principles applicable to all types
of disputes. Caselaw is often shaped,
subtly or directly, by the themes at play in
scholarly work. This section of the book
provides a good survey of the current academic literature, with citations to key
articles from each group of scholars.
Canby’s book is part of West’s Nutshell
series, which consists of about 150 books
summarizing key concepts related to various law-school courses. But Canby’s
book is famous within Nutshell circles as
the first—and probably only—Nutshell
to have received published book review.
Now in its fifth edition, Canby’s book still
provides a good introduction to all of the
key concepts of American Indian law.
His first two chapters cover what is an

Indian tribe, who is an Indian, and the
historical development of federal Indian
law. He then reviews tribal governance
and sovereignty, the relationship between
tribes and the United States government,
civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country, Indian gaming, taxation and regulation in Indian country, water rights,
individual rights of Indians, and rights
related to water, hunting, and fishing.
Canby includes one chapter related just
to Alaska natives.
As would be expected from a Nutshell,
Canby provides an overview in each of
these areas, not an exhaustive survey of
cases. You can be confident, though, that
any United States Supreme Court cases
relevant in an area will be covered, and
Canby notes key cases from federal and
state caselaw as well.
Canby is a senior judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. He formerly was a law professor
at Arizona State University.
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law is the only true treatise in this area.
It has an interesting history, and the present edition is a first-rate scholarly work.
It also has regular updates (including one
published this year), and you should be
able to find it in most law-school or state
law libraries.
The book was first published by Felix
Cohen in 1941, and it brought together
what had been seen as a relatively unconnected set of materials. Cohen’s Handbook
is credited with creating federal Indian
law as a separate area of study and specialty. Cohen died in 1953, and the treatise was later revised by the U.S.
Department of the Interior. While Cohen
had stressed tribal self-government, the
federal government’s revision stressed the
plenary power of the federal government.
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 mandated another
update of Cohen’s
Handbook, and a board of editors and
authors produced a new edition in 1982
that was more faithful to Cohen’s views.
The present edition is the work of more
than three dozen Indian law scholars, led
by a team of scholar-editors and a chief
editor, Nell Jessup Newton, now the dean
at the Notre Dame Law School.

Cohen’s Handbook provides fairly thorough treatment of all areas of Indian law.
The book includes coverage related to
natives of Alaska and Hawaii, as well as
specific discussion regarding tribes in
Oklahoma and the Pueblo Indians. A
particularly useful feature early in the
book is a chapter detailing a number of
principles of interpretation that are specific to Indian law, including a number of
canons of statutory construction that
have been laid down, mainly by the
United States Supreme Court, for Indian
law matters. The Anderson casebook
also provides a detailed discussion of
these canons, but the discussion in
Cohen’s Handbook is especially good,
including as it does a supplement that
keeps the material up-to-date. Cohen’s
Handbook also includes coverage of federal laws of general applicability that may
affect Indian law cases as well.
Pevar’s book is intended for a lay audience, and it’s written in a question-andanswer format. All of these books answer
the question, who is an Indian? Pevar
methodically sets out all of his book in
questions like that, and he then provides
straightforward answers. The book is not
updated as often as the others we’ve listed
here; its first edition was in 1983 and this
third edition was published in 2004. But
it too provides a very good overview of all
of the major areas of Indian law: historical development; civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country; hunting, fishing, and water rights; taxation; civil
rights; gaming; and the Indian Child
Welfare Act.
Pevar is an attorney for the American
Civil Liberties Union. He has taught at
the University of Denver School of Law.
For a quick check of the comparative
usefulness of these four books for statecourt judges, we looked at their treatment of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), which is of concern to any judge
handling a matter related to custody or
adoption of a child who might be eligible
for membership in a recognized Indian
tribe. Between Pevar and Canby, Pevar
provides more thorough coverage of this
topic, with a straightforward, 30-page
chapter. But Canby has a good overview
too.
We looked at coverage of a
subtopic—the “existing Indian family
doctrine,” under which some state courts
have held that ICWA doesn’t apply when
the Indian parents haven’t maintained a

significant relationship with the tribe.
Both Pevar and Canby covered this issue.
Once again Pevar had a bit more detail on
it, but Canby’s discussion, though brief,
was a good summary of the caselaw
development. And he cited to a leading
and recent case in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had reversed its initial
acceptance of the doctrine. See In re Baby
Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004).
Reviewing that one case and checking for
later cases citing it would quickly give
any judge or reader a good overview of
the issue and a way to find the most relevant cases on this topic.
The Anderson casebook and Cohen’s
Handbook had even more extensive treatment of ICWA. Judges will generally find
Cohen’s Handbook of more help since it’s a
treatise with regular updates, while the
casebook format leaves some questions
unanswered—questions designed for
class discussion, though often of significance. But both books provided an excellent discussion of the existing Indian
family doctrine, with ample case citations. Both books had a complete presentation of cases on that doctrine, identifying seven states that followed the doctrine and 13 that had rejected it as of the
books’ publication dates. One of the
seven states both books identify as following the doctrine has recently reversed
course. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543
(Kan. 2009). Presumably the Cohen
Handbook, which is the most regularly
updated, will be the first to note that.
If you have an interest in this area of
law, any of these books can provide you
with a good overview of the key cases,
statutes, and issues. You might be able to
find the Pevar book in a local public
library; Cohen’s Handbook can be found in
most law-school libraries.

d
LAW-SCHOOL LIBRARY
RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

Berkeley Law (Univ. of Cal. – Berkeley)
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/dyna
mic/guide.php?id=49
Law-school libraries have reference
librarians whose mission is to make it
easier for all of us to find what we need.
Reference librarian Dean C. Rowan at

Berkeley Law has prepared an excellent
guide to source materials on American
Indian law. He includes a much longer
list of books than we have, and he
includes a description of each book. He
also provides a review of web-based
sources, even including blogs. We could
have included a of several other research
guides prepared by librarians—there are
useful ones from the Cornell University
libraries, the University of Connecticut
School of Law Library, and others. But
Rowan’s guide is a good one.

o
WEBSITES OF INTEREST

University of Oklahoma College of Law
http://www.law.ou.edu/native/index.shtml
The University of Oklahoma College
of Law publishes the American Indian
Law Review, now in its 33rd year, and the
law school’s website has an excellent collection of American Indian law materials.
This includes the Native American
Constitution and Law Digitization
Project, where you can find codes and
constitutions of many tribes. The website also provides links to home pages of
many tribes, and a comprehensive set of
links to legal resources.
Native American Rights Fund
www.narf.org/icwa/index.htm
The link we’ve provided takes you to
the Native American Rights Fund’s online
publication, A Practical Guide to the
Indian Child Welfare Act. The online
guide works through a series of frequently asked questions (with answers,
of course) and a series of flow charts
about when and how ICWA may apply to
a given case. The full, 367-page written
guidebook (including appendices) may
be downloaded free from the website.
National Tribal Justice
Resource Center
http://www.ntjrc.org/triballaw/
This resource center put together by
the National American Indian Court
Judges Association provides links to
codes and constitutions of tribes, a directory of tribal courts, and searchable opinions from participating tribal courts.
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The Resource Page
c
JOURNALS OF NOTE

Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice
Symposium on
Evidence-Based Sentencing
http://www.chapman.edu/images/userIm
ages/dfinley/Page_12412/CCJ_Spring_
2009_a.pdf
Thirty years ago, published research
concluded that an expert’s chance of predicting recidivism was no more accurate
than flipping a coin would be, and there
was little in the way of valuable research
on risk factors generally for criminal
behavior or effective means of rehabilitation. Much has changed, and the
Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice has
devoted its inaugural issue to an excellent discussion of the research now available and its implications for more effective criminal sentencing.
The full, 282-page journal is available
online, and we think that any criminal
judge interested in more effective sentencing practices would find this issue of
real interest. Indeed, in an introductory
essay, Chapman law professor Richard
Redding argues that a judge’s “failure to
apply known best practices constitutes
sentencing malpractice and professional
incompetence.” We will leave that debate
to another time, but we encourage judges
to read this issue.
Here’s a quick rundown of the symposium articles:
• Professor Redding provides an
overview of the issue with a comprehensive overview of the existing literature on evidence-based sentencing.
In nine quick pages, he gives you a
thorough introduction to the use of
risk and needs assessments in sentencing. He also provides reference to key
articles and studies.
• A prosecutor, San Diego district
attorney (and former judge) Bonnie
Dumanis, and a former defense attorney, University of Illinois law professor Margareth Etienne, provide the
perspective of advocates. Dumanis
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argues for an individualized approach
to sentencing to more effectively
reduce recidivism. She also provides
an overview of San Diego’s prisoner
reentry program for non-violent
felony offenders. Etienne raises due
process and fairness issues, asking
whether evidence-based sentencing
actually “amounts to a form of statistical profiling.” She concludes that evidence-based sentencing will benefit
many defendants.
• Villanova University law professor Steven Chanenson, a former federal prosecutor and current member of
the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission, describes the evidence-based
program used for substance-abusing
offenders in Pennsylvania. He lays
out the risks and benefits that prosecutors may face in using evidencebased sentencing practices.
• Oregon state judge Michael
Marcus, who has previously written
about sentencing issues in Court
Review [Winter 2004 at 16], has long
been an advocate of evidence-based
sentencing. See www.smartsentencing.com (Judge Marcus’s website on
the subject). In this article, he pulls
together his key arguments and the
supporting evidence, emphasizing that
evidence-based sentencing promotes
accountability for all of those involved
in the sentencing process to assess the
impact of sentencing decisions on
public safety. He also provides a discussion of the interrelationship of evidence-based sentencing with the traditionally recognized objectives of sentencing: deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and retribution.
• Drexel University psychology
professor Kirk Heilbrun, a leading
scholar in best practices in forensic
mental-health assessment, provides
an in-depth overview of risk assessment in the criminal-justice system.
He describes advances made in the
research over the past two decades,
focusing on actuarial assessments and
structured professional judgments,
which he suggests based on research
can each provide fairly accurate

results as risk-assessment tools. He
then discusses how these tools may be
used in sentencing, with special
emphasis on drug courts and mentalhealth courts.
• Simon Fraser University psychology professor Stephen Hart, one of the
developers of the Risk for Sexual
Violence Protocol, provides a detailed
look at evidence-based risk assessments for sexual violence. He concludes that appropriate sentences cannot be given without good, evidencebased risk assessments. But, like
Professor Etienne, he also cautions
that although a given risk-assessment
tool may be generally characterized as
evidence-based, “the risk assessment
of a given offender is not.” He urges
judges, attorneys, and probation officers to become knowledgeable about
risk and needs assessments.
• Dr. Douglas Marlowe, a lawyer
and clinical psychologist, reviews the
use of evidence-based sentencing
practices in drug courts. He serves as
the science and policy chief for the
National Association of Drug Court
Professionals. Dr. Marlowe suggests
different treatment of offenders based
on an assessment of each offender’s
needs and risks; he gives specific recommendations for high-risk, highneeds; high-risk, low-needs; low-risk,
high-needs; and low-risk, low-needs
offenders.
• Mark Bergstrom, executive director of the Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing, outlines what state
sentencing commissions can do to
implement evidence-based sentencing
practices. His discussion includes
very practical questions like how to
obtain good statewide data that can be
used to support evidence-based sentencing.

e
FOCUS ON INDIAN LAW

Court Review surveys resources on
Indian law at page 54.

